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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
 Healthcare, it can be argued, is a commodity that has a social constitution.  The reason may 
be because healthcare is seen to have its foundation in socio-economic principles but has evolved 
through scientific study and business application into a profitable business.  The delivery of 
healthcare in South Africa and in many parts of the world has come under immense scrutiny from 
policy-makers, high-volume purchasers, patient-consumers and the healthcare community.  
Arguments criticizing the high cost of healthcare delivery range from levelling the blame on one 
component (pharmaceuticals, medical fees, inadequate medical scheme cover to name a few 
examples) to a condemnation of the entire healthcare delivery system.  The healthcare cost 
deliberation has also shifted to the centre stage in many public-policy debates and certainly caught 
the imagination of the public and journalists alike.  It is an emotional debate. A review of related 
literature of the past fifty years (such as the Sainsbury Report (1967), the Kefauver Hearings (1963) 
and the Snyman Report (1962)), reveals that healthcare and the cost of healthcare delivery are some 
of the most frequently debated areas amongst the citizens and policy makers of both the developed 
and developing world.   
 
Pharmaceutical prices, more often than not, have been cast as the primary reason that the 
delivery cost of healthcare is so high.  The methods used by pharmaceutical companies to promote 
their products – elaborate conventions, colourful brochures and generous amounts of free samples 
(certainly in previous years) to physicians may have contributed to this perception. Furthermore, the 
fact that the absolute cost of manufacturing a single capsule or tablet (including drugs that are no 
longer under patent) is a small fraction of the actual selling price also tends to raise the public ire.   
 
A greater understanding of pricing structures is necessary to appreciate this sector.  The 
writer’s own experience in the area of healthcare that involves insurance for medical risks (medical 
schemes - the private healthcare funding system) suggests that it is crucial that pharmaceutical 
pricing structures be understood against this backdrop.  Therefore the main reasons for undertaking 
this study are: 
i. to appreciate the pricing structures of pharmaceuticals to inform policy debates; 
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ii. the current empirical evidence1 in the South African market has indicated that 
pharmaceuticals are unfairly priced and has prompted the Department of Health to 
introduce price regulations2.  One goal of the research is to ascertain whether this is 
accurate; and 
iii. to obtain a broader knowledge base of the issue of pharmaceutical pricing practices in 
the South African healthcare market. 
It was with this approach that the area of pharmaceutical pricing and the topic was decided upon. 
 
1.2 Research Topic 
 This writer’s study has its foundation in institutional economics, primarily focussing on the 
role of medical schemes in the South African context.  Thereafter an exploration of transaction 
costs was undertaken.  The understanding of transaction costs involves the broader understanding 
of the market exchange mechanism.  In particular and for example, it was issues that had been 
expanded upon by the economist Ronald Coase in his paper ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1938) that 
eventually led to establishing the foundations of transaction costs – that issue was the centralised 
system of governance in the Soviet Union.  Simply stated Coase, on his first journey to the United 
States (in the 1930’s), interviewed the heads of the major corporate enterprises.  He wondered 
whether the many specialised businesses in the United States were more efficient than the large 
centralised structures in the former Soviet Union.  The basic question that Coase ruminated upon 
was why the companies in the United States didn’t grow larger than they already were.  It would 
appear to be perfectly logical if a company can vertically integrate its operations, then it would be 
more efficient because it would not have to trade on the market for upstream and downstream 
resources.  This quandary is partially addressed by the transaction cost approach since the 
transaction cost of using a hierarchy eventually exceeds the transaction cost of using a market. It 
can be shown that the larger the firm grows above a certain threshold level, the larger the burden of 
transaction costs tends to be.  The hierarchical structure would eventually become so cumbersome 
as to generate diminishing marginal returns to profits.   
 
                                                
1 The Treatment Action Campaign’s and other AIDS treatment advocates declared a victory for activists, 
people with HIV/AIDS and poor people everywhere as pharmaceutical companies unconditionally withdrew 
from the lawsuit against the South African government's Medicines and Related Substances Act, Act 90 of 
1997. This occurred when the 38 pharmaceutical companies who originally sued the Minister of Health and 
the government, dropped their case on April 19th, 2001. 
2 Act 90 was changed to introduce price controls and exit prices on the selling price and the dispensing fee for 
medicines. Changes to the Act 90 of 1997 and its subsequent incorporation into Act 101 of 1965, resulted in 
the Amended Act 101 of 2004.  
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The writer has an understanding of the issues that impact the insurance industry such as 
moral hazard.  The ideas explored by Milgrom and Roberts (1992) include bounded rationality, 
motivation and signalling together with the theory of the ‘economic man’3 (Simon, 1957, p.165) 
and deepened the appreciation of the aspects that make up economic thought.  The simple analysis 
of classical economics forms the basis of a maturing of thought and the development of new 
concepts and ideas.  
 
The African National Congress’s (ANC) White Paper for the Transformation of the Health 
System in South Africa (Notice 667 of 1997 in the South African Government Gazette No. 17910) 
commonly referred to as the ‘White Paper’, also appealed to the writer’s subject on how healthcare 
issues facing the country could be addressed.  The White Paper is a broad-based policy document 
that has immersed healthcare policy direction on its current path.  The writer contends that although 
this policy resonates with noble intentions, it does tend to ignore some important basic economic 
tenets.  The primary argument is that it has not reflected thoroughly on the funding of and the 
operational hurdles associated with the implementation of its proposals.  An example would be the 
proposal for a National Health Insurance Plan, the implementation of which is unlikely if it cannot 
be supported by the tax base.  A second example would be the provision of drugs to treat local 
common diseases – the fiscal burden of providing drugs, particularly in a climate where some 
multi-national drug companies are balking at reducing prices for essential drugs, citing that their 
patent rights would be compromised4.  The writer wishes to focus more closely on the issues of 
patent rights in terms property rights.  
 
Ronald Coase’s later article “The Problem of Social Cost” (1960) broached the issue of 
property rights in a manner that included the concept of welfare gains.  It was this exploration by 
Coase that nurtured the idea of trying to investigate how pricing structures in the healthcare sector 
could be made more efficient so as to increase welfare gains in the long-run.  Furthermore 
                                                
3 In his groundbreaking works, Herbert Simon developed the concepts of the ‘economic man’ and the ‘social 
man’ with static and dynamic characteristics respectively.  Furthermore the latter group are adaptive and the 
former are maximising.  These concepts formed part of his foundation for later theories.  
4 Drugs are protected by patents. The argument is that the drug company invests heavily in research and 
development (R&D)in order to produce more effective drugs and if they cannot recoup their sunk investment, 
there would be no initiative to undertake such R&D 
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Anderlini and Felli (2001) looked at the robustness of the Coasian solution in light of ex ante5 costs.  
Their ideas play an important role in highlighting what changes would be feasible.  
1.3 Research Problem and Hypothesis 
1.3.1 Goals and Objectives of the Study 
The objective of the study is to inform the reader about the significant relationships that 
occur in the healthcare sector and in particular, show how these relationships impact onto the 
pricing structure of pharmaceuticals.  Healthcare is a complex area that tends to bring out strong 
emotive arguments regarding policy decisions. Furthermore, South Africa is in the throes of 
healthcare reform as outlined in the White Paper and the nature of the relationships between the 
various stakeholders, including patients, is changing. 
 
The goal of the study here is to understand whether a Coasian solution could exist in the 
current healthcare paradigm.  A Coasian solution is the realisation of the Coase Theorem which 
addresses the issue of inefficiencies.  The Coase Theorem guarantees that when property rights (for 
example, patent protection) are allocated through a negotiation where the agents involved in this 
negotiation are fully informed and rational then the outcome of this negotiation would be efficient 
because the agents involved would ensure that there are no unexploited gains from trade.  Coase 
expounded on property rights and in the pharmaceutical industry, property rights can be defined to 
include patent rights.   
 
1.3.2 The Research Problem 
The main hypothesis is whether or not a Coasian solution can exist in the current healthcare 
paradigm, given that there is a substantial change in the healthcare arena and more changes are 
expected in the future.  A number of questions relating to this hypothesis can be raised and include:  
i. how efficient is the nature of the relationships between the stakeholders in the 
healthcare industry?; 
ii. what aspects of the industry can change in order to create greater levels of efficiency?  
How can these changes be made?; 
iii. what lessons can be learned from healthcare systems that are regarded as more 
efficient?  How can alternate healthcare systems inform the issues at hand?; 
iv. are there any efficient pricing structures that can be utilised?; and 
                                                
5 Ex ante costs are costs that are incurred prior to a negotiation and are directed toward maximising the future 
outcome of the negotiation.  Ex post costs are costs that occur after the negotiation in order secure that the 
intended result does happen.  
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v. ultimately, could an efficient relationship can exist between the supply and usage 
(demand) for medicines?  
1.4 Research Design and Methodology 
The next four chapters will provide the theoretical background leading up to the empirical 
chapter, Chapter 6, which was planned as a pharmacoeconomic study, taking data from drug trials 
and then conducting a cost-effectiveness study.  Early attempts to obtain data from pharmaceutical 
companies proved fruitless, notwithstanding several months of trying and several promises of data 
from various quarters.  The situation was alleviated to a degree with the use of international clinical 
trial data.  Clinical trial data can be applied to different population groups for many diseases 
because sample groups from different countries would reflect similar results.  The use of this data is 
prudent because treatment protocols are targeted at patients who already suffer from the disease 
being addressed.  The writer then decided it would be prudent to survey a number of 
pharmacoeconomic studies that had already been conducted and analyse the results in terms of what 
could be used in the South African setting.  Once a study was identified, the costs were recalculated 
to reflect local prices and a cost-effectiveness study was undertaken.  
 
The simple pharmacoeconomic analysis of Chapter 6 is then used to challenge the notion 
that current prescribing practice is efficient for one particular drug.  A basic scientific and 
mathematical technique of proving the correctness of a theorem states that if the one can show the 
exception to the rule, then the rule is not foolproof.  Similarly, the same logic can be used in an 
economic manner in order to ascertain whether an efficient relationship can exist between the 
supply and usage (demand) for medicines.  The null hypothesis asserts that in a negotiation where 
property rights are assigned, an efficient solution can be reached if the agents involved in the 
negotiation are rational and fully informed.  An efficient solution will ultimately lead to higher 
welfare gains in a process of redistribution of wealth through growth.  
1.5 Outline of Dissertation 
Chapter 1 has outlined the flow of the chapters that will be followed in the study.  The flow 
of the study developed from a theoretical basis to empirical analysis. 
 
Chapter 2 introduces the basic concepts of transaction costs and the Coasian solution to 
economic problems. It explores a number of microeconomic concepts including the economics of 
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institutions, hold-up costs, motivation and moral hazard.  Furthermore it looks at issues pertaining 
to the firm in terms of the Coase theorem and transaction costs. 
 
Chapter 3 looks at the advantages of using Ramsey price structures in the current healthcare 
paradigm.  Furthermore the recommendations from the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) trade 
related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS) agreement regarding patent rights are also 
illustrated for use in dealing with the patent and licensing aspects of pharmaceutical manufacture. 
This chapter also sets the basis of the discussion in Chapter 5. 
 
Chapter 4 concentrates on the history of pharmaceutical price investigations, particularly 
those that had an indirect yet profound effect on the pricing of drugs. Notably, the Kefauver-Harris 
Amendments in the USA (1963), the Sainsbury Report in the UK (1967), the Snyman (1962) and 
Steenkamp (1978) Reports in South Africa.  The study also considers experiences from Australia 
and Canada since these countries have produced far reaching and exhaustive research that overlaps 
with the scope of this study.  The Ontario Provincial Government in Canada for instance has been 
using pharmacoeconomic analyses as part of its decision making process from the early 1990’s and 
is widely regarded as a world leader in this area. The experiences from these countries could hold 
invaluable lessons for South Africa.  
 
Chapter 5 explores specifically the constraints that drug manufacturers face in the pricing 
of their products in South Africa, and in particular from a regulatory and competitive framework.  
Issues such as competition laws, reference pricing and free market pricing are investigated.  
 
Chapter 6 investigates the cost-effectiveness of a particular therapeutic class of drug called 
statins.  Statins are a class of drug that is primarily used to treat problems associated with high 
cholesterol.  This exercise is specific to South Africa.  The significance is that high cholesterol 
leads to coronary problems which are recognised as the world’s leading lifestyle disease.  The two 
top selling drugs in the world, Lipitor and Zocor, are both classified as statins (Med Ad News, May 
2005).  
 
Chapter 7 makes broad observations regarding regulations, competition and price with the 
objective of comparing competition and regulation in setting prices and the specific 
recommendations thereof.  It also cites studies that have demonstrated the impact of regulation on 
the pharmaceutical industry.  
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Chapter 8 draws conclusions from the study and makes recommendations on the above-
mentioned hypothesis.  It draws attention to the fact that the least costly option in the short-run may 
not be the best direction for the long-run and relies on the results of the empirical study done in 
chapter 6.  Furthermore, it uses the experiences from other countries to identify efficiency goals in 
the current healthcare system (with particular reference to pharmaceuticals).  In order to achieve 
greater efficient in the healthcare system it recommends greater use of Ramsey pricing structures 
and limiting the use of uniform pricing in South Africa.   
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CHAPTER 2 
The Microeconomics of Price Policy in the Pharmaceutical Industry 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
Any assessment of price policy requires an examination of microeconomic principles, 
especially those governing price and costs, and in particular, transaction costs. In Chapter 2, the 
writer seeks to discuss the microeconomics of price policy by examining three major areas of 
academic interest, namely: issues surrounding the firm; transaction costs and the Coase theorem; 
and issues associated with motivation and bounded rationality. The first two areas of interest 
identified relate to microeconomic theory.  
 
2.2 Transaction Cost Economics and a Coasian World 
Transaction costs can be defined as the spectrum of institutional costs, including, inter alia, 
information costs, the cost of drawing up and policing contracts, analysing, implementing, 
specifying property rights and negotiation costs. Williamson (1979, p. 239), who has written 
extensively on the topic, defines three dimensions of a transaction: uncertainty, transaction-specific 
investment, and frequency of exchange.  It was Coase’s argument in 1960 that economic efficiency6 
can be attained as long as property rights are fully allocated and that any transaction-cost inhibiting 
trade is not too high (emphasis added).  Key to understanding Coase’s analysis is the definition of 
ex ante costs, or expected costs before the transaction takes place.  The work of Anderlini and Felli 
(2004) explore this aspect of transaction costs. More importantly, they go further by exploring 
second-order transactions which are contingent on the first-order transaction and the degree which 
ex ante transaction costs in the second-order transaction may lead to failures of the Coase Theorem.  
In particular, they look at the ‘hold-up problem’ or the post-contractual opportunism that appears 
when participants involved in a Coasian negotiation are accountable for the ex ante costs necessary 
for the negotiation to take place.  An exploration of the ideas of Williamson (1979, 1998) and 
Coase (1937, 1960) including the reservation raised by Anderlini and Felli (2004) is the basis of the 
first section of Chapter 2. 
                                                
6 There are a number of ways to define economic efficiency. For the purpose of Coase’s argument, the writer 
is referring to Pareto efficiency which is a situation where, in the allocation of available resources, no further 
Pareto improvements can be made. A situation is considered efficient if no person can be made better off 
without another person being made worse off.  Pareto improvement is a situation where a change that makes 
at least one individual better off, without making any other individual worse off ( a win-same situation).  
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The field of transaction cost economics has a broad spectrum. Williamson identifies 
transaction cost economics as a ‘product of two recent and complementary fields of economic 
research’ (1998) and goes on to explain that the first is new institutional economics and the second 
one is what Moe (1984; 1990) called the new economics of organisation (emphasis added).  Both 
research areas focus on expanding the theory of the firm as a production function contrary to the 
firm being regarded as a governance structure. In turn, new institutional economics comprises two 
components: the first deals with the so-called ‘rules of the game’, which primarily relates to an 
analysis of the institutional environment.  The second deals with the various institutions of 
governance as addressed by Williamson (1998).  The origins of both streams of thought can be 
found in the work of Coase: in The Nature of the Firm (Coase, 1937) and notably in The Problem of 
Social Cost (1960).  
 
One of the more important contributions of transaction cost economic theory is that it has 
attempted to examine the inner workings and structures of a firm, something that tended to be 
glossed over by the prior and even classical economic assumptions of a firm. Williamson expounds 
on Coase’s idea that vertical integration within a firm is limited because of the inhibiting effects of 
transaction costs.  Williamson, in developing his ideas, observes a market economist’s view that 
firms are profit maximizing and cost minimization entities which is, by implication, an equilibrium 
theory.  Furthermore, the theory assumes bounded rationality on the part of the stakeholders.  He 
extends Coase’s analyses to infer that there are both transaction and production costs, as is 
expounded upon in Figure 2.1 where Williamson creates a system of governance or infrastructure 
for commerce.  Transactions costs would then be the costs incurred, or rather the penalty for 
deviation from this system of governance.  In the broader economy, this system of governance 
represents an efficient market characterised by perfect competition and information that is available 
to all stakeholders.  If firms want to minimize their total costs, which made up of both production 
and transaction costs, then they need to take cognisance of the situations that might result in lower 
transaction costs in the market or the hierarchy.  
 
Williamson makes certain assumptions regarding his theory, and that is the existence of 
bounded rationality7 and opportunistic behaviour8 associated with the stakeholders.  These 
                                                
7 Bounded Rationality as defined by Milgrom and Roberts (1992) is the limitations on human mental abilities 
that prevent people from seeing all possible contingencies and calculating their optimal behaviour.  Bounded 
rationality may also include limitations on human language that prevent perfect communication of those 
things that are known. 
8 Opportunistic behaviour is self interest behaviour unconstrained by morality. 
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assumptions remain constant in the analyses in order to keep the system of governance constant in 
the advent of changing variables. 
 
2.3 The Value of Transaction Costs 
One consideration is that if the system of markets and prices is efficient, then why are there 
firms? What is their contribution to the economy? What is the mechanism that determines where 
transactions are concluded?  What is the cost of carrying out a transaction? Ronald Coase (1937) 
first raised these issues in The Nature of the Firm.  Transaction costs form part of the costs 
associated with running a market system. The divergent nature of firms and their products require 
solutions, which instigate transaction costs; Co-ordination and motivation costs are amongst the 
most obvious types.  Coase raised the issues that centred on transaction costs, both hierarchical and 
market-based, which lead to inefficient solutions.  
 
Co-ordination costs are the costs of creating the space for the buyer and seller to conclude 
their transactions (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992, p. 29).  An example of this is the Johannesburg 
Securities Exchange (JSE) and specifically the costs involved in setting up the infrastructure 
required to facilitate commerce. Other examples are the costs associated with advertising, research, 
communication, and losses resulting from unrealised transactions.  
 
According to Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p. 30), there are five types of transaction 
attributes that are central to the market analysis;  
i. asset specificity; 
ii. the frequency and duration of a transaction may foster low cost routines (where an 
infrequent transaction may require more time and effort and be more costly); 
iii. the uncertainty and complexity of the transaction that is contingent on the nature of 
the contract; 
iv. the difficulty of performance measurement of the transaction, particularly when the 
outcome is intangible (such as the services of a lawyer in a legal case); and  
v. connectedness to other transactions refers to the interdependency of transactions.  An 
example is software development where transactions of firms reflect design 
connectedness.  Designs need to be co-ordinated in order to reduce relative costs and 
compatibility is paramount.  
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Transaction cost analysis, like most methodologies, has its limitations.  Its basic principle is 
that economic activity is focused on value maximising trades which potentially could be diluted 
because of transaction costs.  Therefore minimising transaction costs is crucial for ensuring 
commercial success.  There are two main issues: Firstly, total costs do not only comprise 
transaction costs and production costs but include a number of other costs that are contingent on the 
organisation and the technology.  The conceptual split of production and transaction costs is easily 
addressed in theory, but proves extremely difficult in practice.  
 
Secondly, Coase postulated that all wealth-maximising trades occur if transaction costs are 
not too high and if property rights are well defined, hence efficient organisations would tend to 
minimise transaction costs.  There are different efficient solutions to the resource allocation 
problem and efficiency alone may not be a strong enough criterion to be the only basis of analyses.  
Firms often try to maximise their total value through a series of transactions. Moreover, in practice, 
the aspects of efficiency may differ between the view held by the firm’s shareholders and that of the 
firm’s managers.  
 
A third aspect, though not proposed by Coase, but still significant is the issue of ex ante 
behaviour and reputation.  The Coase and Williamson arguments do not consider these salient 
aspects of business conduct which include business reputation and trust. Transactions are regarded 
as first–order transactions without any deepening of the relationship occurring between the 
transacting parties.  Williamson (1998) does point out that opportunism does occur some of the 
time.  However, this cannot be predicted upfront.  In order to encourage commerce, firms rely on 
their reputations.  Reputation, trustworthiness and profile are business assets that a firm tends to 
build upon as part of its ongoing business activity.  
 
Influenced by Coase’s thinking, Williamson (1998) expounded upon the idea of different 
levels of social analysis that is available for assessing new institutional economics, as illustrated in 
Figure 2.1.  He describes the advent of economic activity which he refers to as ‘economising’.  
 
Referring to figure 2.1, the activity of first-order economizing takes place at level 2, where 
the institutional environment must be accurately assessed for the viable functioning of the economy 
(Williamson, 1998, p. 25). Level 2 is furthermore the outcome of politics, and lays down the 
parameters in which economic activity takes place. The economics of property rights are raised as a 
key consideration at this level. Furuboten and Richter (1991; cited in Williamson, 1998) say that 
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modern institutional economics attempts to focus on the institution of property rights, or systems of 
norms that govern the acquisition and transfer of property rights.  The right of ownership is another 
discussion that is widely raised at this level and particularly concerns the right to use, appropriate or 
change the form of an asset.  Contemporary examples of property rights being debated in 
mainstream policy making include a diverse range of issues such as environmental concerns, 
intellectual property rights, copyright protection, pollution impacts, patent rights, hunting rights and 
reproductive rights.  The questions raised by these concerns are significant; Who has the right to the 
exclusivity of the environment?  Who has a greater right to life – the mother or the foetus?  Whose 
right is damaged through pollution – the consumer or the resident next to the factory? 
 
Level 3 looks at those areas where governance institutions are active. Second-order 
economizing characterises the third level, where governance structures are established. Operations 
at level 3 take the conceptual rules from level 2, and apply them in practice. Level 4 however 
focuses on marginal analyses, is not primarily involved with transaction cost economics, and thus 
falls outside the main discussion presented here. 
 
A number of questions have been posed that deal with the discrete structural analysis of 
governance at level 3. These are designed to answer the crucial question:  
What is transaction cost economics? - The study of the ‘additional costs’ (over and above 
the purchase price) associated with conducting a transaction, whether those costs consist of time, 
money or inconvenience.   
According to the Wikipedia online dictionary 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transaction_cost), transaction costs also have specific terms 
associated with them; for instance, search and information costs are the costs associated with 
finding the goods to purchase, bargaining costs are costs associated with settling on a mutually 
agreed upon price for the good and policing and enforcement costs are costs associated with 
ensuring that the parties involved keep to their side of the bargain.  Key areas of study include: the 
distinction between institutional environments and institutions of governance; adaptations of the 
central problem of economic organisation; comparative economic organisation; the issue of private 
ordering; and, finally, the behavioural attributes of human players (Williamson, 1998, p. 29).   
 
Some theorists, such as Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p. 20), consider the problem of 
economic organisation by analysing the importance of organisational constructs through 
expounding the main tenets of an organisation.  The structure of the organisation is analysed from  
 15
 
 
Figure 2.1 
Figure 2.1: Level 1 is where the traditional norms and customs reside and this has the longevity of time. Level 2 is the institutional 
environment - the structure here lays down the ‘rules of the game’ that defines the parameters of economic activity.  Level 3 is where 
the institutions of governance reside – a legal system that supports the system of contracts and governance models. Level 4 deals with 
marginal analyses – price, output, incentive alignments etc. Transaction cost economics resides in levels 2 and 3. 
Source: Williamson 1998, p.26 
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various perspectives, inter alia, the value maximising position, efficiency, organisational 
objectives, transaction costs, and wealth effects.  A snapshot of the major organisational structures 
of the past century embodies the significance of the organisation (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, p. 
20).  
 
2.1.1 What are the phenomena of interest?  
The question of why there are so many kinds of organisations has been frequently asked by 
academic researchers (e.g. Hannan & Freeman, 1977) but it simply echoes the broader question 
asked by Coase as to why firms exist when there is already a marketplace. Williamson develops 
Coase’s question by postulating that the broader query goes beyond the ‘market and firm 
dichotomy’ to include inter alia hybrid contracting, regulation, non-profit public bureaux and so 
forth. He especially invites the study of the variations that exist within these categories (emphasis 
added), such as hierarchical variants within firms (Williamson, 1998, p.30).  The inter-play between 
firms in a vertical relationship occurs with parties that are somewhat aligned in terms of parity. 
Where there are disparities between the contracting parties, however, then the transaction becomes 
the primary focus. The characteristic of the transaction, rather than the differences between the 
associated parties, is the core of the analysis.    
 
2.2 The description of human agents and motivation 
The question of motivation is a central economic problem in both management and 
organisation; it is also one that has been well researched. Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p. 137) argue 
that although contracts allow participants some flexibility in their future dealings with each other, 
they also allow participants to behave opportunistically, e.g. a ‘hold-up’ problem or imperfect 
commitment. Real contracts, as they point out, are certainly not complete. As a result, participants 
can end up with malaligned motivations, which can then allow for self-interest and exploitative 
behaviour to develop. The motivation problem then becomes one which works toward overcoming 
opportunistic behaviour. The research proposed here will furthermore explore Milgrom and 
Roberts’ treatment of bounded rationality, which describes the limitations under which participants 
work and sign contracts.  
 
Motivation costs consist of two parts: informational incompleteness (including 
informational asymmetry, which was briefly visited earlier in this section) and imperfect 
commitment (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992, p.29).  Information incompleteness is the situation where 
one or more of the parties involved in a transaction does not have the relevant information 
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regarding the product (usually the purchaser).  The lack of information and resulting lack of 
transparency yields a set of circumstances that is not mutually advantageous to all of the parties 
involved.  The classic example illustrating this type of transaction is the used car that may be a 
lemon9.  The salesperson may have knowledge regarding the vehicle’s history or reliability but does 
not reveal this bit of information.  The piece of information might be important to the sale in the 
sense that if this information was revealed, then it may influence the buyer’s decision to purchase 
the vehicle.  A ‘street-smart’ salesperson would recognise any indecision on the part of the buyer 
and respond by not revealing the piece of information indicating that the car is indeed a ‘lemon’.  In 
order to allay the fears of the buyer and protect their reputations, many dealerships offer 
comprehensive maintenance plan.  In this instance, the maintenance plan represents additional and 
unnecessary (inefficient) arrangements to protect against opportunistic behaviour (the salesperson 
not revealing any of the vehicle’s faults) may be made in order to conclude the transaction.  These 
are costs over and above the cost of the product – and are the costs of doing business, i.e., 
transaction costs.   
 
Imperfect commitment, on the other hand, deals with parties who, after having made 
certain commitments, would like to forsake their earlier commitment.  Consider a supply chain 
situation where a manufacturer makes a specific product for a supplier of raw materials at a 
previously agreed-upon price.  The supplier provides the raw materials for the product.  Moreover, 
the manufacturer arranges with a supplier to commit to investing in machinery specifically designed 
for the manufacture’s product.  The supplier (after having invested in this machinery) is at the 
mercy of the manufacturer, who may subsequently try and influence the previously agreed-upon 
pricing structures.  This can be done in  a number of ways, including forcing the supplier to reduce 
the selling price of the raw materials, claiming increased costs of production or by decreasing the 
rate of output, is an example of the ‘hold-up’ problem.  
 
Motivation is a central problem in economic management and organisation.  The dilemma 
of motivation arises because individuals have different perspectives on a particular set of 
circumstances: for instance individuals have their own private interests, which may not be aligned 
with those of other individuals, in a specific setting.  The manner in which efficiency is lost in the 
economy through bounded rational behaviour is examined in this section, as are inefficiencies of 
private information. A further area of discussion is moral hazard, which can be a form of post-
                                                
9 A ‘lemon’ usually refers to a bad product masquerading as a good one. Typically, the salesperson knows the 
full extent of the problem but won’t reveal this information because it might jeopardise the sale.   
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contractual opportunism.  The ‘hold-up’ problem is a subset of moral hazard.  Herbert Simon 
(1957) argued that one of the fundamental assumptions in economic theory – that of the ‘economic 
man’ characterised by one who tends to minimise cost and maximise profit (or benefits) – is naïve.  
He conceptualised the word “satisficing”10 (Simon, 1957, p. 204, Bannock et al, 1998, p. 369) to 
describe the continual adjusting of behaviour to reflect the influence of new experiences and 
information in the market.  Such behaviour attempts to reach a minimum threshold without 
endeavouring to obtain the highest possible outcome.  Simon’s assertion implies any decision 
undertaken by behaviour in the marketplace is bounded with rationality, uncertainty and lack of 
awareness – this is satisficing.  In the theory of the firm, satisficing implies that the firm treat profit 
as a constraint rather than a profit maximising goal.  Moreover, once the critical level of profit has 
been attained then the firm’s priorities are rearranged to focus on other goals.  
 
To continue along this vein of thought and if we assumed that people behave in their own 
self-interests and there are situations where these are not necessarily aligned with the goals of their 
organisations or the goals of the economy.  Under these circumstances some behaviour may be 
considered socially profligate.  The problem is that the future is unforeseeable, which limits one’s 
ability to describe all the possible contingencies that could impact on desired outcomes.  Incentives 
can be significantly influenced and aligned by contracts that are written in order to align incentives 
with those of the organisation and ultimately with that of society. Society comprises individuals and 
organisations which make it viable for contracts to be re-written in order to address incentives that 
appear to be a problem.   
 
It has been ventured that a complete (comprehensive) contract comprises three parts. First, 
it allows for relevant contingencies to be built in. Second, the parties to the contract must be willing 
and able to devise an efficient course of action in the event of these contingencies occurring. Third, 
participants must abide by the terms of the contract once agreed (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992, p. 
127). 
 
An additional aspect is the concept of bounded rationality which was explored initially by 
Simon (1957, p. 199), and extensively expounded upon by Williamson (1998, p. 30).  Bounded 
rationality describes the behaviour of humans who are deliberately rational, but in a limited manner.  
                                                
10 Wikipedia (the online dictionary) states that the word ‘satisfice’ was coined by Herbert Simon in 1957. 
Simon says that people are only 'rational enough', and relax their rationality when it is no longer required. 
This is called bounded rationality. 
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The bounded rationality problem, when applied to contracts, means that not all contingencies are 
accounted for in the contract and could be affected by, for example, limited foresight, unexpected 
costs, corrective actions, or even vague language (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, p. 130). Typically, 
vertical integration arrangements constitute such examples.  Some terms or sections of these 
contracts, referred to as relational contracts (such as bilateral or unified contracts as in the case of 
franchise arrangements) are deliberately unspecified and cannot be made binding by a court of law.  
These contracts allow the participants some flexibility in their future dealings with each other, but 
more significantly, it allows them to behave opportunistically since they have imperfect 
commitment, hence the post-contractual opportunism such as the hold-up problem.  Milgrom and 
Roberts point out that real contracts are certainly not complete contracts (1992, p.128).   
 
Incomplete contracts can result in agents having misaligned interests, fostering inconsistent 
and perverse self-interest and opportunistic behaviour. The motivation problem aims to tackle this 
kind of behaviour. People do renege on their promises, for instance, through fear of losing money 
by not trusting a trading partner’s motives.  The fact of the matter is that contracts cannot 
realistically describe every contingency, something that gives rise to contractual incompleteness.  
Williamson succinctly addresses the issue of opportunism by saying: 
“If candid reference to opportunism alerts us to the avoidable dangers, which the 
more benign reference to frailties of motive would not, then there are real hazards 
in the more benevolent construction.  Attenuating the ex post hazards of 
opportunism through the ex ante choice of governance is central to the transaction 
cost economics exercise.” (Williamson, 1998, p. 31), 
 
Reneging on a contract occurs more frequently when large specific investments are 
required by the contract.  A specific investment is used to create an asset.  The specificity of an 
asset is the percentage of investment value lost when the asset is re-deployed to its next best use 
(Milgrom & Roberts, 1992, p.135). The need for this action arises when one of the trading partners 
reneges on their contractual undertaking in an attempt to extract more value than the originally 
agreed-upon terms.  The remaining trading partners are forced to re-deploy assets to the next best 
option.  As alluded to earlier, this situation results in a hold-up problem – reflecting the nature of 
post-contractual opportunism. 
 
In some instances, a potential trading partner that is concerned with building a reputation 
for the longer-term, a reputation that is more visible and has more to lose with a damaged 
reputation.  Such a trading partner may take preventative measures to alleviate the incidence of 
 20
post-contractual opportunism.  For this reason, it is often advisable to deal with large reputable 
firms, especially where the parties involved are risk-averse.   
 
Informational asymmetries (or private information) at the time of the contract being sealed 
are another contributor to inefficiency in contracting. Information asymmetries become apparent 
when agents try to misrepresent details or hide particulars of themselves in order to get a better deal 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, p.144). The insurance industry often encounters this type of dilemma; 
insureds often do not reveal the true extent of the risk that they are likely to pose when selecting a 
certain level of cover.  Furthermore, the insured may choose a particular benefit specifically 
because it covers the problem or risk that he or she wants to insure against.  The behaviour 
described is termed ‘adverse selection’ or the selection of a benefit solely based on what can be 
extracted from the risk pool without revealing the nature of the affliction upfront.   
 
The used car dealer scenario can be used as an example.  The dealer may have information 
that would lower the expected price of the vehicle, whereas the potential buyer might be genuinely 
concerned about the lack of warranties, or even simply feign disinterest, even though he or she 
wants to purchase the vehicle.  The value-maximising outcome would be for both parties to gain 
from the trade or transaction.  If each side named a price that represented their true expectation, 
then trade would immediately occur if there were gains to be made from either side.  However, 
even if the value maximising outcome is for the buyer to purchase the vehicle, the deal may fail 
because the parties withhold their respective bits of information.  The existence of private 
information usually means that certain value-maximising plans may not be realised.  In the 
insurance environment, particularly in the medical schemes environment, the concealing of certain 
information by the purchaser in order to qualify for higher-level benefits is regarded as common 
practice.  For example, if a scheme offers a particular benefit in an option, then the option tends to 
attract people who are subject to the condition covered by the benefit.  
 
Bargaining can give rise to another cost: that is, obtaining an ‘information advantage’ 
which is considered to be a loss to society.  The costs of providing incentives for bargaining are 
high and increase substantially with a larger number of participants.  Free riders, or participants 
who stand to gain from the process and do not want to pay, are a substantial drain on the efficiency 
of the process.  Adverse selection, the condition arising from pre-contractual informational 
asymmetries, is a widely documented phenomenon in insurance circles.  A well-known example is 
that of medical insurance taken out by couples or single women who are planning to have children 
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in the foreseeable future.  The medical and accommodation costs associated with the pregnancy will 
be covered by the insurance plan when the baby is born.  Plans to start a family are considered 
privileged information and deliberately not disclosed (in some cases) when medical insurance cover 
is sought.   
 
Furthermore, medical insurance plans that cover specific conditions are susceptible to 
adverse selection, since they tend to attract people suffering from those ailments.  Adverse selection 
also poses a problem of medical schemes being able to measure risk or ‘risk-rate’.  Current 
regulation obviates the impact that observable characteristics such as age and sex can have on the 
ability of the scheme to risk rate by making these characteristics insubstantial.  Several non-price 
related methods have been developed in order to try and alleviate the effects of adverse selection.  
Medical schemes tend to limit benefits, insurance companies insist on co-payment or ‘excess’ for 
short-term payments, and lengthy questionnaires also double-up as a limited pre-screening 
technique.  Adverse selection also impacts the cost of supplying a product in addition to the 
potential revenues that could be brought into being by the supplier (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992,  
p. 149).  Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) developed an adverse selection model to specifically address 
credit rationing and non-market means of credit allocation that proved to be highly effective.   
 
Moral hazard - another term coined by the insurance industry - refers to the post-
contractual tendency of the insureds to change their behaviour in a way so as to increase the 
probability of larger claims against the insurance company (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, p.167).  
The fact that people take out insurance can be viewed with some trepidation, since they could be 
acting in a manner that is beneficial to themselves.  Those who take out insurance for some specific 
event may have an incentive to become careless and even cavalier regarding the limitation of 
behaviour that could result in a loss.   
 
In the larger economy, however, the term ‘moral hazard’ has come to describe 
contractually-bound behaviour that is inefficient (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, p.179).  This 
behaviour typically arises from the differing interests of contracting parties in a principal-agent 
relationship with the agent acting on behalf on the principal.  The problem arises when the agent 
has differing views or goals to that of the principal. In particular, the situation is exacerbated when 
the principal cannot determine the performance or actions of the agent.  The relationship between a 
medical scheme broker and a medical scheme illustrates the principal-agent behaviour. The agent is 
driven by the commission earned from selling the highest number of contracts in the long term, 
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irrespective of the ‘risk-level’ of the potential members that is being signed up. The medical 
scheme is primarily looking for the lowest-risk members or members that would be low claimants, 
namely the young and healthy.  Why does this conflict exist?  The scheme cannot control the risk 
contingent on the type of member that the broker signs up - in any market segmentation, the 
misaligned incentives basically exist because of the inability of schemes to refuse cover – which is 
a legislative requirement.  This in turn is brought about by the schemes’ limited ability to be 
selective primarily because regulation does not address an inherent principal-agent problem11 but 
creates an artificial problem brought about the legal inability to refuse cover.   
 
2.3   Ex ante Transaction Costs and the Robustness of the Coase Theorem  
Anderlini and Felli (2004, 1998) reflect on a Coasian solution as a negotiation about 
payment of costs regarding any future negotiations. This, in turn, gives rise to a new set of ex ante 
costs and a new hold-up problem.  Their paper considers the extent to which the presence of ex ante 
transaction costs may impact a Coasian solution leading to the failure of the strong version of the 
Coasian Theorem.  
 
Anderlini and Felli assert that in its strongest form, the Coase Theorem can be interpreted 
as guaranteeing an efficient outcome is the result when potential mutual gains outweigh the 
bargaining costs, regardless of the manner in which property rights are assigned (2004, p.1).  This 
position appears to be problematic when the empirical facts are considered.  Markets and 
economies are replete with situations where a Pareto improving negotiation may be possible, but 
are foregone because of the impending costs of bargaining (Anderlini and Felli, 2004, p.1)12.  
Essentially, they take issue with the strong version of the Coase Theorem and attempt to show that 
the potential gains from trade are outweighed by the impact of transaction costs.   
 
                                                
11 Wikipedia defines the principal-agent problem as the problem that treats the difficulties that arise under 
conditions of incomplete and asymmetric information when a principal hires an agent. Various mechanisms 
may be used to try to align the interests of the agent with those of the principal, such as piece 
rates/commissions, profit sharing, efficiency wages, the agent posting a bond, or fear of firing. The principal-
agent problem is found in most employer/employee relationships, for example, when stockholders hire top 
executives of corporations. 
 
12 The Anderlini and Felli paper “Transaction Costs and the Robustness of the Coase Theorem” was a 
theoretical working paper Series 406 sponsored by Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics 
and Related Disciplines (STICERD). The paper first appeared in 1999 and this writer initially used the 2001 
version and later the 2004 version. The latter version of the Anderlini and Felli paper is due for publication in 
the forthcoming Economic Journal (2006) published by the Royal Economic Society.  A fuller treatment of 
the paper’s proposals and mathematical substantiation are addressed in Appendix 3.  
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The issue of when transaction costs are paid, before or after the negotiation13 is key in 
determining whether the negotiation will take place or not.  In creating their model to demonstrate 
this assertion, Anderlini and Felli (2004, p.3) put forward that “...the primary effect of ex ante 
transaction costs is that they may generate a constrained inefficient outcome”.  The most basic 
version of their model asserts that agents may not end up exploiting any of the gains from trade and 
any potentially beneficial negotiation may not even occur.  Moreover, when the choice of ex ante 
costs is exhaustive, the escalation of ex ante costs corresponds to the level of detail of the 
negotiation.  This allows the parties to achieve a greater surplus from the negotiation because the 
parties have investigated more thoroughly the potential gains from trade. However, the Anderlini 
and Felli model asserts that agents may negotiate a less detailed contract because of the high initial 
ex ante costs, thereby foregoing potential gains from trade.  Exploration of this theme is important 
for understanding the negotiation process in South Africa, particularly when the concern is about 
the granting of compulsory licences for much needed drugs. This line of thinking can be used to try 
and understand why the Department of Health rejected offers from some of the large multi-national 
drugs companies who were trying to assist with cheaper and even free drugs for HIV/AIDS 
treatment.  Those companies included Glaxo Wellcome, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Pfizer and 
Boehringer Ingelheim (Reekie, p. 171).  
 
Consider a Coasian negotiation where the two agents enter a negotiation that might yield a 
surplus of a random size.  The surplus generated by the negotiation is exogenously given because 
the extensive form of the negotiation is itself exogenous, for example, such as a negotiation 
involving compulsory licences or parallel trade.  This surplus is shared by the agents. 
 
The assumptions associated with this negotiation highlighted in the Anderlini and Felli 
model are agreeable to that of a normal Coasian negotiation. Firstly, the agents must pay a given ex 
ante cost before the negotiation takes place.  Secondly, if the distribution of ex ante costs is such 
that if either one or both of the agents are not able to potentially recoup their ex ante investment, 
then the negotiation will not take place.  This may be possible even if the total potential surplus 
exceeds the total ex ante costs and it is socially efficient for the agents to negotiate the division of 
the surplus and pay the ex ante costs.  Anderlini and Felli (1998) highlight situations where this 
might occur.  Furthermore, thepossibility that agents will not negotiate a socially efficient contract 
                                                
13 It might be prudent at this point to highlight the fact that there are two sets of ex ante costs involved in 
Anderlini and Felli proposal. There is a set of ex ante and ex post costs for the first tranch of the transaction. 
The second and subsequent tranches also have ex post and ex ante costs associated with them. It may be 
possible that these costs outweigh the gains from trade.  
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has been described by Anderlini and Felli as a ‘source of inefficiency’ and in contract theory, it is 
known as the ‘hold-up problem’ (2004, p.3). 
 
Of relevance to the South African situation is that multinational drug companies may not 
feel secure in their negotiation of prices for the supply of drugs to the national Department of 
Health and the private sector in the current healthcare paradigm.  They may not be able to recoup 
their ex ante investments such as research and development.  
 
Referring back to the to the agents negotiation, before the ex ante costs are paid, they 
negotiate a transfer of funds that would compensate the agent but does not recoup his ex ante loss, 
and this is contingent on the agent paying the initial ex ante costs.  The problem arises when the 
payment of the ex ante costs is contingent on the compensating transfer.  
 
The model then investigates a second tier negotiation which involves a whole new set of 
positive ex ante costs.  Additionally, the second tier ex ante costs must be paid for the second tier 
negotiation to occur, and before the first order costs are paid and the first order negotiation takes 
place14.  It is possible that the second tier ex ante costs do not get paid.  It is a recursive relationship 
in that ex ante costs associated with first tier negotiation will, in turn, not get paid as well.  The 
model then goes to show that the actual surplus will not materialize.  This outcome is significant in 
that it survives the restrictions of a negotiation that is conducted in a Coasian spirit, that is, the 
outcome of the negotiation at each stage should yield an efficient outcome.  Since the overall 
outcome is not efficient then by implication, it is not Coasian.  
 
Why is it significant whether a negotiation is Coasian or not?   
 
Primarily, in the negotiation of drug prices, South Africa has a multi-tier negotiation 
process in dealing with the multinational drug companies regarding the supply and cost of drugs.  
This is consistent with the experiences of countries world wide.  At the onset, there is the first order 
negotiation with the national health authorities.  Health authorities, in many countries, represent the 
largest purchaser of drugs and in many cases use their monopsonistic leverage to drive down their 
purchase price of the drug.  South Africa is no exception to this scenario.  The second and 
subsequent tiers of negotiation involves negotiations with the private sector (as is the case in South 
Africa) or with provincial health authorities.   
                                                
14 This is an assumption that Anderlini and Felli use to demonstrate their model.  
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South Africa is faced with a particular set of circumstances in that the negotiations that are 
concluded may not be considered efficient in the Coasian sense and as such, may not be socially 
efficient.  Revenue losses on the part of the drug companies may result in less being spent on drugs 
that are important to the southern African region, namely, malaria, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and 
cholera.  The inefficient solution would result in drug companies tending to concentrate on products 
that result in the favourable return on investments.   
 
A similar situation occurs with the granting of compulsory licenses.  If one agent does not 
recoup potential ex ante costs, then the negotiation for a Coasian solution would not take place, 
even if the negotiation is socially efficient.  This is the arrangements that the TRIPS agreement 
attempts.  
 
2.3.1 The description of the firm 
Transaction cost economics sees the firm in terms of its governance structure, rather than 
the production function described in classical economics. Williamson believes that efficiencies of a 
firm be considered by its ability to align with different governance structures. Furthermore, the 
manner in which business was conducted changed drastically through the 1970’s and 1980’s and 
that change had a significant impact on the firm. Organisational structures, remuneration packages, 
job definitions and information flows have all undergone complete makeovers.  During this period, 
there appeared to be a trend of governments to deregulate and privatise, especially in capitalist 
economies resulting in businesses having to rethink their operational models. A common thread is 
that business now has to seek out new opportunities in order to remain functional and this has 
encouraged companies to look toward each other to establish competitive advantages.  Businesses 
have identified complementary activities that enhance the effectiveness of their operations. 
Furthermore, once a need for change is created, it tends to grow organically, creating an 
environment where the lines of demarcation are blurred.  
 
2.3.2 The main purpose of the economic organisation 
Hayek argued that economic problems arise “always and only in consequence of change” 
(1945, p. 523) and added that the economic problem of society is mainly one of “rapid adaptation to 
a particular circumstance of time and place” (1945, p. 524).  In introducing their book, Williamson 
and Masten (1999) observe that Barnard (1938) made a similar assertion on the importance of 
adaptability of an economic organization. Moreover, Barnard observes that the two assertions 
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mentioned above are in fact complementary. Hayek goes on to explain autonomous adaptation 
where individuals respond to market opportunities as signalled by price changes, while Barnard 
refers to cooperative adaptation, which is the internal mechanism of a firm (Williamson, 1998).  
Critically, transaction cost economics recognises adaptation as the central problem of a firm or 
economic organization.  
 
The organisation has been described as a ‘nexus of contracts’ by a number of theorists, 
most notable Eugene Fama (1980a, p.6) in his well known ‘nexus of contracts’ lecture and Alchian 
and Demsetz (1972, p.781) who also recognised the firm as an independent legal personality or 
entity.  As such, it identifies the organisation as a separate legal identity that is able to bring parties 
together in order to facilitate exchange or commerce.  Without an organisation, there would have to 
be complex multi-lateral agreements or contracts amongst all the participants (Milgrom & Roberts, 
1992, p. 19), something that is logistically unlikely and difficult to effect. 
 
2.4 The Problem of Social Cost 
As discussed earlier in the chapter, transaction costs can be defined as the spectrum of 
institutional costs, including inter alia information costs, costs of drawing up and policing 
contracts, analysing implementation, property rights and negotiation (Williamson, 1979). The 
dimensions of transaction are uncertainty, transaction-specific investment and frequency of 
exchange. The Coase theorem states that economic efficiency will be attained as long as property 
rights are fully allocated and that completely free trade (as long as transaction costs are not too 
high) for all property rights is possible (Coase, 1960, p. 8). Ex ante costs are the expected costs 
before the transaction takes place.  Anderlini and Felli (2004, p.1) explore the impact that ex ante 
costs have on the hold-up problem, as reflected upon earlier in the chapter. 
 
The actions of businesses can have harmful effects on others (e.g. pollutants or factory). 
The traditional approach had been to establish a divide between the private and the social (or 
public) product of the factory, and has been largely based on Pigou’s suggestions in The Economics 
of Welfare. Pigou suggests that by making the ‘guilty’ party liable for any damages arising from his 
actions and taking punitive action, such as placing a tax or penalty on the guilty party that would be 
commensurate with the level of ‘damage’ caused. Coase asserts that the solutions reached from this 
analysis are lacking in depth (Coase, 1960, p. 15-19).  
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Coase challenges Pigou’s contentions as being inappropriate and leading to undesirable 
outcomes. He asserts that the problem is reciprocal in nature in that it attempts to rectify the 
situation of one party results in a loss for another party. This is a balancing act - trying to do less 
harm than the arising situation. Is the intervention necessary? He argues that one should consider 
what is obtained and what is being given up as well as consideration of the total and at the margin. 
Coase illustrates this point with the famed ‘cows or crops’ example which occurs in conditions of 
quasi-competitive frameworks.  However, depending on what can be gained or lost, there is room 
for engagement and negotiation. This is the crux of Coase’s argument (1960, p.3-6).  
 
Coase put forth the principle that from an economic perspective, the goal of a legal system 
should be to establish a pattern of rights such that economic efficiency (as Coase defines it – a 
wealth-maximising trade rather than the Pareto optimum or perfect competition efficiency) is 
attained (Medema & Zerbe, 2000, p. 876). The aspect that Coase attempted to highlight is that a 
legal system has an impact on transactions and that the goal of any legal system should be to 
minimise these costs in order to permit wealth-maximising behaviour. The issue of transaction costs 
is expounded upon through the consideration of contracts that could be used by the relevant 
stakeholders. Such negotiations, according to Coase, would ultimately lead to efficient and 
invariant outcomes under the conditions of wealth-maximisation and the clearly defined allocation 
of rights. It is imperative that the extent of the liability of each party be known since, as Coase 
argues, without the establishment of the initial delimitation of rights there can be no market 
transactions to transfer or recombine them (Medema and Zerbe, 2000, p.837).  The resultant 
outcome, however, needs to be independent of the legal position if a costless pricing system is 
implicit.  
 
The so-called Coase ‘theorem’ was never written up in any formal manner. George Stigler 
(1996) was the first to recognise the potential of Coase’s thinking when he pointed out it asserts that 
under perfect competition private and social costs will be equal. Moreover, Coase’s ideas have 
raised differing debates.  Regen (1972, p. 427), for instance, felt that in a world of perfect 
competition, of perfect information and of zero transaction costs, the allocation of resources in the 
economy would be efficient (Coase’s assumptions) and unaffected by legal rules regarding the 
initial impact of costs (social costs are internalised) resulting from externalities. This drives home 
the point that when parties can bargain and settle their disagreements by cooperation, their 
behaviour will be efficient regardless of the underlying rule of the law (Cooter & Ulen, 1988, 
p.105).  Hoffman and Spitzer (1982, p.73) are also clear in their reading that a change in a liability 
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rule will leave the agents’ production and consumption decisions both unchanged and economically 
efficient within the following (implicit) framework: two agents to each externally bargain; perfect 
knowledge of one another’s (convex) production and profit or utility functions; competitive 
markets; zero transaction costs; costless court system; profit maximising producers and expected 
utility-maximising consumers; no wealth effects and agents will strike mutually advantageous 
bargains in the absence of transaction costs.  
 
In the Coasian world, there are two general claims that are evident; the ‘efficiency 
hypothesis’ and the ‘invariant hypothesis’.  The former is the situation where no matter how rights 
are initially assigned, the ensuing allotment of resources amongst the agents will be efficient.  This 
is also known as the ‘weak’ form of the Coase theorem. The ‘strong form’ of the Coase theorem, or 
the ‘invariant hypothesis’, describes the situation where the final allocation of resources will be 
invariant under alternative allocation of rights (Medema & Zerbe, 2000, p.850).    
 
The implication of the Coase theorem is that any analysis done in a classical economics 
scenario of competitive markets and zero transaction costs, and that subscribes to a Pigouvian 
solution is not necessarily efficient. Furthermore, if the rights are transferable, then the presence of 
the legal rules are important, not the specifics of the law. This arrangement will also be efficient, at 
least according to Medema and Zerbe (2000, p. 861).  
 
The vast majority of literature weighing up the pros and cons of the Coase theorem has 
done so from a quasi-competitive framework perspective. The areas of criticism levelled against the 
model include: rents, entry in the long run, separability of the cost functions, non-convexities at the 
negotiation starting point, plus income, taste and preference effects. The Coase theorem was also 
addressed from a game-theoretic bargaining perspective and the argument is primarily focussed on 
non-cooperative game theory.  
 
The argument involving rents asserts that the Coase theorem cannot hold under perfectly 
competitive conditions in the long run because it considers or gives credence to rents that may not 
exist. This would also be considered to be an agreement. It has been argued further (Medema & 
Zerbe, 2000, p.840) that the prior existence of rents must be sufficient to support the externality 
(such as pollution) in order to keep the players in the fold. This means that both the polluter or the 
victim should have sufficient recourse to stay involved in the negotiation, or else one of them might 
exit from the situation. To understand this assertion, one needs to consider the situation where there 
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are two divergent parties, a polluter (factory) and a victim (citizen). If the polluter pays the citizen 
for the damage caused, then they have reached an agreement. Alternatively the victim can pay the 
polluter a bribe in order not to pollute. The situation poses the dilemma of where or on whom does 
the liability rest. Medema and Zerbe (1999, p.846) conclude that the overall result will be efficient 
regardless of the allocation of rights.  
 
The issue of liability also impacts entry into the market in the long run, and this challenges 
the invariance and efficiency hypothesis of the Coase Theorem. Primarily, depending on the 
allocation of rights, whoever is receiving gratuities (victim or polluter) will experience an increase 
in the rate of return in that industry. “If one assumes that polluters or victims entering the market 
are also eligible for compensation, then entry will occur in the long run, leading to an increase in 
the output of the … industry” (Medema & Zerbe, 1999, p. 841).  Two arguments ensue. Firstly the 
staggered entry affects the legal position of the environment and hence renders the invariance 
hypothesis unworkable.  Secondly, the efficiency hypothesis is rendered ineffective because of the 
liability issue. If the liability lies with the polluters, then the stream of ‘bribe’ payments from the 
victims to polluters results in a excessive victim output relative to what would be considered an 
optimal solution, and vice versa.  
 
Three steps can be taken to alleviate the efficiency position. Firstly, if we assume that 
transaction costs are zero, then the agents involved are rational and there are no legal constraints to 
bargaining, which implies that the long run inefficiency will be addressed through the process of 
bargaining. This is the same process that resolves the short-run inefficiencies (Calabresi, 1968, p. 
68).  Secondly, according to Nutter (1968, p. 17) long-run misallocation of resources will be 
alleviated if a single owner enters the market in order to take advantage of the potential for gain. 
Thirdly, Medema and Zerbe (1999, p. 842) observe that the above argument assumes that efficient 
long run equilibrium exists at a single point where efficiency implies invariance. This ‘point’ need 
not exist since the long-run equilibria are both efficient, obviating the need for any corrective agent 
negotiations to validate the efficiency argument. One of the more robust debates emanating from 
the Coase theorem is the issue of transaction costs, and primarily the assumption of zero transaction 
costs. Transaction costs are those costs associated with search, monitoring, negotiation and 
enforcement.  
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2.5 The Coase Theorem, Wealth Effects and the Value Maximising Principle 
Wealth effects, or the change in choice stemming from change in wealth status, tend to 
influence many economic decisions.  Analysis of value-maximising principles, however, can be 
simplified if no changes in wealth effects in the economies of organisations are assumed.  There are 
three main conditions for the ‘no wealth effects’ proposal to hold15 (see Appendix 1).  Furthermore 
if an allocation is Pareto-dominant and the allocation is efficient then the value maximising 
principle can be summed up thus: 
 
“An allocation among a group of people whose preferences display no wealth effects is 
efficient if and only if it maximises the value of the total parties.  Moreover, for any 
inefficient allocation, there exists another (total value maximising) allocation that all of 
the parties strictly prefer.” (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992, p.36). 
 
Coase (1960) proposed that if parties bargain to an efficient agreement (for themselves) and 
their preferences display no wealth effects, then the value creating activities (y) that they will agree 
on do not depend on the bargaining power of the parties, or on assets each owned when the 
bargaining began.  Rather, efficiency alone determines the activity choice.  The other factors can 
effect only decisions about how cost and benefits are to be shared (x) (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). 
 
The transaction cost approach (i.e. transactions under the assumption of no wealth effects) 
the efficiency principle, and the Coase theorem together imply that all operations are focused on 
maximising the total value of all stakeholders (since the Coase theorem relates to total social private 
costs). Simply stated, the firm’s system of operations is independent of any dominance in the 
relationship between the owners of capital and workers.  Coase’s original thinking (1937) reflected 
on the monolithic government structures of the former Soviet Union that was influenced by Marxist 
ideology.  The Marxist view, however, holds that organisational composition mirrors the power and 
                                                
15 Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p. 35) indicate that the following three conditions are crucial for no 
wealth effects to hold:  
 Given that there are any two decisions y1 and y2 and monetary wealth $x, the first condition states that 
there is an amount of wealth – $x – that would be sufficient to compensate the decision-maker for 
shifting from y1 and y2 (or vice versa).  
 If the decision-maker was given an additional amount of wealth, then the amount needed to compensate 
him for the switching from y1 and y2 would be unaffected.   
 The decision-maker should have sufficient means to absorb any loss in wealth in switching from y1 and 
y2, at least within reasonable parameters.  
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class structures in a particular society.  In another scenario, the practice by firms to limit others in 
the retail chain to set prices may be viewed as anti-competitive, whereas the transaction costs 
approach may view it as efficient behaviour.   
 
Hirshleifer and Glazer (1992, p.376) look at the practical application of transaction costs, 
presenting it as costs of exchange. They distinguish two areas of exchange costs: one, trading of 
goods and services; and two, the physical movement of turnover. They note that the costs of 
exchange may depend on the volume of goods traded; the frequency of trades; the number of 
parties involved in the transaction; and the number of distinct commodities per transaction (1992, p. 
379).  They further assert that costs contingent on volume of trade are ‘proportional transaction 
costs’ while costs contingent on frequency of trade are ‘lump-sum transaction costs.’ Moreover, 
they liken transaction costs to taxes on exchange (Hirshleifer & Glazer, 1992, p. 380), as illustrated 
in Figure 2.2, which illustrates proportional transaction costs.  
 
2.6 Concluding remarks on Transaction Costs 
In the analyses and designs of economic models, it is possible to present unrealistic 
assumptions. Some may be valid but others can be untenable.  It is assumed, for instance, that firms 
want to maximise profits and that efficiency is the primary measure to maximise value, although 
there is a sizeable portion of the market where such principles do not appear to apply. There are 
inconsistencies, for example, in a situation where there is only one party to a trade: the profit-
maximising transaction by the firm need not necessarily maximise the joint wealth for all of the 
traders in order to come to a settlement where all of them gain from the transaction. Many decisions 
made by a firm involve situations where spending and investment patterns occur in phases over a 
period in time, as do the returns.  In order to maximise the market value of an investment, it would 
also be necessary to use insurance and other financial vehicles in order to reduce any risk.  
Reinsurance is an appropriate tool used by medical schemes to reduce the risk of catastrophe.  Such 
measures occur in complete or competitive markets.  There are instances where there is no 
principal-agent problem, which are not entirely competitive, and may interfere with normal market 
processes.  Some examples include situations where decision makers, who are shareholders, meddle 
with the flow of returns in order to protect their personal interests, or if they are a supplier to the 
concern and expect preferential albeit differing price structures. 
 
In developing the theory of joint wealth by the trading-agents (profit-maximising), 
Milgrom and Roberts (1992) make the assumption that people will seek to maximise their utility 
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under the guidance of their well-defined utility functions (rationality based theory).  This 
postulation ignores human aspects of self-sacrifice and altruism that could obviate any notion of 
capitalising on one’s utility function.  An example of this is the soldier’s dilemma in the face of 
frontline war. Their position, however, accurately reflects general business practice that assumes 
people are motivated by their narrow self-interests, i.e. the principal-agent relationship is a problem.  
 
Organisation is the composition of how people are co-ordinated and motivated to get things 
done, what incentives are utilised to encourage employees to show initiative, but also what 
mechanisms are used to deal with people in an external environment.  How to get decision-makers, 
throughout the establishment to share the organisational objectives and how to delegate authority to 
those who could use it most effectively, particularly those empowered with the information to make 
decisions.  Finally, to appreciate that giving incentives and delegating authority are complements 
and to recognise and be able to use this pairing successfully.  
 
  
Figure 2.2:  Proportional Transaction Costs Here there is a proportional 
transaction charge, in the amount of G per unit of commodity exchanged. In equilibrium, there must 
be a price gap of this amount between the price paid by the demanders (Px+) and the price received by 
the suppliers (Px-). The quantity exchanges is X’, and the shaded area represents the aggregate 
transaction costs (Hirshleifer & Glazer, 1992).  The objective for mergers is to reduce transaction 
costs so that X’=>X* so that the price paid falls and price received rises.  
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An organisation is a complex structure and can be analysed from various angles.  The basic 
unit of analyses is the transaction, although the basis for evaluation is efficiency: how well has the 
organisation served the wants and needs of the people it caters to? Efficiency can be used as a 
positive principle; its value can be verified by the interests, events and actualities being served.  An 
organisation can expand its operations through specialisation and then through individual 
transactions.  
 
Transaction cost theory is the theory developed on the premise that organisations are 
designed to minimise costs of commerce (or transacting).  These include costs of negotiating and 
wrapping up transactions including co-ordination costs.  Transactions are best managed through the 
five attributes analysed above, namely asset specificity, frequent similar transactions over sustained 
periods; uncertainty about circumstances and the subsequent complexity of decisions; costliness of 
measuring performance and close correlation to other transactions.  
 
The value maximising principle maintains that when individual preferences are free of 
wealth effects, then the allocations that maximise the total value and divide it amongst the 
participants are efficient.  Similarly, the Coase Theorem states that under a no wealth effects 
environment, the assets, wealth and bargaining power of the parties do not influence decisions 
regarding productive activities or organisational arrangements.  Firms are not bound by the 
standards of the profit-maximising principle owing to their variation in structure and objectives and 
may even be used to serve individual interests or public interests rather than that of the 
organisation.  However, if we look at value-maximising (which depends on the joint wealth 
maximising from trade) the implications are different. Profit-maximising is the outcome or 
behaviour of one party and wealth-maximising is the outcome of two (or multiple) parties. 
 
2.7 Conclusions of the Coase Theorem 
Coase wrote about the allocation of property rights. He concluded that one or more parties 
will enter into an agreement that would be beneficial to those all of the parties involved in the 
negotiation.  However, Coase’s argument remains largely in the theoretical framework of 
transaction cost economics and the realm of practical application is still fraught with unwieldy 
informational asymmetries, bounded rationality and issues of motivation, amongst others, in order 
for an efficient transaction to develop.  With that consideration, Coase offers a strong case for 
efficient transactions to occur in the design of commerce.   
 
 34
In the area of pharmaceutical study, the viability of patent rights should be balanced against 
the need to conduct research, to create more efficient drugs and ultimately, advance to a feasible 
solution that is politically, socially and economically viable.  In a broader context, this is the 
thinking that Coase’s work suggests.   
 
Chapter 3 will highlight areas and trade related instances where the scenarios described by 
Coase arise. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Efficiency in Pharmaceutical pricing? An Examination of Ramsey Pricing 
and the TRIPS Agreement 
 
The realm of pricing structures of drugs is characterised by many opposing influences: of 
national governments, socioeconomic disparities, the perils of poverty pitted against the need for 
efficient drug distribution, research and development, profit motive and commerce.  It is about 
creating a fine balance, adopting a particular pricing policy that would weight the requirements of 
all of the stakeholders in an equitable fashion.  In this chapter the writer will attempt to shed some 
light on creating this balance through the examination of the economics of parallel trade and 
imports; the World trade Organisation’s (WTO) trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights 
(TRIPS) agreement ; and finally, Ramsey Pricing (differential pricing) models such as price 
discrimination, multi-product pricing, and tiered pricing.  The latter three focus in on the 
microeconomics of price theory specifically. 
 
3.1 Ramsey Pricing and Economics of Parallel Trade 
Parallel trade can be described as the movement of lower priced products from ‘low-price 
countries’ to ‘higher-price countries’ (Danzon, 1998, p.294).  Prices of goods, including 
pharmaceutical prices, differ across countries and reflect the characteristics of individual economic 
systems. Healthcare systems fall under this ambit – i.e. prices of medical goods and services differ 
across countries – reflecting a particular country’s need for specific health services and medicines.  
The movement of these goods and services between countries, including service providers (such as 
doctors or nurses), has intensified in recent years, suggesting an increasing impact of free-trade 
agreements and globalisation.  The European Court of Justice upheld that parallel trade was 
consistent with free-trade in the European Union in the case of Merck v. Primecrown (C-267/95), 
even though the exporting country did not offer patent protection (Danzon, 1998, p.296). The 
resultant situation is a circulation of lower prices. Governments, often challenged to provide 
cheaper healthcare, tend to benchmark local prices against the lower-end of the spectrum of 
international prices.  It has also been shown that lower prices are not the result of lower production 
techniques or input costs, but rather the consequences aggressive regulation.  There is little 
economic gain from aggressive regulation because, as Danzon (1998) argues, trade is supposed to 
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increase welfare. Welfare is not improved where price differentials accrue only to intermediaries, 
rather than the consumers or producers of the drugs.  
 
Parallel trade negatively impacts welfare by reducing the ability of the manufacturer to 
recoup costs. Manufacturers need to recoup costs in order to fund further research and development 
(R&D) which can be used to improve consumer welfare. Parallel trade is sometimes viewed with 
trepidation by pharmaceutical manufacturers, primarily because it allows for the importation of 
drugs which may undermine the ability of (locally traded) patented drugs to enjoy the benefits of 
monopolistic pricing whilst their patents are in effect.  Indeed, it has been argued that parallel trade 
cuts into efficiency gains from trade in general (Danzon, 1998, p.299), and - in turn - has a 
detrimental effect on the available resources that could be spent on R&D.  The core issue is that 
pharmaceutical R&D is regarded as a ‘joint global cost’, beneficial to consumers worldwide, and as 
such, a cost that should be borne by these same consumers.  (Refer to page 12 above for analysis)  
 
Ramsey pricing is considered a noteworthy theory of efficient pricing in that it is equitable 
in assigning overheads in order to minimise deadweight loss.  It is a theory that explains how, when 
consumers have different price sensitivities, a pricing structure would be efficient if it is designed 
so that there are different prices for different users. An efficient pricing system would, theoretically 
at least, be able to cover these joint costs.  Parallel trade, as indicated earlier, undermines the 
process of joint-cost recoupment, which is crucial for R&D. One of the more common responses 
from manufacturers is to resort to uniform pricing, which tends to be higher than the marginal cost, 
usually to the short-term disadvantage of lower-income countries and consumers.  Danzon (1997, 
p.309) demonstrates the difference between profit maximising price differentials that would be 
charged by a price discriminating, monopolistically competitive (PDM) firm and welfare 
maximising Ramsey optimal model (ROP).  Moreover, Danzon’s conclusion (see Figure 2.3 below) 
is that although absolute price levels may differ, Ramsey prices are designed to yield specific 
revenue constraints, usually normal profits for the firm. On the other hand, unconstrained profit 
maximising prices are designed to extract supernormal profits in the long run and subnormal profits 
in the short-run.  
 
In the following section, the writer attempts to explore the pricing and cost policies of the 
pharmaceutical industry that makes R&D susceptible to parallel trade. An assessment of optimal 
pricing strategies addressing the issue of joint costs will be undertaken and thereafter the impact 
that parallel trade can have on consumer welfare will be discussed. 
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3.1.1 Pricing and cost policies of innovative drugs 
Innovation or, in the case of pharmaceutical companies, R&D, has its opportunity costs. 
Estimates indicate that R&D costs amount to approximately 30% of total production costs (Danzon, 
1998, p.297).  As a cost, it is the same irrespective of the number of users or countries to which it is 
exported. It is considered to be a joint global cost for this very reason. More importantly, costs are 
recovered to support further development of R&D and although such costs are not allocated to 
specific countries, manufacturers or users, they do require a pricing mechanism whereby they can 
be recovered.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Long-run equilibrium with monopolistic competition.  “With free entry to R&D business and expectations that are 
unbiased on average, entry will occur to eliminate excess expected profits at the margin. In the long run, monopolistically competitive 
equilibrium with the ability to segment markets, each firm sets an optimal price discriminating price structure with price mark-ups related 
to inverse demand elasticities, subject to a zero expected excess profit constraint.  These price discriminating, monopolistic all 
competitive (PDM) differentials withy monopolistic competition should approximate the Ramsey Optimal Price (ROP) differentials 
provided that the cross-elasticities are zero.” (Danzon, 1997, p. 309).  
Source: Danzon 1997.  
 
R&D is a sunk cost and needs to be taken into account in the pricing of the final product, 
and the bulk of R&D costs are sunk by the time a new drug is launched.  Monopsonistic purchasers 
(or single, large buyers such as government, managed care organisations (MCO’s), hospitals or 
highly competitive markets) tend to drive the purchase price down to the manufacturer’s marginal 
cost in the short-run.  Research-based firms would not be in a position to recover the sunk costs.  
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The granting of patent rights is one mechanism used to enable the developer of a drug to recoup 
costs by allowing the patent holder to price at a level that is higher than the short-run marginal 
costs.  The patent also bars the production of the drug by generic producers.  Moreover, a patent 
allows the developer of the drug to price-discriminate between countries, and of course to negotiate 
agreements regarding unauthorised distribution of the drug, including the manufacture and parallel 
import of the drug (Danzon, 1998, p.299). 
 
The monopoly pricing freedom granted by patent protection is restricted by price 
regulations in many countries.  When a country has a national health system, the health policy 
effectively becomes entwined with fiscal policy as well.  Government control over prices stems 
from the ‘moral hazard’ problem explained earlier where citizens become price insensitive to 
medical services, including drugs.  All monopsonistic purchasers will introduce co-payments to 
alleviate the moral hazard problem, but will also seek to drive the supply price down to the country-
specific marginal cost (Danzon, 1998, p.296).  Another issue raised is the ‘spillover effect’. R&D is 
heavily reliant on global revenues and lower prices in one region or free trade zone can 
significantly impact prices in another trading zone (Danzon, 1998, p.302).  
 
The nature of these joint costs make the pharmaceutical industry much more vulnerable to 
downward pressures caused by government regulation, much more so than other industries 
(Danzon, 1998, p.300).  For example, utility providers invest heavily in capital equipment prior to 
being able to deliver a product.  These are also sunk costs and their pricing structure includes the 
recoupment of the investment. One of the dilemmas facing pharmaceutical firms is that they cannot 
tailor prices to recoup some relevant portion of fixed costs from a specific country, because the 
R&D costs are not explicit in any one country.  An illustration of this is that one airline company 
faces the same price for an aeroplane as another airline company, even though the latter hails from 
a different land (this does not take into account specific deal-making associated with such 
purchases).  
 
There is a perception that pharmaceutical firms earn supernormal profits, something that is 
at least partially fuelled by the accounting practice of treating R&D as an expense, rather than 
capital (Danzon, 1998, p.303). Accounting measures of capital are underestimated and expenses 
overestimated giving the impression that returns on capital are higher than they actually are.  
Although not unique, as demonstrated by the advertising and other industries, this is a case where 
the pharmaceutical industry does present a grey area or accounting quandary in the current practice.   
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3.1.2 Optimal pricing strategies addressing the issue of joint costs 
Ramsey pricing theory tackles the issue of pricing according to a market segment’s price 
sensitivity.  It sets out to address the problem of developing a pricing structure that secures the 
highest welfare to consumers, while at the same time generating sufficient income to cover all 
costs, including joint global costs.  Ramsey prices exceed the short-term marginal cost in order to 
ensure that all costs are covered.  However, consumers who have an inelastic demand curve are 
relatively price insensitive and face a greater mark-up of prices than consumers with an elastic 
demand curve. “Such price differentials lead each group to reduce their demand by an equal 
percentage relative to  the hypothetical demand at price equal to (long-term) marginal cost,” as 
Danzon observes (1998,p. 298).  If uniform pricing were employed, price sensitive users would 
reduce their demand significantly, experiencing a greater welfare loss than the price–insensitive 
users. The latter would not increase their usage since their demand is governed by exogenous 
factors like sickness and state of health. Highly price-sensitive users would drop out of the market. 
The resultant situation is a welfare loss to society and a profit loss to the pharmaceutical company.  
 
The economic theory of efficient pricing to cover joint costs, the so called Ramsey pricing, 
yields the greatest social welfare in that it proposes charging different prices to different users.  This 
is the most efficient means of covering joint costs when the end-users differ in their true price 
sensitivity or price elasticity (Danzon, 1998, p.295).  The level of R&D that can be maintained 
through Ramsey pricing far exceeds that of uniform pricing structures.  In practice, some countries 
tend to resort to free-riding and not paying a level of pricing as directed by Ramsey pricing 
principals.  Pharmaceutical regulations in South Africa dealing with a single exit price (SEP) are 
but one example of uniform pricing structures. Similarly, pricing of drugs in France and Italy are 
examples of governments stepping into the fray and setting uniform prices (Danzon, 1998, p.302).  
 
The distinction between constrained and unconstrained Ramsey pricing is necessary to this 
discussion.  Unconstrained Ramsey pricing is when prices are elevated above marginal cost levels 
and are inversely proportional to the markets’ demand elasticities (hence the inverse elasticity rule).  
Resource allocation, while maximizing the amount of funds slated for R&D, will be relatively 
efficient. Constrained Ramsey pricing describes the situation where prices are positioned to a level 
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that would recover fixed costs (Scherer, 2001, p.2).  Professor Scherer, in his presentation16 “The 
Economics of Parallel Trade in Pharmaceutical Products” at the WTO-WHO Workshop on 
Differential Pricing and Financing of Essential Drugs, challenges the notion that Ramsey pricing is 
necessarily requisite in order to recover R&D costs and asserts that calls for Ramsey pricing are 
often motivated by rent-seeking behaviour. “ My belief that unconstrained Ramsey pricing may be 
‘good enough’ is rooted in the assumption that when firms compete for market position and profits 
by investing aggressively in R&D (a phenomenon which could be known as rent-seeking), pricing 
behaviour that maximises the profit pool also maximises the stimulus to R&D investment, which, 
again admitting possible exceptions, is on the whole to be encouraged” (Scherer, 2001, p. 2).  
 
However, given that parallel trade arbitrages price differences, it can undermine any 
attempts to maintain Ramsey-style price differentials.  There are three distinct instances when 
Ramsey pricing may be undermined; firstly, parallel trade may erode profits in high income 
markets thereby hampering the attempts to recover fixed and sunk costs. This could prompt profit-
maximising firms to reduce their supply to low income markets or not supply to these markets at 
all.  The downside is that many multinational companies may view this as a political risk and 
continue to supply the drugs at lower discriminatory prices (Scherer, 2001, p.2).  Secondly the 
applicability of Ramsey pricing is undermined in a situation such as a developing nation that has 
segmented income groups and a multi-tiered healthcare system (Scherer, 2001, p.2).  Consider a 
situation like South Africa where the presence of an affluent minority, covered by private health 
insurance, with a low price elasticity of demand, and the another group which is the low-income 
majority, without private insurance and a high price elasticity of demand.  Scherer (2001, p.2) 
asserts that many multinational companies prefer to supply to the affluent classes (minority) since 
that would be more profitable, but their prices would be too high for the poorer majority. Finally, 
national reference pricing can also undermine the effectiveness of Ramsey prices (Scherer, 2001, 
p.3), primarily because the selling price of the drugs are regulated.  The latter two occurrences 
reflect the prevailing situation in the South African healthcare system.  
 
A common misconception is that differential pricing leads to firms selling in low-income 
countries so that they can cover costs that could not be recouped from higher priced countries, 
behaviour that is know as ‘cost–shifting’.  Supporters of the ‘cost–shifting’ argument, however, 
                                                
16 Scherer, F.M. (2001). “The Economics of Parallel Trade in Pharmaceutical Products.” Short paper 
presented at the WTO-WHO Workshop on Differential Pricing and Financing of Essential Drugs.  For the 
transcript see Appendix 3. 
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ignore the ‘jointness’ of costs issue. Expressing this proposition differently, the ‘cost–shifting’ 
argument ignores the fact that a firm cannot consistently sell below its own variable cost of 
manufacturing the drug.  Pricing in low-income countries should be structured to be able to cover 
the marginal costs of R&D (which are fixed) and this implies that higher priced countries would 
pay less leading to an overall drop in prices in the long run.  
 
3.1.3 Impact that parallel imports has on consumer welfare 
There are two conditions under which consumer welfare is increased by trade. The first is 
when lower prices from an exporting country are a result of superior production techniques that 
lowers the cost of production, or from lower input costs. The second is when lower prices lead to 
increased consumption in the country that imports the drugs. Parallel imports of pharmaceuticals 
often go against the principles of efficiency because of stringent regulatory intervention, rather than 
economic efficiency.  Price regulation of pharmaceuticals introduces an exogenous regulatory 
presence or body, which tends to distort production efficiencies and may even actively reduce 
efficiencies (Danzon, 1998, p.293).  Parallel trade exploits regulated price differentials and does not 
signify real cost differences.  Danzon (1998, p.290) asserts that parallel trade may even increase 
societal costs because of additional transport and administrative costs. A number of associated 
problems are related to parallel imports and include, inter alia, intermediaries capturing profits; 
lack of regulatory control over the quality of the product; problems with language on the packaging; 
or inconsistent standards. 
 
 
3.1.4  Uniform and Ramsey prices – a Static and Dynamic perspective 
In the long run, the manufacturers’ profit-maximising strategy in a parallel trade 
environment is to attempt to set a single uniform price across markets or free-trade zones.  Usually 
the price lies between the expected parallel price floor and the discriminatory price that would have 
originally been set by the manufacturer. This is an attempt by the manufacturer to pre-empt parallel 
trade and it signifies the threat of parallel imports to manufacturer profits.  In practice, however, it 
is generally impossible to quantify the impact of parallel trade and the motivation it has toward the 
move to uniform pricing.  
 
The standard analysis of prices relating to consumer welfare deals with commodities and 
does not adequately reflect the situation of joint costs. Scherer is of the view that under uniform 
pricing, there would be a welfare loss only if there is a reduction in consumption (Scherer, 2001, 
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p.5).  The analysis of the joint costs of pharmaceuticals, and in particular Ramsey pricing, shifts 
away from this analysis by proposing that a reduction in consumption can increase consumer 
welfare.  Economic analysis does however make the point that both Ramsey and uniform pricing 
structures reduce consumption relative to the prices which cover fixed costs.  Both Reekie and 
Danzon observe that price differentials which relate inversely to demand elasticities allow for 
higher consumer welfare than uniform pricing (Danzon, 1998, p.300; Reekie, 1997, p.26). 
 
Reekie distinguishes between two aspects of price theory, static and dynamic, and raises the 
issue of the practical aspect of price setting, citing that it is not as simple as using the elementary 
textbook construct of price equal to marginal cost (P=MC) in perfect competition.  The setting of a 
price is difficult because of the subjectivity of the costs combined with perfect competition, and is 
emphasized by Reekie (1997, p. 26): 
“These suggest that the phenomenon (and its associated condition of price equal to 
marginal cost) is an ideal.  In fact the concept is merely a predictor.  And in an innovative industry, 
where unit variables costs are relatively small (as in drugs) but fixed costs as in R&D expenditure 
are relatively high, the problem of correctly defining marginal cost (even if it can be presumed to be 
objective) is well-nigh insuperable. Unless this is understood, we are in the hypothetical elementary 
textbook abstraction of homogenous products where no improvement or innovation can bring extra 
profits exclusively to the supplier.” (Reekie, 1997, p. 26): 
 
Ramsey pricing proposes that all products should be priced at the long run marginal cost 
and that joint costs should be set in a manner so as to minimise social losses (thereby increasing 
social welfare) by ensuring that the prices are also higher than the variable cost (Reekie, 1997, 
p.27).  These joint or common costs are also factored into the measurement of optimality, which 
occurs when the social benefits that accrues from all the products, measured by the markets 
willingness to pay the price, is equal at the margin per Rand (or $) of deadweight loss that had to be 
given up in order to accommodate the joint costs.  
 
In view of the static theory, Reekie (1997, p.27) considers the issue of optimality by 
considering the following diagram (see Figure 3.2), which is an adaptation of the illustration 
originally proposed by Schankerman.  Suppose that we are working with two drugs, D1 and D2, 
where the demand curves are D1D1 and D2D2 respectively and the marginal production cost is equal 
to MC in both cases.  Consider a joint cost such as R&D. If such a cost (this applies to all joint 
costs) is allocated amongst all of the participants equitably, then the MC would rise to MC1 and the 
original output levels of X* would fall to X1 and X2 corresponding to the relative  deadweight loss 
in each case.  The amount of joint costs that a product incorporates should reflect in its price-elastic 
demand.  By comparing the two situations in 3.2(a) and 3.2(b), it is evident that the products with a 
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relatively price-elastic demand should carry a smaller load of the joint costs than those products 
with an inelastic demand.  In figure 3.2 (a), the total revenue required to handle the joint costs is 
given by the areas ABCD and AEFD.  These areas are equal to the areas WXUZ + YVUZ in Figure 
3.2(b).  The crux of the argument is in the realisation that under Ramsey pricing structures (when 
there are equi-proportional quantity reductions shown by the shaded areas BCI + EFI compared to 
XUI + VUI) the deadweight loss is markedly smaller.  As Reekie (1997, p. 28) points out, no other 
pricing policy would result in a smaller aggregate deadweight loss.   
 
Socially optimal pricing can utilise the inverse elasticity rule, i.e. where the product with 
the greater inelastic demand displays a greater percentage deviation from marginal cost.  Reekie 
(1997, p.29) explores this idea in Figure 3.2(b) where he shows that the optimal allocation of joint 
costs should be where P1 and P2 are increased by ∆P1 and ∆P2 respectively and that the output is 
reduced by equal proportions where X* would fall to X1 = X2. 
 
The situation in South Africa can be particularly tenuous with the original Medicines and 
Related Substances Act (Act 90 of 1997) getting the go ahead in 2005 as the Amended Act 101 of 
1965.  The Act appeals to the uniform mark-up of prices which does appeal to the notions of 
fairness in the eyes of the stakeholders and certainly in the public arena.  The net effect may 
however be a greater loss of social welfare in future pricing systems and patent drug accessibility.  
As Reekie observes (1997, p.30) a uniform mark-up on short run marginal cost implies that 
overheads can be met.  In a situation where there are different demand elasticities, the reduction in 
quantity caused by the uniform mark-up would be greater with the more price sensitive consumers, 
and the relative amount of deadweight loss would be substantial.  However, under a system of 
Ramsey prices, the joint cost can be recouped through a series of different mark–ups that are 
contingent on the price sensitivities of the respective consumer groups.   
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Figure 3.2 Source: Reekie (1997, p.46) 
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 Pricing policy, however, is not a static intervention and is often influenced by short-term 
economic and political influences that may not be the most socially sound path to follow.  On the 
other hand, the pricing policy followed by a profit maximising firm may result in an efficient 
(Pareto) manner yielding the most socially beneficial outcome, even in the midst of provocative 
political discussion.  Both situations however are contingent on the particular circumstances at hand 
that need to be considered.   
 
 Given the competitive and dynamic nature of the market economy, pricing policy tends to 
be in itself dynamic in nature.  Reekie, in his treatment of dynamic pricing theory, explores the role 
of the Cocks modification on the Clemens article (Reekie, 1997, p. 31).  Cocks supports the idea 
that competition takes place in more than one dimension, and that a number of other factors need to 
be considered.  Furthermore, he bases his arguments on the following five premises: 
i) to attain a preferred market position through the development of new products is 
the primary incentive of many firms; 
ii) firms will expand output to a level where the least profitable unit will be produced 
at a marginal cost equal to price.  Additionally, firms gravitate toward meeting 
unfulfilled demand of newer drug treatment through the continuous innovation and 
changes to its existing products, be they major or minor modifications; 
iii) the high degree of cross-elasticity of supply between R&D and pharmaceutical 
production in the therapeutic markets allows for a heterogeneous range of outputs 
to be produced when the demand curves under review are considered as 
commensurate units; 
iv) a firm’s demand curves tend to be focussed on different therapeutic spheres and 
this implies a low cross-elasticity of demand between a firm’s products; 
v)  a firm’s products have a broad spectrum of market positions, ranging from strong 
market vigour (pertaining to new innovative products, e.g. Lipitor, Crestor) to a 
situation of perfect competition (as in generic and multi-source commodity type 
products, e.g. Zocor, Aspirin, multi-vitamins) 
 
Consider Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 below.  The Clemens model, showing five separate 
demand curves for one firm, reflects the profit-maximising position where the  
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Figure 3.3 and 3.4 Source: Reekie (1997, p.47) 
Figure 3.4 
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marginal revenue in each of the five situations is equated to the limits set by the respective 
perfectly elastic demand curves.  This figure is then compared to the lower diagram, Figure 3.4 
which represents the same firm in a subsequent business cycle after it has successfully introduced a 
new drug that is significantly better than any of the existing drug therapies.  In both diagrams, 
according to Cocks, the price competition reflected by the progression toward greater elasticity and 
is indicated by a shift in the demand curves from D1 through to D5.  Of significance in Figure 3.4 is 
the meaning attached to these demand curves. The demand curve D6 represents the new drug or 
drug therapy; the demand curve D7 represents the firm’s entry into the productive areas of its 
competitors. In this scenario, while the firm is in the development stages of D6, its competitors want 
a share of the profit potential associated with the firm’s products (and vice versa).  Also, if the price 
of the product represented by demand curve D5 is higher than its marginal cost, then the 
competitors’ effort to enter their own products into the market would increase the elasticity of D5.  
This phenomenon can be witnessed with the introduction of ‘me too’17 drugs and generic drugs into 
the market. Furthermore the introduction of D6 signals to competitors the profit potential associated 
with the new product.  This may result in starting the cycle, described above, in a subsequent 
business cycle.  
 
The equilibrium that this situation moves toward is one where the price reflects the 
marginal cost in every therapeutic market that is characterised by innovation.  Furthermore, as 
Reekie observes, if the price: marginal cost ratio reflects the differences in R&D cost of producing 
a New Chemical Entity (NCE) for the intra-marginal markets, then the hypothetical outcome would 
be an true indicator of a perfectly competitive equilibrium.   
 
Reekie (1997, p. 32) asserts that in a static analyses, the pricing conduct of the industry 
implies that there is a competitive process with a welfare loss or monopoly rents.  This welfare loss 
is the source of funds used for R&D projects and developments for the future.  In a purely 
competitive environment, these rents are considered to be a social opportunity cost in the sense that 
this is what society gives up when prices are higher than marginal costs.  In order for newer NCE’s 
to be produced in the future, society must forego the benefits of lower prices at present.  If this 
‘welfare loss’ to society is added to ‘production costs’, it may result in the ratio P: MC being 
equated, i.e., the product price may be close or equal to the total marginal cost.  The series of events 
                                                
17 ‘Me too’ drugs are drugs that are modified mimics of existing drugs.  It is widely considered that they 
undermine the profits generated from the blockbuster or patented drug and that the R&D that goes into the 
development of me-too drugs is thus a social waste. It does not add any social value, but is focussed on 
seizing a share of profits from other drug companies.  
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described above is recursive in that new products must be introduced over the continuum of time in 
order to extract funds for R&D purposes.  Furthermore, it is exacerbated by the fact that the 
component of total production costs is eroded over time with the introduction of ‘me-too’ drugs and 
expiring patents.  
 
Reekie (1997, p. 33) points out that the static model of perfect competition is largely an 
inappropriate tool for the analysis of an innovative industry in that it does not account for the 
“…richness and complexity of real life variables that determine product price and quality.”  Citing 
Schumpeter’s theory of ‘creative destruction’, Reekie stresses that a theory that is dynamic with 
respect to price and quality and defines marginal cost in a way that sufficiently includes innovative 
expenses.  Much of the analysis that we do regarding perfect competition is not congruent to the 
real situation at hand because of the fact that it is devoid of the incentive for innovation.  
 
Uniform pricing has a negative impact on consumer welfare where consumers in relatively 
low-price countries would face higher prices for medicines than they would have paid under a 
country-specific Ramsey price structure.  The broader picture is that small, low-price countries tend 
to lose access to medicines if manufacturers do not find it profitable to supply medicines to these 
countries.   
 
Certain policy options are open to discussion regarding manufacturers dealing with parallel 
trade.  First, manufacturers can apply to government to protect their products by excluding 
competing products that enjoy patent rights from parallel trade.  Governments can also be more 
aggressive regarding the protection of intellectual property and patent rights.  Second, country-
specific contracts can be established which allow for a rebate system targeting the end-user.  
Rebates would allow price-sensitive users to enjoy lower prices than users who are less price-
sensitive.  All buyers would face the same ex ante prices, but price-sensitive users would have 
lower degrees of ex post prices (Danzon, 1998, p.302). It would also prevent the distributor or 
intermediary from exploiting the price differentials.  
 
A key aspect of Ramsey pricing is that rebates reflect the true price sensitivity of users and 
would yield a normal rate of return. Contract prices should approach Ramsey pricing principles.  
The issue with a company that enjoys patent protection is that it would priced as a price-
discriminating monopolist, yielding returns that could be higher than competitive levels and thus 
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encouraging other firms to enter the market. The resultant situation is that returns would be driven 
down to competitive levels.  
 
A common debate (Danzon, 1998; and Scherer and Watal, 2001) is that healthcare has both 
economic and social implications. In light of this, the question is whether or not pricing should be 
structured so as to reflect the value to the user, or the cost to the producer. The difficulty in trying to 
regulate prices that are based on cost of production is that the adequate level of R&D cannot be 
ascertained.  One reason, although not unique, has been that accounting methodologies do not take 
into account the full costs of the development of a particular drug, a process which often stretches 
over several years, nor is the opportunity cost that is associated with the development of that drug 
fully taken into account.  
 
3.2 Concluding remarks on Ramsey Pricing 
The issue of Ramsey pricing and patent rights challenges the Coasian argument that if the 
parties involved are left to their own devices (where transaction costs are low and property rights 
are specified) they would conclude a contract that is beneficial to both of them and also efficient, 
given the set of circumstances.  Drug companies, when guided by regulation to sell at a specified 
price, will tend to acquiesce to the level of their country-specific marginal cost.  If both parties gain 
from the relationship, according to the Coasian interpretation, they can hold this arrangement 
indefinitely.  The issue is whether they see any benefit in continuing with this contract or not.  A 
Coasian solution might be, for instance, to sell drugs to Canadian buyers if, and only if, they agree 
not to resell the drugs to the USA.   
 
However, it can just as easily be concluded that Ramsey pricing and patent rights confirms 
the Coasian argument given that property rights (patents) are fully specified and that trading is 
voluntary.  Argument against this type of solution is inherent in the fact that patent rights are not 
fully specified since they are often confused with transaction costs, thereby violating the conditions 
for the Coasian argument to come into play.  
 
A salient aspect would be to use the arguments presented by a number of writers (including 
Reekie, Scherer and Danzon) that the methodologies used in the analysis in order to support a 
particular viewpoint are lacking in depth. Elementary analyses are often used to leverage particular 
viewpoints.  Healthcare is an emotive issue, often mired in politics and socio-economic 
circumstance, and the issue of substantial profit on behalf of the pharmaceutical companies would 
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appear to be predatory.  In order for issues to be settled, a level of transparency and good faith, on 
both the supply and demand sides, is important. 
 
3.3 The Impact of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
Agreement on Access to Drug Prices in Developing Countries 
 
The agreement on the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) came 
into being in 1995 with the establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).  Even though 
there was a formal acceptance of the agreement, developing nations have experienced some 
difficulty in implementing the final provisions (Watal, 1999, p.105). The implementation of 
intellectual property rights (IPR’s) met with resistance in some developing countries, and this even 
at the risk of jeopardising direct foreign investment.  It was through no fault of their own since they 
were originally given ten years to change their laws to meet with the compliance, but in reality they 
had to begin implementation of the IPR’s immediately, particularly in areas involving 
pharmaceuticals and agriculture.  
 
The most significant aspect of the TRIPS agreement is that intellectual property rights, such 
as patent rights, are private rights that should be enforced by member states.  This is the system that 
is designed to provide protection to patent holders.  It is also important to note that American 
pharmaceutical companies led the international business coalition that called for the TRIPS 
agreement (Ostry, 1999, p. 196).  The issue of parallel imports raised the question of where the 
limits of property rights were exhausted.  Article (6) permits a World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
member to use parallel imports in a manner that best suits its needs (Ostry, 1999, p. 201).   Needless 
to say, some very strong and eloquent points of view were raised from those in favour of restrictive 
measures and those in favour of permissive measures regarding parallel trade. One of the arguments 
favouring restriction was that the positive dynamic benefits that would accrue from the 
multinational enterprises (MNE’s) expertise at customising production and to price differentially 
would eclipse the benefits from static efficiency losses characteristic of restrictive trade.  The 
argument against restriction focussed on the fact that the WTO sought to liberalise trade, yet 
supported the concept of protectionism. The Coasian concept that trade arrangements will be made 
that are beneficial to both parties comes into play here, particularly around the allocation of 
property rights. The European Union allows free-trade, including parallel trade of patented goods, 
amongst its member states. However, no external trade of patented goods occurs without the 
consent of the patent holder. The EU has a monitoring mechanism that could observe such trade.  
 
 51
The interpretation of the patented criteria can vary somewhat.  There are three classes:  
i) novelty; 
ii) non-obviousness (or inventive step); and  
iii) utility (or industrial applicability).  
 
These are designed to create transparency in negotiations (Watal, 1999, p. 107 and Ostry, 1999, 
p.196).  The rights of patent holders are strictly protected under this agreement. However there are 
deliberate ‘loopholes’ that spell out limited exceptions to the patentee’s exclusive rights.  One of 
the subsections of the agreement, Article 30, does not list the specific circumstances where patents 
could be used without authorisation. In addition, developing countries could use non-voluntary 
licences to make patent inventions available at more competitive prices (Watal, 1999, p. 110).  
 
Patents are important to the inventors or developers of pharmaceutical products because it 
allows them to maximise potential profits from trade for the length of its patent life or until 
superseded by a new patent.  Pharmaceutical product patents, in conjunction with government 
enforcement, are particularly effective in protecting the rights of the patentee.  Danzon (1998, 
p.295) has raised the issue of the recoupment of costs for R&D expenditure. The public policy 
question is how to balance the desire of national health systems to provide new drugs at an 
affordable level, and yet retain strong incentives for R&D (Scherer and Watal, 2001, p. 4).   
 
India changed its patent law in December 2004 by presidential decree in order to meet a 
January 2005 deadline to allow patents on the chemical molecules used in drugs.  The decree came 
into effect on January 1st, 2005.  Why would this be significant?  One reason is that India18 is the 
one of the largest pharmaceutical manufacturing countries in the world, primarily of generic drugs 
and two is that two-thirds of its drug exports are intended for developing countries.  The policy 
change will cost the Indian economy over $700 million each year, while creating only $57 million 
in profits for multinationals (James, 2004).  However, the real issue for the multinationals is the 
poor-country examples and not the financially small poor-country markets.  One way of looking at 
the situation is that how can people in rich countries be persuaded to accept death from cancer and 
other diseases because they cannot pay the tens of thousands of dollars a year that a new generation 
of drugs and treatments will cost, if companies in India could manufacture and sell the same 
medicines for a small fraction of the price?  
                                                
18 Nature Medicine, December 30, notes that India is the fourth largest producer of pharmaceuticals in the 
world [some say it is the third largest], and two thirds of its exports go to developing countries 
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Parallel trade leads to the importation of generic products; there is evidence from nations 
with patent protection that the prices of pharmaceutical products fall substantially with the entry of 
generic products into the market (Scherer and Watal, 2001, p. 5).  For a country like South Africa, 
which may be considered a semi-industrialised, middle income country (World Bank Report 2000, 
p.315), the pertinent question regarding patent protection is whether the market exclusivity 
provided by patents would encourage R&D investments. One of the areas to consider is whether the 
market is sufficiently large to provide the purchasing power to justify the higher prices provided 
under patent protection. Would this market be substantial enough to sustain expenditure on R&D in 
terms of total or pro rata global outlay?  
 
R&D costs are recovered from a relatively small number of commercially successful drugs 
(Scherer and Watal, 2001, p. 12).  The issue facing developing nations in the new TRIPS 
environment is how to best enhance their access to the newest drugs within their budgets.  There are 
a number of policy options available that would not run afoul of the TRIPS agreement including 
compulsory licenses, enforcing price controls, donations or financial assistance of medicines and 
participating in international drug procurement ventures. The writer will discuss compulsory 
licences as it deals directly with national pricing policies. The other influencing factor is parallel 
trade.  
 
 
3.4 Compulsory Licensing 
One option available to developing nations that allows for affordable access to patented 
drugs in the TRIPS environment is compulsory licenses. A compulsory license is the authorisation 
by permitting a third party to make, use or sell a patent or invention without necessarily seeking the 
patentee’s consent.  Article 31 of the TRIPS agreement stipulates that the prospective licensee 
should have tried for a reasonable period of time, and have been unsuccessful within this period, to 
obtain authorisation from the patent holder. This requirement can be waived in the event of an 
emergency or extreme urgency or if the drug is used for non-commercial use (Scherer and Watal, 
2001, p. 14).  It is understood that non-commercial public use of drugs might occur when health 
authorities distribute drugs through public health outlets such as clinics.   
 
Compulsory licence regimes have been used to restore competition in the realm of antitrust 
violations in the United States.  The German Federal Cartel Office addressed the issue of 
monopolistic pricing by dominant firms, in some cases based on patent rights. The most high 
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profile case, and most litigated, was the case brought against Hoffman-La Roche, manufacturers of 
Valium (Scherer and Watal, 2001, p. 18).   
 
The TRIPS agreement is important for global trade to be conducted in a fair and open 
manner. Its interpretation however may result in extreme hardship for less developed nations. The 
agreements do afford participating nations some level of flexibility in their negotiations. The TRIPS 
agreement also limits the developments of generic drugs by giving credence to the patent right of 
the drug’s inventors. It also requires that governments play a role in ensuring fair play does exist 
and not to free-ride on the inventions of other. However the compulsory licence issue and parallel 
trade gives rise to two areas that threaten the transparency in relationships; firstly, WTO members 
cannot free-ride on R&D of other nations and secondly, international trade involves comparative 
advantages with the result that developing countries with small economies may not find it in their 
interest to uphold the TRIPS principles. Furthermore it might be more advantageous for them to 
engage in unauthorised economic activities in the short run.  
 
3.5 Concluding Remarks on TRIPS 
The Coasian solution in light of these disparities is to highlight the fact that multinational 
companies will engage each other in order to resolve their conflicts regarding property rights, 
compulsory licences, generic substitution and parallel trade.  One consideration is that the issue of 
compulsory licenses allows for flexibility in the trade agreements that would allow for nations to 
develop their own unique set of trade agreements. These agreements would deal with issues 
concerning production standards in drug manufacturing, pricing, quantity and also some form of 
payment to the patent holder (if agreed to), reflecting the Coasian solution.  
 
3.6 Conclusion  
 There are a number of issues at hand regarding compulsory licences and parallel trade.  
When would be viable to issue compulsory licences?  The most recent high profile case could 
provide some answers19.  There is a current debate regarding the threat of the avian flu strain 
(HV51) becoming a pandemic and the efficacy of the drug Tamiflu to treat it.  The patent holder 
Roche purchased the patent from Gilead Sciences Inc in 1996.  The debate is centred on the 
inability of Roche to meet worldwide demand for the drugs and its initial refusal to allow for 
compulsory licences.  Taiwan, Korea and Argentina have already issued compulsory licences for 
                                                
19 The Boston Globe editorial (November 11, 2005) and the San Francisco Chronicle (October 19, 2005) 
reported on this issue.  
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local production and the Indian generic manufacturer, CIPLA, has announced that it has mastered 
the manufacturing technique to produce the drug.   
 
Reekie (1997, p. 36) raises the pertinent issues regarding this issue and Ramsey pricing; 
i) “How can governments strengthen the demand side further to foster 
competition? 
ii) How can it encourage an informed environment rather than a directed one? 
iii) How can patients and prescribers be empowered so that their individual 
wishes   and wants are responded to by suppliers?” 
This approach has its critics and supporters.  Primarily, depending on the method of analyses 
used, one can come up with ‘scientific evidence’ to supports one’s view.   
 
The question remains whether the obvious profit motive, regardless of the analyses used, is 
more valuable than the current lives lost or is the possible future lives lost more important.  This 
line of thinking can be distilled into a Coasian argument of who holds the most important right.   
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CHAPTER 4 
A History of Pharmaceutical Price Regulations  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Now that a sound theoretical framework has been established in the preceding two chapters 
the author intends to focus on the history of safety legislation in the pharmaceutical sector and its 
implications or lessons for pricing policy. A number of international case studies that are relevant to 
the South African experience and can be used to inform current policy thinking on price and pricing 
structure. At the same time, there are international experiences that directly impact – and even limit 
– the thinking on pharmaceutical pricing in South Africa today. In the chapter presented here, two 
specific cases have been identified: one in the United States of America (USA) and one in the 
United Kingdom (UK).  The section will open with a discussion of the influential Kefauver-Harris 
Amendment, which deals with the development of drug safety championed by Senator Estes 
Kefauver, a member of the USA senate sub-committee on anti-trust and monopoly activity (see 
Wang, 2002).  The impact and continuing ramification of the amendment for drug-pricing, 
particularly in the USA, will also be assessed. A similar discussion will examine the findings of the 
Sainsbury Committee in the UK, which outlined the UK experience of drug safety and high drug 
prices. The work of Towse (1997) will be used to ascertain lessons from Australia and Canada, and 
whether or not these lessons can be effectively applied in the South African market.  Two 
significant inquiries that were held in South Africa focussed on the high cost of healthcare and the 
perceived high drug prices. Both these inquiries, the Snyman Report (1962) and the Steenkamp 
Report (1978) made observations similar to those of their international counterparts.  The Melamet 
Commission (1993) went beyond the existing debate and made recommendations on reviewing and 
changing the tax structure.  Primarily, people paying for insured medical benefits (medical 
schemes) received a tax break on the amount that they contributed for this cover.  The situation 
resulted in a greater benefit to those employees who fell into the higher tax brackets and they 
benefited from the then current tax laws.   
4.2 International Developments 
Costs to patients and reimbursements incurred when paying for medicines has given rise to 
many investigations including those conducted by the Hinchcliffe Committee in 1959 by the 
Department of Health (DoH) in the UK; the Douglas Committee, also in 1959, by the Scottish DoH, 
These commissions may have made it feasible for weightier investigations, which will be discussed 
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below, to take place; importantly the Kefauver Senate Committee hearings in the US, which were 
instituted in 1960, and brought out both a majority and a minority report (Snyman Report, 1962, p. 
104) and the Sainsbury Report in1965-7.   
 
4.2.1 The Kefauver Hearings in the United States of America (USA) 
The Kefauver hearings focused on strengthening the drug provisions that were originally 
promulgated in the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic (FDC) Act of 1938 and signed by President 
F.D. Roosevelt. In the USA, prior to the FDC Act, there was an ongoing problem with perceived 
dangerous drugs because drugs were being introduced into the market without significant testing 
(Hamilton, 1997, 14). The issue received national attention when more than a hundred people died 
after taking a preparation called ‘Elixir Sulphanilamide’, a drug distributed by the manufacturer 
Massengill. The preparation contained diethylene glycol, which Hamilton (1997, p.14) described as 
“a chemical analogue of antifreeze” (1997, 14).  In June 1938, the FDC Act was signed into law 
and required that new drugs be tested for safety before being distributed onto the market. The 
results of these tests had to be submitted to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in what was 
called a ‘new drug application’ or NDA.  The law also required adequate labelling for information 
and safety purposes. 
 
Notably, Senator Estes Kefauver of the Sub-committee on Antitrust and Monopoly, which 
fell under the Committee on the Judiciary, chaired these hearings. One of the outcomes of the 
hearing was Bill No. S3815, which among other measures proposed that stringent manufacturing 
standards be instituted. It also expanded antibiotic certification to cover all antibiotics. The bill was 
explicitly aimed at protecting public health (Hamilton, 1997, 14).   
 
Whilst the Kefauver hearings were in progress, the FDA received a new drug application 
for a brand of thalidomide, called Kevadon, from the William Merrell Company. The application 
was however not supported by sufficient data and analysis from safety trials.  William Merrell 
Company undertook trial runs of the drug. By 1962, the disastrous effects of thalidomide on 
newborn babies became evident and the drug had to be removed from its limited distribution 
channels. Subsequently, the application was not approved. In light of this development, Senator 
Kefauver re-introduced his Bill, which came into effect when President John F Kennedy signed the 
Drug Amendments of 1962 into law. These became known as the ‘Kefauver-Harris Amendments’. 
The Amendments were far reaching. They required that drug manufacturers prove to the FDA the 
safety and efficacy of their products prior to the products being marketed; that all antibiotics be 
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certified; and that the FDA area of control be expanded to encompass drug advertising.  In the wake 
of these amendments, the FDA’s approval of new drugs became increasingly risk averse and 
rigorous.  The FDA extended the processing times for new drugs typically by almost two years 
(Gieringer, 1985).  The cost of development was also impacted as a direct result of the 1962 
Amendments, increasing to $24 million by 1976 which was about 20 times that prior to the 
Amendments being enacted.  Furthermore, the amendments ensured that the full details of clinical 
investigations be submitted to the FDA and that all drugs be tested on animals prior to any human 
trials (Hamilton, 1997, 14).  Although the 1962 Amendments did not directly address the price of 
drugs, it put into place drug safety requirements that needed to be met.  It was the process of 
ensuring that a particular drug was safe that impacted on the final costing of the drug.  Elements 
such as development times, safety and efficacy standards resulted in the higher prices of drugs.  
 
Ruwart (2004a, p.1), in trying to assess the impact of the Kefauver-Harris Amendments on 
prescription drug expenditures by consumers used published data to show that the Amendments had 
both a monetary and human life cost, the latter being beyond the scope of this paper.  The results 
showed that drug development time increased by an additional 9.8 years, primarily due to the 
Amendments.  After the amendments the rate of R&D costs increased by 13-fold.  A comparison 
was drawn between pre- and post-amendments trends. Had pre-amendment trends continued, the 
capitalised cost of putting a drug on the market would have been approximately 8% of the cost in 
2004.  Ruwart also shows a strong correlation between R&D/NCE20 and prescription drug 
expenditures which suggest that there is a significant link between excessive drug prices and 
amendment-driven increases in drug development costs.   
 
The significance of what Ruwart highlights is that the additional costs of drug development 
which are amendment-induced add significantly to the structuring of the price of the drug.  This 
means that manufacturers spend more on R&D in order to compress development times. Additional 
development costs will be captured into the final selling price structure.  Further impacts on 
manufacturing, labelling and advertising would also tend to increase the final selling price.   
 
Finally, it is common business practice to price products as a multiple of costs.  R&D is the 
largest cost factor in the development of NCE’s and hence becomes an expedient measure in which 
to price new pharmaceuticals.  The reduction in development costs would imply that there would be 
a proportionate reduction in the selling price and hence in total drug expenditures (Ruwart, 2004a, 
                                                
20 New Chemical Entity (NCE) 
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p.1).  Ruwart estimates that, in the USA, reported drug costs in 2003 were $162 billion, whereas 
they could have been as low as $24 billion (15% of what they are today) had pre-amendment trends 
continued.  The Amendments had the effect of imposing additional fixed costs which impacted on 
the final cost of the drug, and which had a knock-on effect of increasing the selling price to the 
consumer.   
 
4.2.2 The ‘Sainsbury Committee’ Investigation in the United Kingdom (UK) 
 
In 1966 the British government, under pressure to investigate alleged spiralling drug cost to 
the National Health System (NHS), charged a committee of inquiry under the chairmanship of Lord 
Sainsbury to inquire into this process. This Committee, known as the ‘Sainsbury Committee’ was 
tasked with examining the relationship of the pharmaceutical industry in Great Britain with the 
NHS.  Their agenda  included the consideration of and inter-relationships between, the structure of 
the industry, the commercial policies of the respective firms in the industry, pricing practices, 
marketing practices, the impacts of patents, the relevance and value of any research that was 
conducted and finally to make recommendations regarding its findings.  This Committee made 
thirty-three recommendations and in doing so set the ground rules relating to pharmaceutical trade 
for a number of countries, many of whom were in strong trade relationships with the UK.  The 
recommendations were broken down into four sections, two of which are of relevance to this paper, 
“Future Pricing Arrangements and The Medicines Commission” and included; 
i) The Ministry of Health (Ministry) should be entitled to obtain from a 
manufacturer of any medical speciality product a Standard Cost Return in 
prescribed form.  
ii) That the Standard Cost Returns should be prepared on the basis of a stated 
anticipated annual volume of sales and each return should show the 
proposed margin of profit and the proposed selling price.  
iii) That the Ministry should compare their own estimate of cost with the 
Standard Cost Returns and should negotiate prices of medicines on this 
basis and in the light of successive Financial Returns of the firm 
concerned.  
iv) The attention of the British tax authorities should be drawn to the transfer 
prices of pharmaceutical raw materials or intermediaries, and that the 
Ministry, in assessing the Standard Cost Returns of foreign-owned 
manufacturing companies, should make use of the ability of chemical 
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engineers to form reasonable assessments of the production costs of 
chemical materials.  
v) That the ministry should calculate capital employed on the basis of 
historical cost provided the limitations of this basis are borne in mind. 
vi) That, since the negotiation of prices may sometimes fail to result in 
agreement, a procedure must be available to which the ministers may have 
recourse and that the ministers should consider amendment of the National 
Health Acts to bring the General Medical and Pharmaceutical Services 
within definition of ‘services of the crown’ for the purposes of Section 46 
of the Patents Act, 1949. 
vii) That the Commission should prepare a ‘control document’ for a product on 
the basis of information submitted in prescribed form by the manufacturer.  
The Commission might also introduce an abbreviated control document to 
facilitate the control of advertising. 
viii) That all advertisements for licensed medicines should be wholly consistent 
with the control document. 
ix) That no product subject to the licensing procedure should be advertised 
until a copy of the control document has been sent out to all practising 
doctors and pharmacists.  
x) That as soon as the Commission has established procedure for dealing with 
advertisements relating to new pharmaceutical preparations, it should 
consider to what extent they should apply to existing products advertised to 
doctors.  (Sainsbury Report, 1967, p. 1-3) 
 
The Committee gathered information from diverse sources including the pharmaceutical 
industry, research houses, factories and specialists and general practitioners from the UK, USA and 
Switzerland. The primary focus was whether or not drugs were unreasonably priced resulting in 
drug companies making excessive profits.  Furthermore the Committee sought to establish whether 
the industry’s research effort is relevant and viable and whether the methods employed in the sale 
and distribution of drugs are appropriate (Sainsbury Report, p. 5) 
 
The profitability and operational aspects of firms were scrutinised and a robust stance was 
adopted against companies who reflected substantially high profits. In one instance, a severe view 
was taken against the drug manufacturer Beecham because of their high drug prices and large 
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profits (Corley, 1997, p 21).  Furthermore, the Committee were resolute that Beecham had spent 
relatively little on scientifically based R&D compared to that of marketing and sales.   
 
The Committee also argued against the government control of drug profits, as observed by 
Earl-Slater (1967), who also points out that the concept of reasonable price is an ongoing 
discussion.  Moreover, he identifies seven problems which are endemic with the pharmaceutical 
regulations ranging from lack of robust reasoning, theoretical basis, empirical basis, transparency, 
due process and an impact analysis.  
 
The Committee considered a policy of nationalising the pharmaceutical and healthcare 
industry but abandoned the idea. However they did recommend that a Medicines Commission be 
set up in order to supervise the manner in which drugs are introduced, promoted and marketed.  The 
findings of the Committee revealed that the “industry was out of control, that the market was 
‘flooded with undesirable drugs’, and that the NHS was paying for them” (Rawlins and Medawar, 
1998, p.1). The recommendations played a vital role in promulgating the Medicines Act of 1968 in 
Britain.  This Act was a first step in the regulation of the pharmaceutical industry in a constructive 
manner.  
 
In retrospect, it is beneficial, at least to British society, that the Sainsbury Report did not 
have any legislative muscle to completely entrench its recommendations since its impact on prices 
would have been profound.  The focus tended to rely too heavily on controlling the prices of drugs 
through regulation.  Danzon (2000) has showed, albeit subsequently, that the prices of innovative 
drugs tend, in the long-run, to be cheaper in countries that have free pricing as opposed to countries 
that have restrictive pricing regulations.  
 
The Sainsbury Commission did impact positively in some ways.  Primarily it set the 
foundations for the formation of the Voluntary Price Regulation Scheme (VPRS) which 
subsequently became the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS).  This body regulates 
profits.  It permits new drugs to be freely priced provided total company or specified product profits 
remain within a range of 17.5% to 22.5% of sales which are not normal profits. Ramsey pricing 
structures are the implicit basis of these recommendations.   
 
Despite the Kefauver-Harris Amendments and the Sainsbury report, the USA does not and 
the UK does not impose stringent control on drug prices.  The UK has moderate controls- which 
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results in profits from constrained Ramsey pricing.  Competition is buoyant, the market forces of 
demand and supply would settle on pricing levels and R&D would be encouraged.  The control of 
prices through regulation (Italy, France, and Japan) can also keep prices at a sustainable21 level in 
the short run. It does, however, imply that there would be fewer funds deployed to R&D by the 
manufacture’s because the return on investment is low.  As Ruwart concludes, there is also a social 
welfare need that has to be addressed 
 
4.3 The South African Experience 
As in the US, pharmaceuticals as a cost factor in the healthcare equation have received a 
great deal of attention from both health authorities and users in South Africa. As mentioned earlier 
in this dissertation, a number of commissions have investigated the pharmaceutical industry in 
recent years. The SA pharmaceutical industry has had its share of investigations, too, including: the 
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into High Cost of Medical Services and Medicines in 1962 
(the Snyman Report); the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Pharmaceutical Industry in 
1978 (the Steenkamp Report); the Interim Report on Pharmaceutical Services in 1985; the findings 
of the Melamet Commission; and the Medicines and Related Substances Act (Act 90 of 1997), 
which was eventually promulgated as an amendment to the SA Medicines and Related Substances 
Act, No. 101 of 1965.  
 
4.3.1 The Findings and Recommendations of the Snyman Report (1962) 
The authors of the Snyman Report conceded that the pharmaceutical industry had made 
great strides towards building the health of SA, in particular with the introduction of new and 
innovative medicines.  The report also noted that there had been a remarkable decrease in the 
number of deaths from infectious diseases, as well as earlier recovery of patients, and lower 
demand for hospital beds (Snyman, 1962, p.188).   The commission furthermore identified the 
following factors in the price structure of medicines: 
i) Export prices, where control is beyond that of the importer; 
ii) Customs tariffs, which amounted to about 20% of the normal wholesale price. The 
commission concluded that there was no justification for import duty on essential 
medicines that could not be manufactured in South Africa; 
 
                                                
21 The healthcare systems from these countries draw up budgets regarding what can be spent annually on 
various medical interventions. The amount spent on drugs has an annual limit.  Through regulation and price 
controls, these healthcare systems are amongst those that attempt to get the most value in the short run, which 
in this case is considered to be one year.  
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iii) Local transport costs, which fluctuated between 5% and 25% of the drug; 
iv) Importers profit margins, which were set overseas; 
v) Wholesale profit margins, which amounted to 15% of the retail price; and 
vi) Retail trade prices, estimated at about 50% of the retail price. 
The commission noted that it was concerned about the multiplicity of identical compounds on the 
market and called for this practice to be curtailed. Among the recommendations made by the 
commission, the following are pertinent to the discussion here: 
 
Recommendation 32 
The Central Board of Control of Medicines should fix and limit the permissible number of identical 
preparations. This issue had implications in that it could impact on the development of generic 
medicines and keep upward pressures on innovative drug prices high. The board was eventually 
established in terms of the Medicines and Related Substances Act, Act 101 of 1965 and called the 
Medicines Control Council.  
 
Recommendation 33 
The commission devoted attention to better siting of pharmacies within communities and considered 
the contribution of pharmacists by canalizing medicines through pharmacies, which could only be 
achieved if no other business other than a pharmacy is allowed to sell medicines within a certain 
distance of an established pharmacy.  The decision had implications for the amendments of Act 101 
in 2004, where the issue of doctor dispensing licenses was dealt with as well as that of the single exit 
price (SEP) and capped dispensing fee for pharmacists. A detailed discussion of the 2004 
amendments will be undertaken in Chapter 5 of this paper. 
 
Recommendation 41  
Patent rights on medicines should be maintained for a period not exceeding five years and when a 
patent is granted only the generic name of the preparation, followed by the name of the company 
concerned in brackets, should be granted.  There is a clear indication that the issue of patent rights of 
manufacturers was seen as a problem by the commission. Patents, at that stage, were held for sixteen 
years and it was viewed that manufacturers exploited this patent in order to employ monopolistic 
pricing. 
 
Recommendation 46 
The commission recommended that all white (taxable) citizens, regardless of income, should join 
existing or future schemes providing medical cover.  
 
Recommendation 47 
Compulsory membership of funds for all employees should be made as a condition of service of the 
various public authorities.  
 
These final two recommendations called for mandatory cover of white income earners.  
Mandatory cover is currently being touted as a progressive step in some quarters of the medical 
schemes industry.  
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4.3.2 The Findings and Recommendations of the Steenkamp Report 
The Steenkamp commission deliberated on a number of different issues regarding the 
pharmaceutical industry but its primary purpose was to assess the manufacture of drugs in SA and 
analyse the requirements for enabling this manufacture. Aspects of the investigation included raw 
materials required, patent legislation, exports, prices and associated factors and finally, joint 
purchasing of public requirements. The commission also discussed the possibility of reducing the 
rate of increase in medicine and developing a domestic industry, suggesting that measures should 
address the healthcare situation as a whole, rather than considering a single aspect in isolation (such 
as pharmaceuticals). 
 
The commission considered the physical possibilities of developing a local manufacturing 
industry. Although it felt that South Africa was on the verge of significant progress in this area, the 
commission pinpointed a number of economic factors that could hinder the process. A lack of a 
strong domestic market was one such concern, particularly because of highly skewed income 
distribution patterns in the country as evidenced by the Gini Coefficient. A measure of health and 
income inequality, the coefficient takes 0 to mean perfect income equality and 1 to mean perfect 
inequality. The Gini Coefficient for SA reached 0.68 at its peak. Local demand for high-cost drugs 
was thus limited to a small group of people. The fact of a higher local price (compared with 
international prices) meant that exports would be limited.  
 
One of the commission’s most pertinent observations was regarding patent rights. The 
commission quotes healthcare economist Duncan Reekie in saying that patent rights encourage 
innovation (Steenkamp, 1977, p. 44). The observation is made that no company can sustain the 
costs (e.g. research or marketing) of introducing a new and innovative drug when a competitor can 
simply copy the drug and recoup its profits.  The commission went on to support the view, widely 
held at the time, that patent protection should be extended to twenty years depending on the 
product. The proposals were in line with then-contemporary thinking in Europe. Another 
recommendation (internally inconsistent) that was made in the Steenkamp report was the 
introduction of price controls, to limit monopolistic behaviour on the part of manufacturers and 
distributors. It went so far as to suggest that a statutory body be established to investigate 
monopolistic conditions (Steenkamp, 1977, p. 48).  
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A desirable policy measure was that government policy should be encourage market 
transparency, rather than intercede with price.  The follow-on effect would be an improvement in 
competition.  The report findings supported the need for more market transparency via the 
restriction of ‘non-market’ related practices.  Examples included ‘sampling and bonusing’, a 
practice where ‘free’ samples are given to practitioners in order to ‘encourage’ them to prescribe a 
particular manufacturers’ product.  Add to that, the excessive promotion material produced by the 
manufacturing companies allegedly reduced both transparency and competition in the marketplace.  
This perception does create a moral dilemma; Does one allow for more advertising which would 
invariably dissipate more information?  More information creates a greater level of understanding 
and subsequently a greater level of transparency.  In an ideal economic paradigm, perfect 
competition occurs in a situation where there is perfect information.  One can thus infer that greater 
transparency is synonymous with greater competition.   
 
Coase surmised that for parties involved in a negotiation for exchanging their respective 
property rights, the parties involved need to be fully informed about the situation at hand, both in 
terms of ex post and ex ante costs.  To restrict the flow of information through restrictive 
advertising practices would imply that consumers would not have the requisite amount of 
information in order to make an informed choice, thus compromising social welfare.  A simple 
example would be when a physician prescribes a certain drug for a patient to use.  If the patient has 
an allergic reaction to that particular drug, then the patient can inform the physician who can 
change the prescription.  Had the patient not been informed and developed an allergic reaction, 
there would have been a welfare cost to society.  The Steenkamp Reports recommendations in this 
area, consistent with that of the Sainsbury and Kefauver recommendations would ultimately, in the 
long run, lead to structural inefficiencies in the purchases of medications.  
 
The purchase of generic products by the state and provincial departments was also 
highlighted by the commission (Steenkamp, 1977, p. 65).  Although the commission supported this 
proposal, it felt that the matter required further investigation.  
 
The relevance of the Steenkamp report to the discussion at hand is primarily its 
acknowledgement that patent rights do encourage innovation and thus should be promoted, 
although weighed-up against the need to reduce costs for the patient. The commission was likewise 
aware of the ability to adopt monopolistic pricing that patent protection permits.   
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For the research here, the key question is whether or not the findings of the Snyman and 
Steenkamp commission are relevant for a Coasian approach to pharmaceutical pricing. Bear in 
mind that a Coasian solution presupposes agreement between parties to a transaction. The ex post 
costs associated with supplementing the supply of drugs by encouraging local discovery of 
innovative drugs would arguably lead to a failure of the Coasian solution.  If discovery of 
innovative medicines were to occur in South Africa under a licensing arrangement, then the costs of 
the associated R&D would likely be prohibitive such that it would not be a viable option to 
undertake such an endeavour. There is currently a lot of work done in HIV/AIDS research, but the 
primary source of innovative medicines still remains America, Asia and Europe.  South Africa has 
substantive production facilities and has been sufficiently competitive to be able to enter the export 
market in pharmaceuticals.  
 
4.4 The evaluation of pharmaceutical pricing methods - experiences from Australia and 
Canada  
The SA commissions discussed above made the point that information on efficient drug 
pricing is crucial for policy-makers to design a healthcare system in line with the country’s 
healthcare objectives. This is where the Coasian and Williamson arguments regarding transaction 
costs (as described in Chapter 2) can best be demonstrated.  They believed that in trying to ascertain 
which of the available drugs work most efficiently, money would need to be spent to achieve an 
efficient outcome. 
 
Towse (1977) however argues from a more traditional point of view. He disaggregates the 
idea of ‘efficiency’ into two categories: allocative and productive efficiencies (1997).  Allocative 
efficiency is achieved through a mix of outcomes that is based on what society wants, i.e. how 
consumer valuation is reflected in product prices.  Productive efficiency is simply achieving the 
outcomes at the most cost- effective manner, i.e., the prices that permit profit over costs.  Towse, in 
an attempt to measure the value and quality of life, uses the concept of the Quality-Adjusted Life 
Year (QALY).  It was useful in ascertaining the success of an intervention through measuring the 
outcomes based care. 
 
Outcomes from treatments and similar health-influencing pursuits comprise two basic 
components: the quantity and quality of life.  Costs are measured per Quality-Adjusted Life Year 
(QALY), which is designed to combine both the quality and quantity of life. QALY however is 
undoubtedly a crude measurement. As Towse himself explains, “ …costs per QALY thresholds and 
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QALY maximization objectives will, if met, lead to productive efficiency (for a given drug), but 
only to allocative efficiency if the sole objective of the healthcare system is to maximize health 
gain, irrespective of whether some patients or diseases are left untreated as a consequence”, 
(Towse, 1997, p. 64).   
 
Furthermore, health policy – to be allocatively efficient – needs to assess inter alia 
economic observations, social values, advocacy, views of lobby groups and political expediency.  
Economic evaluations for instance could be used to enhance productive efficiency, which in turn 
yields production efficiency, and could add value by supporting allocative decision-making. 
Measures to enhance productive efficiency gains in the short-run may also be employed, including 
an increase in generic prescribing, or reducing repeat-prescription. The short-term implications of 
reducing pharmaceutical prices may be attractive to payers, as proposed in the current legislative 
paradigm in South Africa, but brings up the possibility of sacrificing longer-term ‘dynamic’ 
benefits for short-term ‘static’ gain.  Towse describes static efficiency as realising productive and 
allocative efficiencies from available resources. Dynamic efficiency he defines as realising the best 
outcomes over time.   
 
The use of economic evaluation of pricing structures raises two issues. The first is the 
efficient pricing in pharmaceuticals and the second is the timing of economic evaluation.  A product 
can be priced in a range bounded by the ‘bottom’ end and the ‘top’ end, where the bottom-end is a 
range of prices approximately equal to the marginal cost of production. Pricing can be considered 
cost-effective if it is skewed towards this lower end.  Under this scenario however the manufacturer 
would not realise sufficient returns on its sunk costs, and particularly its investment in R&D.  The 
top-end is where prices equate to the value of health benefits that society pays the manufacturer. 
Ideally, the price of a drug should be bounded by these two extremes.  The precise setting of the 
price is a judgement call between balancing society’s willingness to pay for the drug and the 
importance of encouraging pharmaceutical innovation. Simply put, it can be seen as a trade-off 
between static and dynamic efficiencies.  Ultimately the trade-off is determined by the willingness 
of patients to purchase more expensive drugs because of perceived better outcomes, in addition to 
the degree of competition (Towse, 1997, p. 65).  Efficiency in pricing can be used to influence the 
economic evaluation and favour a policy of lower prices to maximise static efficiency.  
 
The second issue for dynamic efficiency stems from timing – specifically when the 
economic evaluation is conducted in the continuum of the drug pricing procedure.  In addition, 
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cost-effectiveness may differ from clinical practice to results achieved in the clinical trials, as the 
drug could be used for different patient groups or for different treatments than originally intended 
(Towse, 1997, p.64).  The quantum of cost-effectiveness may differ in real life from those of the 
clinical trials for two reasons: 
 
i) The cost-effectiveness could deviate from cost-efficacy because of inconsistencies 
between actual experience and drug trials, caused by a number of factors including 
accuracy of diagnosis or patient compliance; and 
 
ii) The constant evaluation of the drug could result in additional patient responses 
being collected, thus reflecting a different outcome. 
 
Such inconsistencies highlight the fact that healthcare decision-making about price occurs in a 
second-best situation where guidelines intended to achieve efficient results can be constrained 
because other areas of the healthcare system are inefficient.  
 
4.4.1 National healthcare systems in Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom – 
ascertaining value for money in pharmaceuticals 
Australia, Canada and the UK each use the economic evaluation of pharmaceuticals in 
order to determine what the payment of drug therapies by their national healthcare system would 
be.  Although such methods are typically used in the public sector, they have significant 
implications for the private sector in South Africa because of the dual healthcare system with both 
public and private streams. Drugs are sold at public sector prices to the government via a tender 
process and at a supposedly marginal cost level.  The same drugs are sold to the private sector at 
higher prices in order to recoup sunk costs, as it is claimed (Appasamy and Riding, 2004, p. 1), to 
private sector buyers. Private sector prices are directly linked to public sector prices. It may be 
useful to consider the methods of reimbursement used in other paradigms.  
 
4.4.1.1 The Australian Experience 
Australia requires that companies provide an economic evaluation of any new medicine if 
they want to be listed on the Pharmaceutical Benefit Scheme (PBS), which is a public 
reimbursement scheme that handles about 90% of the Australian prescription pharmaceutical 
market (Towse, 1997, p. 65).  Guidelines for information on a specific drug are published by the 
government.  Based on this, and economic evaluation, the drug may be listed for reimbursement 
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purposes by the PBS. Economic evaluation further assists in establishing a price for the particular 
drug when it is listed. The evaluation and related price-setting exercise are the primary mechanisms 
used by the Australian model to arrive at a ‘value for money’ level.   
 
Drummond and Aristides (1997, p. 34) point out that possible delays and restrictions in 
getting a drug listed may result in preventable healthcare costs being incurred.  They note that the 
PBS process is weighted toward static cost-effectiveness, rather than innovation and those new, 
innovative products are sometimes denied listing because they are not sufficiently cost-effective.  
 
Towse refers to a study on the Australian pharmaceutical industry conducted by the 
Industry Commission Inquiry, an organisation that has published data on price trends. It shows that 
prices of new products in Australia are about a third lower than the world average.  Further, it 
shows that the best-selling products in Australia are, on average, approximately two-thirds below 
world prices (Towse, 1977, p. 68).  It has been argued that the use of economic evaluation as part of 
the price-setting process helps benefit the industry by rewarding innovation (Freemantle, et al, 
1995).  Economic evaluation has been responsible for pushing up prices in this environment 
compared to that in a more arbitrary regime; however, there was also the concern that economic 
analyses could be used as a cost-containment tool rather than an efficiency tool.  
 
There are, however, a number of problems associated with this approach.  Drummond and 
Aristides (1997, p.36) point out that if thresholds are used to calculate payouts, there would be an 
attempt to rule out expensive drugs for chronic ailments, even where these drugs could result in 
higher levels of health gain.  The current medical scheme environment demonstrates this thinking.  
The medical scheme, under pressure to contain costs, would opt for cheaper, albeit less cost 
effective drugs and procedures, in order to maintain reserve levels22.  An informal threshold 
furthermore could be manipulated.  Higher-priced, newer products could be listed but may not be as 
cost-effective, or only be cost-effective at lower prices.  The process is also susceptible to delays in 
market access for companies while the analysis is in process, thereby imposing a substantial cost to 
both the PBS and the applicant.  The process falls short in its monitoring of the drug once it hits the 
market, especially in terms of competition from generic drug producers, parallel imports and 
                                                
22 In a conversation with a principal officer of a large open medical scheme, the point was made by the 
principal officer that it was not the schemes responsibility to see to social welfare.  Rather, if the physician, 
employer or patient was of the opinion that an alternate drug or procedure (which usually has a higher initial 
and absolute price) provided a faster recovery time and greater social welfare, then those parties should pay 
for the higher priced alternative intervention.  
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provider prescribing practices.  Towse nevertheless emphasises that there is no evidence that the 
rate of growth of pharmaceutical prices is slowing down.  
 
4.4.1.2 The Canadian Experience 
An economic evaluation in Canada needs to take cognisance of the guidelines developed by 
the Central Coordinating Office of Health Technology Assessment (CCOHTA).  Although the 
guidelines are not prescriptive, they do require that funding and stakeholder details be disclosed, as 
well as ensuring that the project team has a certain level of independence (Buxton, 1997, p. 19).  
CCOHTA does however commission its own studies. There is also a national health technology 
assessment unit in each province and the CCOHTA liaises with the provinces in this matter.  
 
Canada has a publicly-funded health system that includes a limited pharmaceutical benefit. 
The national prices are capped at a maximum set by a separate national body, the Patent Medicine 
Pricing Review Board (PMPRB).  The board likewise sets prices for both the public and private 
sectors, usually setting the maximum price in both environments.  
 
The modus operandi of the CCOHTA is that it requires an applicant of a new drug to 
submit an economic evaluation as a prerequisite to obtaining listing and subsequent reimbursement 
price of the drug to each province is based on a provincial formulary (Towse, 1997, p. 66).  Canada 
has a federal system of government and each province gets reimbursed a portion of the provincial 
spending on each drug.  
 
Buxton (1997, p. 23) concludes that economic evaluation will continue to have a significant 
influence on the pricing process in Canada, albeit in specific situations. Good economic evaluation 
will generate information that is relevant to local needs but in order to achieve this goal, the 
guidelines – as in the case of the CCOHTA (which is province specific) - need to be context-
specific. Buxton (1997) goes on to say that even though the differences are unique in each situation, 
the CCOHTA guidelines encourage a culture of including economic evaluation in order to develop 
a price directive. 
 
4.4.1.3 The UK Experience 
The UK’s National Health Service (NHS) controls approximately 95% of the UK 
prescription drug market (Towse, 1997, p. 66) and it lays down guidelines for economic evaluation 
(of new drugs) to be undertaken by those companies wishing to trade with the NHS. However, 
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companies are able to set their own prices for new drugs in their negotiation with the NHS. A profit 
control scheme, the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS), regulates profits, permitting 
firms to freely set the price of new drugs, and hence, potentially compensate for lower-priced drugs 
if the company has no innovation.  It allows for given, controlled profits for manufacturers and 
(what is perceived to be) affordable prices for users.  
 
A cost to the consumer is a function of frequency and severity. The control mechanism for 
keeping medicine costs in check is to monitor the prescribing budgets of the general practitioner 
(GP) and this is accomplished through a series of reports reflecting budget comparisons.  The 
alternate approach used is to give the budget holding GP’s to GP’s who will retain surpluses.  GP’s 
are also influenced by an NHS programme of research, review and dissemination of information 
relating to economic evaluations (Towse, 1997, p. 66).  The budget approach is similar to the 
mechanism used in France where each provider group is provided with a national budget.  
Similarities can also be drawn with the medical schemes in South Africa using the medical savings 
account. 
 
The introduction of budgets passes the responsibility of cost containment and risk-sharing 
to the GP. The NHS system appears to be succeeding in getting the message across, as seen in the 
growth of prescribing of generic medications across the national healthcare system. The budget 
holders reduced their drug costs more than the non-budget holders as reported by the GP group 
(Towse, 1997, p. 66).  Towse notes that one of the key concerns is that prescribers often do not see 
the value of economic studies and this could partially be due to the fact that there is a lack of 
relevance to the local situation, or a view that cost effectiveness is not an important decision 
making criterion. This is the revered doctor-patient relationship, one that requires the best 
healthcare at all costs.  
 
The pricing of pharmaceuticals, primarily if it is positioned above the short-run marginal 
cost level, is contingent on the public sector costing structures - as has been illustrated by the 
Towse discussion above and the Reekie discussion in the previous chapter.  This occurs in many 
countries that operate on a government run public healthcare system. The government’s 
involvement in healthcare (as in Canada) allows it to become a monopsonistic purchaser of drugs. 
Economies of scale would dictate that the selling price to this purchaser would be as close to or 
equal to the marginal cost of production.  This issue of Ramsey pricing is raised in the Canadian 
market, which has a large, affluent middle class who are able to afford the price of drugs.  The 
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uniform price structure, although lower than what manufacturers would like to price their products 
at, would still tend to alienate the less affluent pockets of the population.  Ramsey pricing is non-
existent.   
 
4.4.4  Concluding remarks 
In summary, the legislative concern of drug pricing began in earnest with the Kefauver 
recommendations to the US Senate, and gained gravitas with the Sainsbury Committee report to the 
British Parliament in the 1960’s. Arguably, these were two of the more prominent markets 
regarding drug pricing regulations in the world and their actions did spill over into and 
subsequently influence other markets. South Africa had its experience with a number of 
investigations into pharmaceutical pricing, including the Snyman Report in the 1960’s and the 
Steenkamp Report which were discussed here. It is important to note that many of the issues, 
including the single exit price and dispensing fee control, investigated by these commissions (such 
as the Snyman and Steenkamp Commission) were primarily driven by pressure from the higher 
income groups who dislike paying more for health services and drugs than the lower income 
groups.   
 
More legislative issues will be examined in Chapter 5 including the pricing of drugs being 
dependent on factors including the markets, the public sector infrastructure, and patent protection. 
The Coasian Theorem stipulates that for an efficient solution to exist there should be an exchange, a 
critical level of harmonisation or agreement between these parties. It is therefore important to 
appreciate the forces that influence pricing structure.  
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 CHAPTER 5 
A Review of the Regulatory and Environmental Constraints on 
Pharmaceutical Pricing 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
Building on the theoretical and historical lessons gleaned in the preceding three chapters, 
this chapter turns to the market that includes both the private and public environments within which 
drugs are priced in South Africa. An initial priority will be to explore the competition agenda in 
South Africa, with specific reference to price collusion.  The market dilemma is whether collusion 
on any level is regarded as anti-competitive. Examples include price parallelism, price uniformity, 
pricing transparency and specific price differences.  The letter of the law appears to lend support to 
the interpretation that most forms of information sharing is collusion and hence anti-competitive.  
Previous research suggests that two mechanisms play a role in the regulation of prices: namely, 
competition and legislation. Price structures are built on a web of relationships between various 
stakeholders in the healthcare industry. In the prevailing environment, the Competition Commission 
uses the Competition Act (Act No. 89 of 1998) to investigate price collusion between private sector 
stakeholders, including inter alia bodies such as the Board of Healthcare Funders (BHF), the 
Hospital Association of South Africa (HASA), and the South African Medical Association 
(SAMA). The effects of the Competition Act (Act No. 89 of 1998) on drug pricing will be 
explored. 
 
Apart from the risk and monitoring of collusive behaviour, the healthcare industry faces a 
changing regulatory environment that impacts the pricing of drugs.  South Africa’s public sector 
healthcare policies in the past decade have been strongly influenced by the Department of Health’s 
initial White Paper (1997), which sets out the broad-based long term goals of the ministry.  The 
proposed reforms were substantial, the goals and objectives are listed below: 
i. to unify fragmented health services at all levels into a comprehensive and integrated 
National Health System; 
ii. to promote equity, accessibility and utilisation of health services; 
iii. to extend the availability and ensure the appropriateness of health services; 
iv. to develop health promotion activities; 
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v. to develop human resources available to the health sector; 
vi. to foster community participation across the health sector; and 
vii. to improve health sector planning and the monitoring of health status and services. 
The critical aspect of the policy is that it overlooked a basic economic tenet - the scarcity of 
resources. In attempting to fulfil its noble and admirable reforms, the opportunity cost of such 
reforms needs to be considered. Primarily, the more accessible healthcare becomes, the greater the 
size of the financial burden is on the government.  The Minister of Finance, the Hon. Trevor 
Manuel, has indicated that this is a problem when he was speaking about changes to the private 
healthcare system (BHF conference, Namibia, 2002).  Moreover, the national budget for healthcare 
has been progressively reduced over the past four years and as such presents a double-pronged 
dilemma – less money and more people to treat.  
 
The question as to how this situation impacts upon pharmaceutical prices is somewhat 
perplexing.  The Department of Health, faced with smaller budgets and greater number of patients 
to sustain, would be placed in a position to obtain resources from other areas; either negotiate the 
purchases of goods and services at a lower price using its monopsonistic leverage or cut back on its 
range of services and introduce a minimal ‘co-pay’ for all services rendered. The department has, as 
the pharmaceutical manufacturers allude to, chosen to intensify its negotiation around the purchases 
of drugs.  In turn these manufacturers increase the price of drugs to the large purchasers of drugs in 
the private sector, i.e., the hospitals and the pharmaceutical retailers.  This is a world-wide 
phenomenon and both Scherer and Danzon have referred to the role that the government plays in 
influencing the price of goods.  An indirect (and simplistic) interpretation would be that the greater 
the pharmaceutical manufacturers’ cut is to the national purchaser (above marginal cost), the higher 
the selling price to the private sector purchaser – which is the free market price since the public 
goods are not traded.  
 
The past ten years has also seen private healthcare undergo some dramatic changes, not 
least because of the Medical Schemes Act (1998) which resulted, inter alia, in the advent of the 
Prescribed Minimum Benefits (PMB’s), in the enforcement of the previously unenforceable, the 
minimum reserve levels that schemes need to hold and the introduction of the new investment 
guidelines for schemes.  These factors all need to be scrutinised and applied to the question of how 
price structures are influenced by the regulatory environment.  The writer also intends to explore 
the link between market regulation and innovation by assessing the effect of government price 
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regulations on drugs on the cost and quality of healthcare such as incentives for R&D in drugs, and 
the problem of indirect impact, as researched by Kessler (2004).  
 
Another component of the discussion around drug price regulation in South Africa is the 
development of national health reference price lists and, critically, the impact these could have on 
free market operations (Magennis, 2004). As has been pointed out, relationships between private 
sector stakeholders, prior to the intervention of the competition authorities, were characterised by 
each trade organisation, the South African Medical Association (SAMA), the Hospital Association 
of South Africa (HASA) and the Board of Healthcare Funders (BHF) producing their own 
negotiated price lists.  These relationships have subsequently shifted as the competition authorities 
charged that these negotiated price lists were anti-competitive.  The writer will analyse the issue of 
how these shifting relationships drive prices. An additional area of analysis is the delivery costs of 
medical services, mainly in the private sector (BHF, 2004; CMS, 2004) and their role within the 
wider milieu of factors affecting pricing and possible policy directions.  
 
5.2  The Medical Schemes Environment 
Perfect competition occurs in an environment where there is availability and access to 
perfect information. The healthcare industry has, in many instances, exhibited non-competitive 
behaviour. In the patient-practitioner relationship, the patient is in a weak bargaining position (the 
patient would tend to follow the advice of the practitioner) because of informational asymmetries, 
and this is particularly true in a fee-for-service (FFS) environment where there is a principal-agent 
relationship between the patient and the physician.  It is not in the interest of the physician to limit 
medical interventions. Another case would be the medical scheme-private hospital scenario. The 
informational asymmetries allow the hospital to charge as it pleases with very little rebuttal from 
the medical scheme.  This scenario forces the medical scheme into a position of a price-taker as 
opposed to that of a price-setter. Reekie (1997b) describes it as an agency problem (emphasis added 
by writer). In the long-run, the medical scheme would be regarded as a cash cow by large 
enterprises such as hospitals.  In order to maximise the amount it receives from a medical scheme, it 
is imperative that these enterprises charge the same fee for services so that any form of bargaining 
on the part of the schemes is obviated.   
 
Furthermore, there are two key reasons why the patient does not challenge the charges of 
the service provider: firstly, the patient is in a weaker bargaining position and secondly the patient 
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enjoys third party payer status in that the medical scheme would settle any outstanding payments.  
There appears to be no perceived value in challenging the system.  Such a situation creates the 
circumstances for monopolistic pricing structures to emerge, replacing any competitive price 
structures and ultimately allows for oligopolies and cartels to develop.  The most overt example of 
this is the rapid growth and development of the private hospital sector in South Africa.  The cost of 
this falls back to the patient through the cyclical relationship which warrants that the patient 
(consumer) ends up paying for these charges through increased medical scheme contributions.  
Baumol23 raised the argument in his dual economy theory- the service sector and the production 
sector.  Increases in the production sector occur steadily whilst that of the service sector tend to lag 
behind because of time constraints.  With the service sector lagging behind the production sector, a 
threshold is reached resulting in the service sector increases being substantially more than that of 
the production sector.  This is the phenomenon that we are currently seeing in the healthcare sector.  
This will continue as long as the production sector becomes more efficient.  
 
The Competition Commissioner (CC) needed a cause to investigate the private healthcare 
sector and the spiralling prices gave the Commission the reason.  The Commission was established 
in 1999 by the Competition Act, No. 89 of 1998.  The Commission, armed with this Act, began to 
flex its muscle regarding anti-competitive behaviour.  The private healthcare sector displayed an 
endemic problem of steep price increases.  The BHF Annual Survey of Increases reflected that 
medical scheme contribution increases were literally double that of headline inflation for the years 
2001 to 2004 (Appasamy, 2001b, 2002b, 2003b, 2004b).  A number of practices in the healthcare 
industry were not seen to be in the interests of the consumer.  The Medical Schemes Act 131 of 
1998 introduced a number of the concepts that were originally mooted in the National Health Plan 
such as open enrolment and community rating for members of medical schemes.  It introduced the 
first set of Prescribed Minimum Benefits24 (PMB’s) that schemes had to offer as part of their 
benefit options, and also introduced the date that medical schemes had to achieve a minimum 
solvency level (25% by 31st December 2004).  In addition, these regulations reversed the schemes 
ability to manage risk in the manner that they have previously done.  The restriction on investments 
and the restriction on medical savings accounts leading to the current proposals to phase out 
medical savings accounts.  The medical schemes reaction to the burgeoning benefit structures and 
                                                
23 In discussions with Professor Reekie who broached the issue of service sector salaries.  
24 The Prescribed Minimum Benefits (PMB’s) are a group of 270 treatment pairs that each scheme has to 
offer all of its members. Furthermore, these conditions have to be paid for from the explicit risk pool and not 
from the medical savings accounts (MSA).  The PMB’s are a community and not an individual risk, hence all 
medical schemes need to offer then as part of any benefit package and pay for them out of the schemes risk 
pool rather than from an individual’s MSA.  
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Medical Schemes Private Hospitals Pharmaceuticals
Year Contribution Annual Year on Year Percentage of Annual Year on Year Percentage of 
 Increases CPIX Spend % Change Total Spend Spend % Change Total Spend
2000 10.54% 7.80% R 8,260,725 8.70% 30.42% R 7,311,690 5.00% 26.92%
2001 19.60% 6.60% R 8,987,929 8.80% 29.12% R 7,929,897 8.50% 25.69%
2002 16.40% 9.30% R 11,436,297 29.40% 35.70% R 8,656,021 5.60% 24.28%
2003 12.50% 6.80% R 13,283,344 15.80% 34.33% R 8,617,709 -4.00% 22.27%
greater fiscal restraint was to increase premium contributions at rates that exceeded any inflation 
index (see Table 1 below).  
 
The medical scheme quandary is exacerbated by the agency problem and the price-taker status. In a 
fee-for-service environment, the provider of service has no incentive to save costs, neither does the 
patient who enjoys ‘first-rand cover’ (cover without any co-payments or deductibles) and the 
administrator to the scheme also has no incentive to cut back on cost since their business model is 
structured on the number of claims processed (Reekie, 1997, p. 297). Add to that the increasing 
spend on private hospitals (approximately half of which is in the form of pharmaceutical charges) 
and pharmaceuticals, also creates upward pressure on contribution increases.  
Table 1 
 
 Source: Council for Medical Schemes, Annual Report 2004 
 
Pharmaceutical companies, prior to the introduction of the single exit price (SEP), engaged 
in a system of sampling (the free supply of medication from the manufacturer to the dispenser) and 
bonusing (a rebate or bonus system).  This was a case of anti-competitive behaviour, particularly 
when it became the modus operandi25. It was this behaviour that drew the attention of the architects 
of the ANC’s document on the National Health Policy and subsequently motivated the Medicines 
and Related Substances Control Act of 1965, as amended in 2001.  
 
Table 1 above also highlights the point that the pharmaceutical and hospital spend make up 
the bulk of the total spend in the industry.  The demand for first generation innovative drugs and 
what the hospital industry considers ‘first-world hospital services of the highest standards’ is 
primarily induced by the supply of these services.  The system of referrals by the primary 
physicians to specialists associated with a particular hospital shows that there are unnecessary 
                                                
25 In an interview with Ms Maureen Kirkman in 2003,  the then CEO of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association (PMA), Ms Kirkman indicated that she had received complaints that one of the private hospital 
groups used its oligopolistic power and demanded these rebates. If these rebates were not forthcoming, then 
the hospital group refused to see these manufacturers’ representatives and also refused to make any purchases 
from them.  Such a situation could be considered as anti-competitive behaviour.  
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services being rendered.  One example is the rate of Caesarean procedure births (C-Section) being 
performed.  The South African private sector has a rate of approximately 63% of birthing being 
done in the C-Section compared to an average in North America and Western Europe (similar 
socio-economic homogenous populations) is approximately 19% (World Health Report 2000).  
Another example are newspaper reports in June 2000 of pathology laboratories giving kickbacks to 
general practitioners for higher volumes of blood tests (The Star, June 2000,).  Given the situation 
of supply induced demand, these two areas have traditionally been regarded as the primary drivers 
of high prices in the private sector (Appasamy and Riding, 2002, p.14).   
 
An important consideration when discussing prices is that the private sector accounts for 
approximately 60% of the total healthcare budget (BHF 2002, CMS 2002). The disparity could be 
partially explained by the fact that there is a level of cross subsidy of state purchases by the private 
sector, and this cross-subsidy is reflected in their pricing structure26.  The State, through the 
National Department of Health, purchases approximately 70% of the medicines used in South 
Africa.  The State uses its monopsonistic capacity to purchase drugs at a price level that equates to 
the current levels of the marginal cost of production.  Drug companies, in order to recover some of 
their ‘losses’, inflate their selling price in the private sector.  This may be considered as a form of 
Ramsey pricing, however according to Danzon (1998), this form of pricing does not seek to extract 
monopolistic profits but rather to make normal profits. Hence the pricing structure may be 
considered to be monopolistic pricing, but in actuality it is a form of Ramsey pricing.  
 
The practice has come to the attention of the Competition Commission and its ensuing 
action highlighted the issue of abuse of market dominance. The Commission investigated a 
complaint by the Ms Hazel Tau and ten others, including the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) 
against GlaxoSmithKline (Pty) Ltd (GSK) and Boehringer Ingelheim (BI) pertaining to anti-
retrovirals in 2003. GSK is the world’s largest producer of AIDS medicines and has 50% of the 
world market (Baker, 2003).  The Commission found that the two companies abused their dominant 
positions in their specific anti-retroviral markets (CC, 2004) and referred the case to the 
Competition Tribunal.  The Competition Commission has found that pharmaceutical firms GSK 
and BI have contravened the Competition Act of 1998. The firms were found to have abused their 
dominant positions in their respective anti-retroviral (ARV) markets.  “The Commission found that 
the firms engaged in the following restrictive practices: 
                                                
26 Interview with Ms Maureen Kirkman, CEO of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA), in 
2003.   
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i) Denied a competitor access to an essential facility; 
ii) Excessive pricing; 
iii) Engaged in an exclusionary act.”   
The Commissioner, Menzi Simelane, said that, "Our investigation revealed that each of the firms 
has refused to license their patents to generic manufacturers in return for a reasonable royalty. We 
believe that this is feasible and that consumers will benefit from cheaper generic versions of the 
drugs concerned. We further believe that granting licenses would provide for competition between 
firms and their generic competitors."…  Simelane said these practices violate the Competition Act 
of 1998's prohibitions against excessive pricing (section 8(a)), refusing access to essential facilities 
(section 8(b)) and exclusionary acts that have an anticompetitive effect that outweighs 
technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gains (section 8(c)”. (Competition Commissioner 
Press release, October 2003 – see Appendix 5).  
 
Both GSK and BI, facing the prospect of litigation from the Competition Tribunal, agreed to 
negotiate voluntary licences with generic manufacturers rather than face the possibility of 
compulsory licences (Baker, 2003). Seven licences were issued to generic manufacturers and the 
new licences will have the effect of significantly increasing access to these medications.  
 
The finding of the Competition Commission represents acknowledgment of the Doha 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health.  The Doha Declaration is a World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) agreement reached in Doha, Qatar that gave more consideration to public health concerns as 
opposed to absolute patent protection.  Baker (2003) asserts that the decision by the Commission 
endorses three significant competition theories: 
i) That the monopolistic pricing structures used by drug companies (for 
primarily patent protected drugs) can and will impede access to necessary 
drugs even if these prices are discounted.27 
ii) The reluctance of the drug companies to issue voluntary licenses to generic 
manufacturers impedes competition. 
iii) The refusal to grant voluntary licences has, particularly for treatments that 
require combination therapies, hinders the production of fixed dose 
therapies.  
 
                                                
27 Access is however contingent on the size of the discount.  
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Patents, by their very nature are anti-competitive, since they are exclusionary - they tend to 
impede or prevent firms from coming into, entering or growing the market. However, patents do 
not automatically mean that the patentee would enjoy monopolistic profits because the patented 
product could face competition from similar products already on the market.  Furthermore, the 
product could be used to treat conditions, such as pandemics, where the afflicted population may 
not be able to afford the treatment.  Baker (2003) asserts that whilst reaping the benefits of a patent 
might not be considered exploitative, excessive pricing policies and the refusal to licence may be 
considered anti-competitive behaviour in some situations.  He contends that the “most encouraging 
pro-competition/public health arguments focus on both exclusionary and excessive pricing doctrine 
and on a resulting access/affordability gap for the product” (Baker, 2003, p.6).  In the South African 
situation, the competition regulations are designed to discourage exclusionary acts.  It is possible to 
argue that exclusivity, coupled with higher ‘oligopolistic’ prices, deny access to those who need the 
drugs.  The resultant situation could be used as a justification for compulsory licenses. The case-in-
point is that of the anti-retrovirals ruling made by the Competition Commissioner.  Simple 
economic theory holds that generic drugs, when introduced in a market, would tend to be 
competitive and as such drive down the price of all drugs in that particular therapeutic class.  The 
surrender by GSK and BI meant that cheaper, locally produced generic drugs have significantly 
influenced the timing of the ARV rollout in the public sector.  A further consideration is that 
although GSK agreed to the compulsory licences, it had already made its patented drugs (for the 
treatment of HIV/AIDS) available at a price lower than the suggested UNAIDS prices.  The South 
African government initially did not want to purchase these drugs from GSK, citing budgetary 
constraints and policy direction, but now appears to have no reason not to purchase the drugs.  
 
Stakeholders of the private healthcare sector have enjoyed a longstanding, if somewhat 
consultative, relationship with each other.  This relationship has grown organically, resulting in 
annual negotiations regarding tariffs or price. However, the three large medical trade associations, 
the Hospital Association of South Africa (HASA), the South African Medical Association (SAMA) 
and the Board of Healthcare Funders (BHF) were all investigated by the Competition Commission 
in 2003 and 2004 for price collusion in the setting of tariffs. This action changed the relationship 
between these groups. The Commission argued that the negotiations done on behalf of each group 
was tantamount to price collusion. Free market principles were being undermined by this 
negotiation process. Arguments from the stakeholders that a tariff was needed in the industry to 
ensure stability appeared to have gained some sympathy from the Commission; however, they 
recognised that a price guideline is necessary in the industry.  This and this is called the National 
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Health Reference Price List (NHRPL) and is published by the Council for Medical Schemes 
(CMS). The associations agreed to refrain from publishing price lists.  HASA were charged and 
found guilty of price collusion and had severe penalties imposed on it, including being fined, and 
similarly with SAMA.  BHF, whose primary focus is the consumer, got off without a large fine and 
an agreement to investigate the economic impact of price collusion.   
 
The reasoning behind the actions taken by the Competition Commissioner was too 
simplistic. Primarily, the Commission appeared not to have taken cognisance of the transaction 
costs involved in the healthcare situation that it was addressing.  The purpose of the price 
negotiations between these associations was to facilitate a common price that would agreeable to all 
of the participants of the negotiations.  A Coasian solution would have considered the ex ante costs 
of the negotiation and ascertained whether they were too expansive or not.  A Coasian solution is 
not possible because the perceived added welfare to society may not materialise.   
 
The action of the Commissioner, however, has had a minimal impact on the pricing 
structure of hospital prices in the short term. Even in an environment where direct collusive 
behaviour has been curtailed on the surface, the oligopolistic nature of the hospital industry has not 
resulted in any significant reduction in the total amount spent on hospitals in the short run.  Some 
aspect of this is that cost is a factor of price as well as volume.  The basic economic dilemma is that 
as prices fall, the quantity demanded for these services (goods) will increase, recreating the 
quandary that it originally set out to address.  In an oligopolistic market, it is extremely difficult to 
establish a competitive pricing structure if oligopolists enter into some sort of collusive behaviour.  
It does however, set the base for a more transparent pricing structure going into the future.  This 
policy creates a situation of greater information to the consumer (both medical schemes and 
patients) and may, theoretically at least, create a situation where the consumer does not have to be 
in a weaker bargaining position.  
 
Consider the development of drug regulation in the current paradigm and the relative 
impact that it has had on the stakeholders involved. The framework of the current environment had 
been laid down by the African National Congress’s (ANC) National Health Plan for South Africa 
(1994).  The thrust of the ANC document was to re-focus the direction in which healthcare was 
delivered – to concentrate on health of the nation as opposed to medical care – and the healthcare 
approach was to be based on a Primary Healthcare Approach (PHA).  There also appears to be a 
move away from the reliance on the form of treatment in favour of the PHA and in particular 
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moving away from drug therapy as is evidenced in “The National Drug Policy (NDP) will 
incorporate strategies for the effective application of drugs within the framework of the National 
Health Service (NHS).  The promotive, preventative and rehabilitative aspects of healthcare will 
receive proper emphasis and will not be made subservient to the curative aspect, with its reliance on 
the use of drugs.” (NDP, p. 23). This is an important aspect because it does influence the amount of 
gravitas the drug issue sustains in the legislative environment.  
 
The proposed tenets of the drug policy included the increased use of generic drugs in both 
the public and private sectors, the development of the essential drug list, the promotion of the local 
drug industry and the procurement of drugs by the government at the best possible prices. 
Furthermore, the mechanisms that were mooted in order to translate the policy principles into 
regulations included the setting of a maximum drug price, non-discriminatory drug prices, parallel 
importation and a review of all drug prices. In addition, the proposals put forward a suggestion to 
investigate the feasibility of a National Health Insurance (NHI), a construct of health insurance of 
which medical schemes would form the basis.   
 
The proposals addressing the broader healthcare environment impacts on pharmaceutical 
prices as will be demonstrated later in this chapter. The writer wishes to show that there have been 
endemic problems in the spectrum of healthcare delivery, and that the current regulations, at least to 
this stage, have tended to destabilise the industry, allowing for opportunistic pricing leading to 
monopolistic gains from trade in some sectors, particularly in the private hospital sector (as 
discussed above) and the specialist and pharmaceutical sectors.   
 
In May 1997, the Department of Health under the leadership of Dr Nkosazana Dlamini 
Zuma, presented the White Paper on the Transformation of the Health System in South Africa 
(White Paper). The White Paper should be considered in conjunction with the NDP since together 
they form the basis of the healthcare programme for South Africa, and offer guidelines as to how 
pharmaceutical services in the country will be managed.  In addition, the tenets of the White Paper 
and the NDP are in line with the guidelines published by the World Health Organisation (WHO: 2nd 
edition on National Drug Policy, 2001).  
 
The White Paper attempts to deal with two major issues; First, it outlines a number of steps 
in the addressing the inadequacies created by the apartheid regime’s delivery of healthcare. Second, 
it introduces the building blocks toward moving to a national healthcare system. In laying down the 
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foundation of the way forward, the NDP outlined specific objectives, categorised into the three 
areas of health, economic and national development objectives. The former two areas put forth the 
notion of an accessible and available essential drug28  list would be made available to all citizens.  It 
also requires that the rational use29 of drugs by prescribers be promoted. Furthermore, the objective 
that the cost of drugs in both public and private sectors should be lowered is also considered.  
 
Reekie, in his presidential address30, commented on the essence and viability of the White 
Paper from an economist’s perspective, focussing on the study of exchange. He espouses a Lockean 
view that natural rights are generalisable and non-contradictory (Reekie, 1997b). Healthcare, 
according to this benchmark, is not a natural right, since it pre-supposes that another individual 
needs to supply the requisite healthcare and as a result lacks that right to healthcare.  The only 
rights that can be generalised are life, liberty and estates, primarily because they are available to all.  
 
The thrust of the White Paper is to provide healthcare for all citizens, healthcare being 
considered to be a basic human right in the New South African Constitution. It is this idea or 
concept that is termed a ‘positive’ right.  Reekie (1997b) raises the issue of the alleviation of socio-
economic inequities, or the mechanism purported by the notion of ‘positive’ rights that the wealthy 
should give to the less affluent to the best of their ability. The dilemma still remains, ‘Where is the 
threshold?’.  Reekie (1997b) proposes four counter arguments to the ‘positive’ rights view, as 
follows: 
i) The traditional view of healthcare should be refined, people strive for the best (and 
not second-best) that they can give themselves and that inequities are a result of 
successive (generations) voluntary trade decisions; 
ii) The “…view that health care is a merit good, implicit in the positivist view, should be 
challenged.” (Reekie, 1997, p.287).  People do not have a choice regarding a merit 
good; it is made available by the governments for any of its citizens to use.  An 
example being a system of highways for transport, public health systems or the police 
force;  
                                                
28 Essential drugs, as defined by the World Health Organization, are drugs that are required to treat the 
majority of conditions that are prevalent in a particular country. Since these drugs would be provided 
primarily by the public sector, they should be made available in a cost-effective and efficient manner.  
Furthermore, these drugs would predominantly be used by the bulk of the population in that country, 
requiring that their availability should be uninterrupted and dosages forms should be correct.  
29 Rational use of drugs refers to the use of drugs that are therapeutically sound and cost-effective when 
compared to other alternatives.  
30 Prof W Duncan Reekie, during his term as President of the Economic Society of South Africa 1995-97, 
September 1997. 
 83
iii) Externalities such as ‘free-riding’ impacts on ‘positive’ rights. Reekie argues that 
there would be no externalities if the provision of healthcare is treated as a public 
good.  If there are free-riders, then there can be no efficient provision of the public 
good; and  
iv) He argues that “…some minimum level of health-care provision is one where the 
political process as opposed to the market process has a role to play.” (Reekie, 1997b, 
p. 290).  
Furthermore Reekie makes the point that the objectives of ‘equity’ and ‘access’ fall within 
the confines of available resources and may not be possible at the margins since different diseases 
require different interventions, and hence different cost structures.  He raises the dilemma that we 
could have equal outcomes, equal inputs and equality of care at the margins.  The latter would 
maximise health outputs but the second situation of equal inputs is far more politically attractive.  
Hence it is easily concluded that the three situations are incompatible. 
 
One can argue that a Coasian solution is possible in a market where one would be able to 
negotiate the value of one’s healthcare package, particularly if it is not a merit good. This could be 
the direction in which Reekie appears to be heading.  
 
The submission for rationalisation of price structure of pharmaceuticals included the 
establishment of a Pricing Committee that would investigate the viability of price transparency 
across the supply spectrum, including that of a single exit price. The Pricing Committee would also 
explore the feasibility of a non-discriminatory pricing system (non-Ramsey pricing structures),  
regulated price increase of drugs, state supply of certain high priced drugs to the private sector and 
a system where the single exit price and dispensing fee would replace the wholesale and retail 
percentage mark-up for drugs (NDP, p. 8). Moreover the NDP proposals also recommend the use of 
“…interchangeable multi-source pharmaceutical products (IMPP), using non-propriety name 
(INN), or generic name…” drugs in order to reduce drug costs and expenditure (NDP, p. 10).  
 
Generic names will be used to draw up the Essential Drugs List (EDL).  The EDL is 
designed to meet the needs of the bulk of the population, and has a default to the drug with the best 
cost advantage and the best locally manufactured drug amongst other criteria (NDP, p. 11).  The 
NDP also proposes the strengthening of the role of the pharmacists in the dispensing of drugs, 
particularly in their role of informing and educating patients regarding their choices.   
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The White Paper resulted in a number of healthcare related Acts being introduced by the 
Department of Health through Parliament, some of the more significant being the National Health 
Act (Act No. 61 of 2003), the Medical Schemes Act (Act No. 131 of 1998) and the Medicines and 
Related Substances Control Amendment Act (Act No. 101 of 1965, as amended in 2001).  These 
Acts can be seen as building blocks toward building the structures ultimately leading to a national 
health system. Although Act 101 (as amended) deals primarily with the pharmaceutical industry 
and the pricing structures, the sequence of legislative changes stemming from the White Paper need 
to be considered in their entirety.  
 
Act 101 (as amended) introduces the EDL as a concept that will be compiled and published by 
the Department of Health at predetermined intervals. It also addresses the need for more affordable 
retail drug prices.  The Act proposes a number of interventions that could be used by the Minister, 
the Director-General or the Department of Health: 
i) by empowering the Minister to revoke the patent specific drugs that are required to 
protected the public should the health of the public be threatened and the specified 
drugs are required for treatment (s15C(a), (b), (c)); and 
ii) by allowing the Minister to grant permission for parallel importation of these specified 
patented drugs (s15C(a), (b), (c)). 
 
Furthermore Act 101 also addresses the bonus and sampling schemes that was endemic in the 
supply of medicines (s18A and s18B). There have been arguments in the pharmaceutical industry 
that this practice led to higher prices at the retail level.  
 
Finally, one of the more litigious issues has been that of establishing a single exit price (SEP) 
by manufacturers and a dispensing fee for pharmacists as a percentage of this SEP (s 22(g) of the 
Act).  The regulations have been challenged by a group of pharmacists and hospital groups who 
believe that the regulations are unconstitutional as they limit the right to earn a living on the part of 
the pharmacists. At the time of writing, the case was being heard in the Cape High Court where the 
Department of Health (DoH) was challenged by a consortium of corporate pharmacies that included 
New Clicks Pharmacies, Netcare Holding on behalf of their pharmacies and the Pharmaceutical 
Society of South Africa (PSSA).  The Cape High Court ruled in favour of the DoH in September 
2004.  This decision was appealed by the complainants and in December 2004 the case then went to 
the Supreme Court of Appeals,  which upheld the application by the complainants.  The matter was 
subsequently heard by the highest court in the land, the Constitutional Court of South Africa in 
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March 2005. At the time of writing, the Constitutional Court ruled that the legislation is valid, but it 
has referred the legislation back to the DoH for re-writing. 31 
 
The broad-based challenge to the regulations is that it interferes with the normal market 
related economy in medicines and challenges the basic ethos of trade. Furthermore the advantages 
gained from economies of scale and economies of scope have been compromised by the 
regulations. The impact, its critics claim, would be that drug prices would tend to face an upward 
pressure since there are no discounts available.  
 
At the initial stages of the proposals, the Competition Commission’s Annual Report for 
2002 also raised concerns regarding the issue that the SEP. The Competition Commissioner felt that 
the SEP might facilitate collusive price setting by manufacturers and a complex reimbursement 
structure further down the supply chain.  There might be some truth to this.   
 
HASA, in its submission document to BHF in August 2004, raised its concerns regarding 
price setting issues. Concerns centred on the unintended consequences of the price-setting 
regulations, specifically production distortions and limited access.  HASA cites research from an 
article in the Economist magazine that draws from a Bain and Company study (Gilbert & 
Rosenberg, 2004) that Europe is a significant loser in R&D in healthcare and economic terms 
primarily because of price controls. The USA has grown into a far more dominant force in 
pharmaceutical R&D, creating greater economic spin-offs. Furthermore, price regulation impacts 
on access to drugs and tends to get to the market much more slowly. The resultant situation is that 
people spend longer periods in hospitals, have higher absenteeism rates in the workforce, and 
higher rates of mortality (Gilbert & Rosenberg, 2004).  The Bain and Company study also makes 
assertions that price regulations have an indirect impact on innovation and tends to discourage 
competition.  
 
The principal objective of price regulation is to reduce the price of the drug primarily in 
order to reduce the expenditure on healthcare delivery.  Price regulation has two fundamental 
effects on the price of medicines. Furthermore, this effect may impact the cost and quality of 
                                                
31 It has been inferred or speculated that the Constitutional Court might adopt a ‘wait and see’ stance in order 
to allow for some sort of negotiation to take place between the various stakeholders in the industry at the time 
of the Constitutional Court proceedings.  The decision reached by the Constitutional Court is that the 
legislation is valid, but it has given it back to the DoH for re-writing. 
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healthcare in two ways, and in each case the impact of price regulation on the well being of the 
patient is not fully understood (Kessler, 2004).  
 
First, the immediate impact of regulation on drug development happens at the R&D project 
stage – that is projects that are being undertaken by the drug company. There is a general series of 
events.  Regulation-induced reduction in pharmaceutical expenditure leads to lower profits and 
reduced cash flows for the pharmaceutical companies. This means lower profits and lower cash 
flows for the pharmaceutical manufacturing firm. Kessler (2004) refers to a study by John A. 
Vernon that suggests lower expected profits translate into a reduced supply of external capital 
which in turn means lower investment.  This significant analysis indicates that if profits are held 
constant, “…then the lower expected cash flows translate into a reduced supply of internal relative 
to external capital, which may independently reduce investment, to the extent that the external 
markets are imperfect.” (Kessler, 2004, p. 3).   
 
A decline in investment into R&D may result in fewer new products being developed a 
basic linear relationship.  Danzon (1997) is of the view that most price regulations result in fewer 
products being expanded.  Furthermore, regulators are inclined to focus on the more prominent 
drug expenditures which tend to be those attracting higher prices or volumes.  Danzon (1997) 
further asserts that many of these drugs are apt to be innovative or ethical drugs (that is, they are not 
generic drugs).  In addition, a ‘reference pricing’ system – where a drug is costed and regulated at a 
certain level – tends to be biased against innovative drugs.  Reduced R&D has two implications.  It 
could lead to more or less cost-effective healthcare.  The latter is the situation that results in higher 
mortality, morbidity and more healthcare expenses.  The former occurs when the reduced spending 
on R&D exceeds the associated costs of not spending.  
 
The second implication of price regulation is that the regulation may affect the quality and 
cost of healthcare through the use of existing products.  Kessler (2004) contends that lower 
regulated prices may lead to lower per unit costs and therefore lower total healthcare costs. 
However, the inverse may also occur: Regulation could have unintended consequences for drug 
prices that may nullify intended benefits. Prices may actually increase: An obvious example is 
when the single exit price was introduced in South Africa, the associated regulations (Amendments 
to Act 101 of 1965) abolished the system of bonusing and rebates that were inherent in the 
pharmaceutical supply system.  The implementation of the regulations resulted in the prices of 
many drugs increasing, particularly for chronic medication.  Danzon, Wang and Wang (2003) point 
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out that firms may delay their launch of new drugs in regulated markets because of the threat that it 
may, through parallel importing, ‘spillover’ into unregulated markets at a cheaper price thereby 
undermining the price which the drug company expected to sell it.   
 
 
patent protected drug since it faces an inelastic demand curve.  In price-regulated regimes, with  
 
 
One of the more divisive debates is the one that relates price regulation, market 
performance and the innovation of pharmaceuticals. Vernon (2003) investigates the relationship 
between price regulation and profit margins. In his study involving a sample of twenty large 
pharmaceutical firms over a five year period (1994-1999), Vernon found a significant negative 
correlation relationship between a firm’s sales in a price-regulated environment and its pre-tax 
profits. He compared the level of sales from outside the USA to that within the country. He 
demonstrated that a ten percent increase in sales in price-regulated environments outside the USA 
Firms’ Market 
Performance: 
Profits, Sales 
and Cash flows 
Research and 
Development 
Discovery of 
New Drugs
Cost and Quality of Medical Care
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Source: Kessler 2004 
Figure 5.1  
The Effect of Government Price Regulation on Pharmaceuticals on Cost and 
Quality 
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resulted in a 2.7% to 3.5% decline in the profit margin in the USA.  In his later paper, Vernon 
(2004) expands his original analysis to show that declines in profit margins resulting from 
exogenous factors such as price regulation outside the USA leads to reduction in R&D spending by 
the pharmaceutical company.  In a model developed to simulate how global pharmaceutical R&D 
spending would react to a price-regulated regime, he demonstrated that the impact decreased the 
amount spent on R&D by 23.4% to 32.7%.  This is however an obvious argument. The profit (net 
or pre-tax) is contingent on the sales volume and the price.  Intrinsically, there would be very little 
variation in sales volume of an innovative, volume held constant, the level at which the price is set 
in the primary influence on the profits earned by the drug firm.  In a situation where other factors 
are kept constant, the drug firm would have more resources available to spend on R&D at higher 
rather than lower prices.  In a simple linear relationship, the more resources that are put towards 
R&D would usually result in a greater number of innovations.  
 
Interventions using newer improved drugs are initially more costly than the conventional 
approaches but tend to have a greater efficiency in the long run with regard to the actual health 
outcomes.  In his argument regarding this issue, Kessler states that there is a substantial body of 
evidence linking the discovery and use of pharmaceutical leads to lower long term medical 
expenses and improved outcomes after treatment interventions.  This is especially true of newer and 
novel32 drugs. In particular, he refers to the work done by Frank Lichtenberg (2004, 1996) and 
Miller and Frech (2002) regarding treatments and outcomes for 100 disease profiles between the 
years of 1979 and 1998. The findings are predictable: An increase in the availability of drugs leads 
to an increase in the mean age of the patients studied. Furthermore, the fraction of people dying 
before the age of 65 is also reduced. Lichtenberg also finds that the number of inpatient bed-days is 
reduced by the increased use of novel drugs, and in particular there is a reduction in mortality. 
Improved short-term outcomes from these interventions necessitate more spending on ambulatory 
care. Kessler (2004) also makes the observation that the use of drugs does impact the cost and 
quality of healthcare. In particular, he draws on the point that there is significant association 
between a national budget or expenditure on novel medicines and the quality and length of life.  
The pertinent questions involve the conditions under which these drugs extend the length of life, 
primarily what is the quality of life in that extended period and at what opportunity cost?  
 
                                                
32 Novel drugs are drugs used for a specific purpose – they are highly effective drugs with few side effects – 
and are developed primarily using the genetic coding of the parasite that infects the host.  
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CHAPTER 6  
Statins in South Africa: A  Cost-Minimization Investigation  
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In undertaking a pharmacoeconomic analysis the writer wishes to investigate how do the 
pricing structures of drugs relate to the Coasian Theorem explored in Chapter 2.  One needs to 
consider the dilemma in terms of ex ante and ex post costs.  Anderlini and Felli (2001) argued that 
the Coase theorem would not hold in cases where the potential or anticipated ex ante costs are 
expected to be substantially higher than the ex post costs.  They examine the basic ‘hold-up 
problem’ that arises whenever agents to a Coasian negotiation have to pay ex ante costs for the 
negotiation to take place.  Developing this theory would lead to a conclusion that rising healthcare 
costs that are unsustainable.   
 
 The investigation will study the pricing of statins relative to each other. The reason for 
pursuing a comparative study of statins was that the level and availability of drug price data was 
overwhelming in the international arena.  However data relating to the use of statins in South Africa 
still appears to be sparse. Furthermore multinational drug companies are making a number of 
assumptions in their marketing literature with regard to the efficacy of their drugs. Often local 
conditions and attitudes toward newer drug regimens are ignored.  On the other hand, if the drug 
companies are not freely allowed to market their drugs because of restrictive regulatory oversight, 
then the space for new drugs to enter the market might not be sufficient to accommodate newer, 
technologically superior products.  The potential welfare gain from the products would be the 
welfare loss to society.  A secondary reason was that there was insufficient data available to 
conduct an independent analysis into another drug class because there is very little work being done 
in South Africa and many of the drug trials are being concluded in foreign countries.  
  
 Pressures on healthcare resources, in developed and developing economies, emanate from 
both the supply and demand side.  Informational asymmetries, inequities, regulatory intervention 
and unchecked provider and administrative costs are examples of supply side pressures (Appasamy 
and Riding, 2004).  The situation is exacerbated by higher demands stemming from aging 
populations, lifestyle diseases and an increasingly high level of supply-induced demand.  This is a 
classic economic problem of scarcity and resource allocation resulting in an emergence of a 
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different class of healthcare purchasers (Wessels, 2004, p. 2) including pharmaceutical benefit 
managers (PBMs), formulary managers and district health authorities (DHAs).  Furthermore, 
Appasamy and Riding (2002, 2003, 2004) note that the largest component of healthcare spend in 
the privately insured market in South Africa is on pharmaceuticals33.  This constitutes the in-
hospital spending that includes the surgical disposables and consumables and out-of-hospital 
spending which is from pharmacies. The hospital dispensed drugs and direct pharmaceutical spend 
is in excess of 45% of the total benefits paid for in the private market.  This is the backdrop to the 
pharmacoeconomic investigation undertaken in this chapter.  
 
6.1.1 An Introduction to Statins – lifestyle ‘wonder drugs’  
 
 One of the classes of drugs is called statins and these drugs are used to treat symptoms 
associated with vascular diseases such as hypercholesterolemia, asymmetric dimethylarginine 
(ADMA), heart attack, stroke and revascularisation.  Statins are a class of enzymes called 3-
hydroxy3-methyl-glutaryl-coenzyme A (HMG-CoA) reductase inhibitor.  They tend to reduce 
coronary mortality and morbidity in certain types of high-risk individual by limiting the amount of 
low-density lipoprotein cholesterol (LDL-C) produced by the liver.  The statins achieve this by 
slowing down HMG-CoA reductase, an enzyme responsible for cholesterol production. Moreover, 
statins enhance the liver’s facility to eliminate LDL-C from a person’s bloodstream.  This has been 
shown in a number of clinical trials, particularly with the impact of statins in the reduction of heart 
attack and stroke. Statins are generally well tolerated by most patients.  The most prescribed drug in 
the world is the statin called LIPITOR®34.  However, myopathy-muscle aches and pains is one of 
the major side effects of statins and may subsequently lead to kidney damage. Conversely, the 
frequency of myopathy is rare, and is more likely to occur in individuals with complicated medical 
conditions or in the elderly. Another side effect is that statins could lead to an increase in liver 
enzymes, which necessitates additional costs in that liver tests may need to be conducted. All statins 
are effective in lowering total and LDL-C and increasing HDL-cholesterol, but have differing rates 
of reduction. The newer, more developed statins tend to be more potent than the older statins, a 
consequence of ongoing research and development by the pharmaceutical companies and also a 
testament to the advantages of newer, albeit more expensive, technologies. The precept is that a 
                                                
33 Pharmaceutical spending usually constitutes in-hospital and out-of-hospital spending and is usually around 
45% of total healthcare spending. 
34 Lipitor is made by Pfizer and is often acknowledged by the medical industry as the drug that sets the 
‘golden standard’ amongst statins.  
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lower blood concentration of LDL-C is associated with lower cardiovascular disease (MRC/BHF 
Study, 2002, 2005)35.   
 
Coronary heart disease (CHD) is one of the leading causes of mortality amongst the South 
African population and in many of the industrialised nations of the world. HD prevalence is high, 
with South Africa having one of the highest rates in the world amongst certain race groups. 
However, despite the high prevalence rate of CHD, mortality associated with CHD declined in the 
decade from 1988 to 1998 (Hay and Sterling, 2005, p. 134) in the United States.  A number of 
studies have confirmed that this decline is evident in many countries with populations that suffer 
from CHD related diseases, including South Africa.  The primary reason is because of the 
development of drugs, such as statins, that are used to treat plasma lipid disorders. These drugs and 
the associated treatments are the fundamental aspect of the improvement in the mortality rate 
associated with CHD.  Furthermore, Hay and Sterling (2005) note that there is a substantial body of 
evidence to prove that HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors A (statins) have reduced the number of CHD 
events by approximately 31%. In addition, these reductions are independent of patient age, gender, 
ethnicity, diabetes, pre-existing CHD or any other risk factor.  
 
South Africa faces a situation where CHD is endemic in the more affluent sectors of 
society. It is a disease that has a strong linear relationship with lifestyle factors such as eating foods 
that have a high fat content, smoking and a sedentary way of life. Add to that, the market 
penetration of insured or private medical cover tends to be fairly high in this sector when compared 
to the less affluent quarters (BHF website, Statistics South Africa (STATSSA) 2001 census).  It is 
therefore plausible that it becomes extremely important for medical schemes and third party payers 
that the drugs they are paying for are efficient and cost-effective.  
 
What could be considered the ex ante and ex post cost for someone on a drug therapy?  The 
ex post costs are the costs associated with using the drug after therapy has begun, including the cost 
of the drug and the payment of any adverse reactions to the drug. The ex ante costs would be the 
cost of developing the drug and making it available on the market.  In order to reduce potential ex 
post cost (such as adverse reactions to the drug therapy), a greater amount of ex ante spending 
needs to be undertaken.  
                                                
35 MRC/BHF Study – are the acronyms for the United Kingdom Medical Research Council (MRC) and the 
British Heart Foundation (BHF) and should not be confused with the South African Medical Research 
Council and the Board of Healthcare Funders.  
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When considering the efficiency, efficacy and cost of a particular drug regimen, it is 
important to take a number of different factors into consideration such as the impact of a particular 
intervention (such drug regimens are considered chronic medication) in both the cost and life-
changing scenarios in the medium- to long-term.  Chronic medication generally needs to be taken 
over relatively long periods in order to be effective.  In a Coasian world this would entail the 
consideration of ex ante and ex post costs.  If the ex post costs are too high, i.e. the drug is not 
effective in the short term, or that cost would continue in perpetuity, then the intervention is not one 
that would be considered favourable. However, if ex ante costs are relatively higher and result in a 
shorter period that the insured remains on the drug, then the ex post cost would tend to be 
minimised.   
 
It is with this understanding that the writer approaches the pharmacoeconomic study of the 
various statins available in South Africa.  Whilst individuals and providers of service may have 
individual nuances pertaining to each treatment event, the broad based analysis is drawn from a 
number of randomised controlled drug trials (the Comparison of the Efficacy and Safety of 
Rosuvastatin versus Atorvastatin, Simvastatin and Pravastatin across doses (STELLAR) trial; the 
Myocardial Ischaemia Reduction with Aggressive Cholesterol Lowering (MIRACL) trial, the 
Scandinavian Simvastatin Survival Study (4S study) group, the Current Lipid Management and 
Low Cholesterol Goal Attainment in Common Daily Practice in Spain (REALITY) study, the Open 
Label Primary Care Study: Rosuvastatin based Compliance Initiatives to Achievements of LDL 
Goals (ORBITAL) study and finally, the Smith and McBurney’s paper, ‘An Economic Analyses of 
the Atorvastatin Comparative Cholesterol Efficacy and Safety Study (ACCESS) based on the 
ACCESS study. The last study is an economic analysis of statins and can easily be adapted to 
accurately reflect the South African scenario. Furthermore permission has been obtained from the 
primary researcher on the ACCESS study, Dr Dean S Smith at the University of Michigan, United 
States, to use the modelling exercise that they developed in the study.  In consideration of the 
discussion up to this point and by using this model, it is possible to address the four questions raised 
by Summer et al (1998) that deals with the specifics of undertaking a pharmacoeconomic study.  
 
The initiation of any drug therapy is dependent on a number of factors,  The obvious one is 
choice. Choice is subject to both clinical and financial considerations.  The former is developed 
along the lines of safety, efficacy and patient preferences (particularly when there is a possibility of 
some form of adverse reaction), whilst the latter is largely a function of affordability. The 
overriding reason is that if the patient cannot sustain long term-costs in the event of insured benefits 
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running out, the likelihood of non–compliance to the treatment regimen is high, thereby 
compromising the treatment of the disease.  The same scenario is true of most chronic treatments. 
Price, out-of–pocket payments for drugs, restrictive benefit plans in the medical scheme arena, and 
a desire to control costs are all factors that need to be considered when making such a decision.  
 
The ACCESS study was designed to address the different factors that could influence the 
manner in which a particular drug regimen is developed, and especially the factors that could 
impact the choice of HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors.  Its design constituted a depth and range that 
includes the features of the South African market.  Salient features include a range of five 
comparators, a large number of patients (3600), and the goal of achieving the NCEP-II guidelines 
for cholesterol targets in a 54 week program.  
 
6.2  Methodology 
The methodology employed is broken up into two components, primary and secondary.  
The primary methodology consists of a review of the literature pertaining to statin drug trials for the 
reduction of LDL-C and selecting an appropriate model. An understanding of the initial 
methodology used the understanding of the subsequent part of the methodology.  The secondary 
methodology will be to use the results of part one and convert that to reflect the South African 
experience as closely as possible, taking into account the local pricing structure including generic 
drugs. This can be done because clinical drug trials, unlike economic drug trials, can be applied to 
different populations that have a similar profile.  Moreover, the statins available are those that are 
currently used in South Africa.  It is also important to observe that there are two endpoints in such a 
study – a clinical (or efficacy) endpoint and a financial (or economic) endpoint – and these needs to 
be adapted to meet South African guidelines.  
 
6.2.1  Study Description  
The study’s objective was to compare the efficacy of atorvastatin to that of other statins on 
the market. A randomisation of approximately 4:1:1:1:1was used with atorvastion at 1800 patients: 
fluvastatin, lovastatin, pravastatin and simvastatin all at 450 patients each. This was conducted in 
153 centres across the United States and 3916 patients.  Amongst the eligibility criteria, patients 
had to have an LDL-C level that was at least 30mg/dL (0.8mmol/L) higher than the NCEP LDL-C 
target, have a fasting tri-glyceride (TG) level of less than 400mg/dL (10.26mmol/L), and also had 
to give their consent for taking part in the study.  Patients were provided with one of the five study 
medications listed in Table 5.1 below.  These study medications were dispensed at six-week 
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intervals during weeks 0, 6, 12, 18 and 24.  At weeks 30 and 42, a 12-week supply was dispensed.  
Patients were started on the lowest possible dose that was titrated up to the requisite dosages as 
recommended by the NCEP guidelines in the subsequent weeks.   
 
This study was pivoted around two endpoints, efficacy and economic.  The former is 
informed by the number of patients reaching the NCEP targets, and hence the objective of the study 
by measuring the impact of these various drugs.  The targets are 160mg/dL (4.13mmol/L) for 
patients with less than two risk factors, 130mg/dL (3.36mmol/L) in patients with two or more risk 
factors and 100mg/dL (2.59mmol/L) in the higher risk groups, i.e., those patients with a history of 
CHD. 
 
Table 6.1 Study Medications  
Drug Dosage per day 
Atorvastatin 
Fluvastatin 
Lovastatin 
Pravastatin 
Simvastatin 
10-80 mg per day (2x40mg for 80 mg dose, twice daily) 
20-80 mg per day (2x40mg for 80 mg dose, twice daily) 
20-40 mg per day (2x40mg for 80 mg dose, twice daily) 
10-40 mg per day  
10-40 mg per day  
Source:  ACCESS Study 2003 
 
The economic endpoint was the cost associated with each of the interventions in achieving 
the NCEP II LDL-C targets.  Third-party payer (health insurance companies, HMO’s) costs were 
taken into account.  Furthermore, only direct medical costs were considered and not indirect costs 
such as out-of-pocket payments and loss of productivity. The secondary economic endpoints 
included the relative cost-effectiveness of patients achieving their targets.  
 
The costs were calculated by adding the absolute costs of treatment, and these included the 
standard cost of services provided to patients during the course of the study. Costs were adjusted for 
those patients who achieved their targets sooner than the required timeframe. The total costs 
comprised the cost of study medication, recommended physician visits to review lipid level 
concentrations, costs associated with lipid level measurement, and costs to accommodate for 
adverse reactions and contra-indications.  
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6.3  Results of the ACCESS Study 
6.3.1  Patient demographics  
 The patients had similar profiles in each of the groups. The objective was to compare the 
cost effectiveness of atorvastatin with the other statins. The atorvastatin group comprised of 1944 
patients; fluvastatin had 493 patients; lovastatin had 494 patients; pravastatin had 478 patients and 
simvastatin had 478 patients. A total of 3887 patients were randomised into one of five statins. The 
descriptive statistics of each group is summarised below in Table 6.2.  
 
Table 6.2 Risk Status and Demographic Characteristics of Patients 
Status/target Atorvastatin 
(n=1944) 
Fluvastatin 
(n=493) 
Lovastatin 
(n=494) 
Pravastatin 
(n=478) 
Simvastatin 
(n=478) 
< Two risk factors/4.13mmol/L (%)a 12.6 12.4 9.7 12.1 10.9 
> Two risk factors/3.36mmol/L (%)a 20.3 20.3 21.1 21.5 24.9 
CHD or PVD/2.59mmol/L (%) 67.1 67.3 69.2 66.3 64.2 
LDL-C target (mean)a,b 1.83mmol/L 1.78mmol/L 1.85mmol/L 1.85mmol/L 1.75mmol/L 
Mean age at randomization (years) 61.2 62.4 61.4 61.1 60.8 
Gender (female) [%] 39.0 37.55 39.9 38.5 42.3 
Race (non-white) [%] 11.8 11.6 8.9 11.3 11.1 
Weight (kg) 83.1 83.6 83.5 82.8 83.1 
Systolic Blood Pressure (mmHg) 133 133 133 133 134 
Diastolic Blood Pressure (mmHg) 80 80 79 80 81 
Source: ACCESS Study 2003      
CHD – Coronary Heart Disease; PVD – Peripheral Vascular Disease; LDL-C – Low-density lipoprotein cholesterol 
a - converted from 160 and 130 mg/dL respectively    b – the mean point reduction in LDL-C necessary to achieve 
LDL-C target, calculated from risk factors and LDL-C target concentration                                                            
 
6.3.2  Efficiency Analyses and Results 
The number of patients reaching their LDL-C targets in the atorvastatin and simvastatin 
groups was significantly higher than in the other three groups.  These response rates were similar to 
clinical trials that were previously conducted.  One of the reasons for the difference in the numbers 
reaching their targets could be the higher atorvastatin sample size, which may have influenced the 
variance of the group.  Furthermore, the number of people who left the study as well as those who 
did not reach their targets from each individual statin group may have had a significantly larger 
impact on the smaller sample groups.  The clinical efficiency analysis is summarised in Table 6.3 
below. 
 
 
 96
Table 6.3 Clinical Efficiency Analysis of Ethical Statins 
Statin 
Ingredient 
Percentage of Patients 
Reaching LDL-C Target 
Atorvastatin 88% 
Fluvastatin 48% 
Lovastatin 66% 
Pravastatin 44% 
Simvastatin 76% 
Source: The ACCESS Study 2003 
 
6.3.3  Economic Analysis 
The quantum of medications required to reach the NCEP II LDL-C targets are presented in 
Table 6.4 below.  The concern that was raised by the investigators was that the consistency with 
which the medication was dispensed varied for a number of reasons including wrong dosages and 
wrong medication.  However this was low (n=50 or 1.3%) and followed a similar pattern amongst 
all of the treatment groups. Hence this impact was considered to be minimal.  From the table below 
it is evident that the number of treatment visits varied substantially.  Primarily, a high variance 
would be expected in a sample that has a low number of visits over the treatment period, as would 
be expected.  The variance can be explained by the number of patients opting out of the study after 
they began treatment (611 patients), patients missing scheduled appointments and then picking up 
the slack (9 patients) and patients reporting adverse reactions to the medication (241 patients).   
 
A total of 9707 adverse events were reported during the study.  It was indicated that 1327 
of these events were directly related to the study medication. The majority of these reactions 
concerned previously recognised complaints associated with this class of drug, including that of the 
digestive system, the musculoskeletal system and the body as a whole.  A number of these events 
were treated in the scheduled study visits and did not incur any additional costs.  All of the statins 
experienced a similar percentage of complaints with the exception of fluvastatin, which was 
somewhat higher.  However, the smaller sample size may impact on the interpretation of the results, 
indicating a higher variance for fluvastatin.  The patients’ experiences are reflected in Table 6.4 
below.  
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Table 6.4 Resource use to achieve National cholesterol Education Panel (NCEP) II low density 
lipoprotein cholesterol (LDL-C) targets.  
 Atorvastatin  Fluvastatin Lovastatin Pravastatin Simvastatin 
Mean number of treatment visits 2.94 4.85 3.98 5.03 3.49 
Standard Deviation 1.47 2.31 2.18 2.43 1.93 
Difference vs. Atorvastatin  1.91 1.04 2.09 0.55 
p-Value of the difference  <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Number of Patients with medicine 
related adverse events (%) 
317 (16.3) 99(20.1) 77(15.6) 64(13.4) 93(19.5) 
Difference vs. Atorvastatin (%)  3.8 (0.7) (2.9) 3.2 
p-Value of the difference (%) 
ANOVA 
 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.10 
Source : ACCESS Study 2003 
 
The ACCESS study calculates the cost of treatment for each statin. The resource use 
(summing of the unit values associated with medication, study visits and adverse events) is 
multiplied by the price of each component. This exercise yielded the total treatment costs.  The 
ACCESS study also concluded that medication costs in this study amounted to almost half of the 
total costs.  Furthermore the investigators concluded that total treatment costs associated with 
atorvastatin are significantly lower than the other statins.   
 
As previously mentioned, the secondary methodology calls for these clinical results, inter 
alia, to be used in a South African setting to ascertain whether the same conclusions will hold there.  
It is also vital to attempt to explain the relevance to South Africa.  A demographic review of South 
Africa indicates a society that is segmented in terms of socio-economic level, race, health and 
accessibility to healthcare (BHF website, census 2001 - STATSSA website).  A small part of the 
population, approximately 16%, has access to privately insured healthcare (Appasamy and Riding, 
2003, 2004).  This subgroup also enjoys, subject to benefit constraints, access to the most 
technologically advanced drugs on the market.  Drug trials involving statins may not necessarily be 
conducted locally because the target population that is likely to afford the drug is not significant 
when compared to high-cholesterol sufferers in other parts of the world.  It becomes imperative that 
any drug trial be ‘reinvented’ in order to reflect local conditions.  South Africa’s high-cholesterol 
sufferers are concentrated in two specific segments of the population, namely, Afrikaner and Indian 
males.  These two groups have also tend toward a high degree of diabetes and high blood pressure 
in their later years.   
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A number of considerations would need to be taken into account: the ACCESS study did 
not use generic drugs;  the advent of the single exit price (SEP) brought on by regulations in the 
South African market may have changed the relativities between the price of the drugs; pricing 
structure may differ substantially from the United States because of patents regulations; 
multinational relationships and other significant differences; the development of newer, more 
potent drugs that have come onto the market since the study was undertaken , and finally, there may 
be different treatment protocols that could impact on the cost minimisation analysis.  Table 6.5 to 
Table 6.8 illustrates the number of scripts that were used to calculate the total amount of tablets 
required for each strength of medication in order to achieve the NCEP II LDL-C targets.  The 
number in the top grid corresponds to the number in the lower grid (it is simply multiplied by 42 
which is the number of days in-between the prescription collection points.  The 80mg dosage of 
fluvastatin and lovastatin were doubled to accommodate for the consumption of a 40mg dose twice 
a day whilst the same dosage for atorvastatin remains as is because the price is the same for both 
the 40mg and 80mg strength tablet.  The prices of the drugs at the various dosages, used in this 
analysis, were taken from the local reference price files for drugs (NAPPI) that reflect the single 
exit price (SEP) of the medication. The SEP is made up of the ex-manufacturers cost (the 
manufacturers selling price) plus the logistics fee (the agreed upon distribution cost).  Under the 
current regulatory framework, all scheduled drugs have to have a transparent pricing structure that 
is consistent across the country thereby obviating any regional price differentials.  More 
importantly, it negates the use of discounting and rebates in the pharmaceutical supply chain.  
However, it obviates the opportunity to engage in a contract that may involve Ramsey pricing or 
even a Coasian solution.  Table 5.7 reflects the local price per tablet that was utilised in the study, 
and following a similar process that was used in the ACCESS study, the cost of the medication, at 
each dose used in the study, was calculated.  The cost per patient was calculated by dividing the 
total number of patients in each statin group by the total cost in each group. This was the cost that 
was borne by the third-party payers.  
 
Table 6.5 Number of scripts used in the ACCESS Study 
Total Amount Atorvastatin Fluvastatin Lovastatin Pravastatin Simvastatin 
10mg 2966 n/a n/a 560 659 
20mg 1278 575 639 449 400 
40mg 724 492 429 1061 357 
80mg 649 1140  (x2) 780  (x2) n/a n/a 
Source: The ACCESS Study 
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Table 6.6 Number of Tablets at each dose level  
Total Amount Atorvastatin Fluvastatin Lovastatin Pravastatin Simvastatin 
10mg 124572 0 0 23520 27678 
20mg 53676 24150 26838 18858 16800 
40mg 30408 20664 18018 44562 14994 
80mg 27258 95760 65520 0 0 
Source: The ACCESS Study 
 
Table 6.7 Local prices of medication 
Total Amount Atorvastatin Fluvastatin Lovastatin Pravastatin Simvastatin 
10mg R 5.35   R 5.65 R 2.63 
20mg R 8.30 R 3.91 R 2.38 R 7.03 R 2.96 
40mg R 9.39 R 5.22 R 2.69 R 8.41 R 3.78 
80mg R 9.39 R 6.00 R 2.69   
Source: The NAPPI Code and Price File for medications using the Single Exit Price (SEP) as supplied by MediKredit June 2005.  
 
Table 6.8 Price of medications used in Study 
Total Amount Atorvastatin Fluvastatin Lovastatin Pravastatin Simvastatin 
10mg R 666,460.20 R 0.00 R 0.00 R 132,888.00 R 72,793.14 
20mg R 445,510.80 R 94,426.50 R 63,874.44 R 132,571.74 R 49,728.00 
40mg R 285,531.12 R 107,866.08 R 48,468.42 R 374,766.42 R 56,677.32 
80mg R 255,952.62 R 574,560.00 R 176,248.80 R 0.00 R 0.00 
Total Drug Cost R 1,653,454.74 R 776,852.58 R 288,591.66 R 640,226.16 R 179,198.46 
Cost per Patient R 850.54 R 1,575.77 R 732.47 R 1,339.39 R 374.89 
Source: The ACCESS Study and NAPPI Code Price File as supplied by MediKredit June 2005. 
 
The second part of this equation is to calculate the cost of the medical interventions utilised 
to achieve the NCEP II LDL-C.  This comprises the cost of the physician’s consultation, of 
dispensing the drugs, of conducting lipid tests and the additional cost of adverse reactions that the 
patients may have had to the medication.  This segment of costs can be subjective and driven from a 
supplier-induced demand in the world of real practice. However in the tightly defined clinical 
study, the number of visits to the physician tends to be higher than usual36.  Table 6.4 above 
summarizes these interventions as reflected in the ACCESS drug trial.   
 
A comprehensive analysis is presented in Table 6.9 on the development of the economic 
understanding of the efficacy of drugs and the development of a cost effective and cost 
                                                
36 In a conversation with Dr Rajesh Patel, Head of the Benefit and Risk Department at Board of Healthcare Funders, Dr 
Patel indicated that clinical studies tend to have a higher proportion of physician intervention than in practice.  
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minimisation analyses.  The actual cost of treating a patient over a period of 54 weeks will be 
substantially less if the generic form of simvastatin was used. Simvastatin is R272.77 less than 
atorvastatin and R512.28 less than lovastatin.  The other two statins, at higher absolute prices, are 
substantially more expensive. 
  
Furthermore, dividing the minimum cost amount by the efficacy of the drug can deepen the 
analysis. This exercise yields the cost effective value, which is the actual cost of treating a patient 
over the period of a year.  Atorvastatin and simvastatin are virtually identical in terms of their cost 
effectiveness and these two statins are substantially more efficient when compared to the4 other 
three statins in the study.  
 
This conclusion is in line with that of the economic analysis of the ACCESS study that 
atorvastatin is the more cost effective drug. However, when compared to simvastatin, it does not 
appear to be all that more cost effective.  On cost minimisation comparison, it appears that 
atorvastatin is about R272-78 more expensive than simvastatin.  However when the consideration 
accommodates for the effectiveness of the drug, then the difference between the two drugs is less 
than two Rands (R1.93, to be precise).  
 
Table 6.9.  Cost Minimization and Cost Effective Analysis for Statins 
Cost Minimisation  Atorvastatin Fluvastatin Lovastatin Pravastatin Simvastatin 
Analysis (n=1944) (n=493) (n=494) (n=478) (n=478) 
Mean number of Visits 2.94 4.85 3.98 5.03 3.49 
Cost of Physician's Consult R 154.70 R 154.70 R 154.70 R 154.70 R 154.70 
Cost of Lipid Measurement R 191.12 R 191.12 R 191.12 R 191.12 R 191.12 
Dispensing Fee (Legislated) R 26.00 R 26.00 R 26.00 R 26.00 R 26.00 
Medical Intervention Charges R 371.82 R 371.82 R 371.82 R 371.82 R 371.82 
Total Medical Intervention Cost R 1,093.15 R 1,803.33 R 1,479.84 R 1,870.25 R 1,297.65 
Medicine Costs R 850.54 R 1,575.77 R 732.47 R 1,339.39 R 374.89 
Medicine and Physician 
Intervention Cost 
R 1,943.69 R 3,379.09 R 2,212.31 R 3,209.64 R 1,672.54 
Adverse Reaction Adjustment (R) 3.47% 3.05% 1.73% 2.33% 3.93% 
Adverse Reaction Adjustment (%) R 67.42 R 102.94 R 38.31 R 74.73 R 65.80 
Cost Minimisation Analysis Total 
Cost per Patient  
R 2,011.12 R 3,482.03 R 2,250.62 R 3,284.37 R 1,738.34 
Efficacy from Clinical Assessment 0.88 0.48 0.66 0.44 0.76 
Cost Effective Analyses R 2,285.36 R 7,254.23 R 3,410.03 R 7,464.48 R 2,287.29 
Source : The Access Study, Council for Medical Schemes, Lancet Laboratories,  
 
6.3.4  Sensitivity Analyses 
The two drugs, atorvastatin and simvastatin have virtually the same cost-effectiveness; this 
means that a slight change in any of the factors used in the progression toward the total cost would 
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be reflected as a change in price and result in either one of the drugs being more cost-effective.  
They have a seesaw relationship with the pivot being the number of visits to a physician in one 
relationship and the other pivot being potency of the drug.  Any adjustment to these two areas 
impacts the cost effectiveness one-way or the other.  In conducting the sensitivity analysis, one 
component is adjusted whist the others are kept constant.  This has been done for four factors that 
reflect quite succinctly the effect of such an adjustment would have (Table 6.10).  An increase in 
the price of drugs would have a greater impact on a higher priced drug and in the situation of a 
delicate balance would forego advantage to the lower priced drug, as in the case of simvastatin.  In 
the event of such an increase, the relative cost-effectiveness of the drug could be made less 
attractive when compared with a competing compound.  As shown below in Table 6.10, this impact 
can vary from 1.96% to 8.68%, depending on the rate of increase.  
 
Table 6.10 Increase in the Price of Drugs results in an efficiency gain for simvastatin 
Percentage Increase Rand value Efficiency Gain (%) 
10% R 46.80 1.96% 
20% R 95.54 3.84% 
30% R 144.28 5.58% 
40% R 193.01 7.19% 
50% R 241.75 8.68% 
Source: The ACCESS report, own study 
 
Similarly, the increases in the non-drug costs would have a greater impact on the lower 
priced items such as a generic lower priced drug as in the case of simvastatin.  The factors that 
influence the lower priced drugs are contingent on these externalities, which fall outside the ambit 
of drug manufacturers.  The three tables below (6.11, 6.12 and 6.13) support this assertion. The 
tables reflect different scenarios where the external factors are increased, and this impacts the lower 
priced drug adversely, making it less cost effective. 
 
Table 6.11 Increase in the Number of Physician Visits results in an efficiency gain for 
atorvastatin 
Percentage Increase Rand value Efficiency Gain (%) 
10% R 50.86 2.10% 
20% R 99.79 3.92% 
30% R 148.72 5.57% 
40% R 197.00 7.06% 
50% R 246.58 8.42% 
Source: The ACCESS report, own study 
 
Table 6.12 Increase in the Cost of Physician Visits results in an efficiency gain for atorvastatin 
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Percentage Increase Rand value Efficiency Gain (%) 
10% R 22.29 0.94% 
20% R 42.65 1.75% 
30% R 63.01 2.51% 
40% R 83.37 3.23% 
50% R 103.72 3.90% 
Source: The ACCESS report, own study 
 
Table 6.13 Increase in the Dispensing Fee for Drugs results in an efficiency gain for 
atorvastatin 
Dispensing fee increase Rand value Efficiency Gain (%) 
R 29 R 5.88 0.26% 
R 30 R 7.20 0.31% 
R 33 R 11.15 0.48% 
R 37 R 16.41 0.71% 
R 40 R 20.36 0.87% 
Source: The ACCESS report, own study 
  
6.4  Conclusion 
The manner in which prices of drugs is pitched is contingent on a number of factors, both 
internal and external.  It appears that when looking at a comparative drug study such as the 
ACCESS study, there may be an inclination to draw too much on the conclusions as opposed to 
examining the assumptions that the study is based upon.   
 
The original study concluded, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that atorvastatin is a much more 
cost-effective drug. However, one of the tenets of the study is that it looked at branded products.  
The situation is a little different in South Africa in the sense that there is a strong legislative 
presence when compared to the United States (the ACCESS study setting). The single exit price 
legislation, generic drugs and monopsonistic purchasers (Department of Health) would all tend to 
influence the pricing structure of the drug. When these influences are taken into account, there is 
virtually no difference in the cost effectiveness between atorvastatin and simvastatin.  
 
Technology has introduced a number of newer drugs onto the market, including a statin that 
is not currently locally available, rosuvastatin.  It may be prudent to accommodate for the current 
impasse in the dispensing fee legislation and the single exit price debate when undertaking a pricing 
structure for the drug.  Recent analyses in the United States placed rosuvastatin’s potency at 
reducing LDL at 63%, atorvastatin at 57%, and simvastatin at 47%37.   However the circumstances 
                                                
37 Caremark publication, article by Maribeth Bettarelli, available on www.caremark.com, accessed on 16th 
June 2005.  
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in the real world treatment, such as the REALITY Study conducted in a number of European 
countries, indicated that the drugs actually achieved a lower level of success.  The externalities 
would include lifestyle factors, up titration of drugs, and the use of combinations of drugs. One 
such combination would be the use of the statin with a fibrate, such as Ezetimibe, which works to 
reduce the amount of cholesterol that the body absorbs.  
  
In concluding, compliance with the drug regimen is more important than the drug potency.  
Compliance is a dynamic result of price, availability, acceptability and simplicity of the dosages.  
Looking back at the dilemma posed at the beginning of the chapter, the Coase Theorem applies in 
the sense that if ex ante (the cost of drug development) or ex post costs are too high (the costs of 
complying with the drug regimen), then the transaction would not be concluded. Newer drugs 
would not enter the market if the drug manufactures’ are not guaranteed of a certain return on 
investment.  
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CHAPTER 7    
Regulations, Competition and Price - Observations 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Pharmaceuticals are the focus of much of the price control regulation geared toward 
reducing the cost of healthcare delivery.  There are two schools of thought on the topic of price 
control.  One that favours regulation to limit or to restrain the price of drugs, the other proposes that 
competition be allowed to govern the level at which prices are set.  Moreover, there is a substantial 
body of evidence supporting both points of view.  
 
Danzon and Towse (2003, p.1-2) identify three unique economic questions relating to the 
pharmaceutical environment. First, the substantial capital investment related to research and 
development, patent protection, and technical advances raise weighty positive and normative 
concerns regarding the industry structure, prices and broader healthcare policy.   
 
Second, the industry is heavily regulated and its tenets have been born out of a regulatory 
environment that was initially set on safety and marketing ethics (Sainsbury Report, 1966, 
Kefauver-Harris Amendments, 1962), but subsequently enhanced its role to include the efficacy of 
drugs, to a more recent attention to areas deemed to be non-healthcare costs (Appasamy and Riding, 
2002, p.12 ).  These concerns are driven by the need for budget-conscious governments to control 
healthcare cost in order to minimise spending on their national healthcare budgets.   
 
Third, major drugs are globally sold products and the cost of the development of those 
drugs should ideally be shared globally.  Under the current paradigm, there exists the incentive for 
countries to have national free-rider strategies for drugs that required by their populations.  On the 
other hand, regulators are under pressure to limit the total healthcare expenditure in order to support 
the burgeoning need for healthcare.  Ironically increased demand for healthcare stems from the 
lower prices of healthcare interventions and drugs and reflects a classic economic problem of the 
scarcity and the allocation of resources.  The issue of moral hazard (as explained in Chapter 2) also 
emerges in this situation.  The lower cost of healthcare increases demand for healthcare thereby 
placing a larger burden on limited resources (in this case both the public and private healthcare 
budgets).  Ultimately the objective to provide sustainable healthcare services to all tends to be 
compromised.  
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In South Africa, the introduction of the single exit price (SEP) may be indicative of this 
development and implies further regulatory and structural expansion in the future.  It is ironic that 
the government policy on the SEP and pharmacy dispensing fee issues are directed exclusively for 
the benefit of the middle class purchaser, which constitutes primarily the medical scheme member.  
On the surface it appears that this policy is not designed for the benefit of the public sector health 
departments.  However, the development of Social Health Insurance is a signal that the government 
intends to substantially increase its role in the private healthcare market, a directive that is in line 
with the White Paper proposals – in order for that market segment to support the public sector 
infrastructure.   
 
The dilemma, in light of this paper, is whether these developments will be efficient in a 
Coasian sense.  Furthermore, there is also a question as to the measurement of efficiency of the 
changes.  How can this be measured?  One suggestion is that there is currently a wealth of multi-
variate information, both in the public and the private sectors for an information baseline to be 
established.  It can be seen that this baseline can be used as a measurement tool against which to 
measure future experiences.   
 
This and the final chapter will review the literature of some of the thinking in this area and 
make recommendations regarding the development of healthcare policy with specific reference to 
pharmaceutical pricing.  Weighting of the costs against the benefits of any regulatory intervention 
would be ideal as a simplistic measurement. However, the impact of any such regulation is 
subjective and contingent on a myriad different factors including the socio-economic target group, 
the level of out-of-pocket payment for the patients with insurance cover, the behaviour of the 
prescribing physician as to whether or not they are acting as true agents for the patients, the likely 
presence of a national social insurance, and the penetration of generic drugs into the market.  
 
7.2 The Costs and Benefits of Regulation 
Part of the role of regulation is to protect the public, control the manner in which commerce 
is conducted, and to establish a transparent basis for trade; which includes protecting the public 
from the incidence of dangerous drugs and drug therapies being used by its citizens.  Secondary is 
the function to provide services that add value or simply put, services that increase the welfare to 
society.  The latter function usually means that the regulatory framework might opt for a delivery 
method that fits its budget – its focus is to deliver a certain level of healthcare to as many people as 
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it possibly can at the lowest price.  Governments also use their monopsonistic purchasing power to 
negotiate for better prices. There have been attempts to quantify the impact of regulations on 
pharmaceutical prices (Peltzman, 1987, Ruwart, 2004), especially by researchers in the United 
States, but there is very little literature available that deals specifically with this issue.   
 
In a similar manner, attempts have been made to try and quantify the cost of regulatory 
interventions.  One well known study by Grabowski et al (1978) compares the changes in the 
United States after the Kefauver-Harris Amendments of 1962 to the situation in Britain, where, at 
that stage, there had not been considerable regulatory change.  Studies dealing with the cost of 
regulation counted the cost in lives of not having the drug on the market because of the regulatory 
processes that needed to be adhered to.  
 
7.3  Pricing and Competition 
An obvious approach to the issue is to look at competition in the pharmaceutical market, 
including the relationship between the innovator drugs and the generic drugs.  Mathews (2000) 
observes that there are two pharmaceutical industries, one that manufacturers generics and over the 
counter (OTC) drugs fairly cheaply, and the other that spends billions of dollars in R&D in order to 
develop new compounds that are more effective that current therapeutic drugs – the ‘pharmatech 
industry’.   
 
Competition in this area comes in three forms: between drugs in the same therapeutic class, 
such as the branded statins; between innovative and generic drugs in the same class (simvastatin 
versus the other statins); and finally amongst the generics themselves such as the aspirin producers.  
The world market for innovative pharmaceuticals is largely governed by developments in the 
United States market.  This was clearly evident in the Uruguay Round of the World Trade 
Organisation talks concerning intellectual property rights.  Those countries that have robust 
pharmaceutical manufacturing industries, particularly Switzerland, the United Kingdom, France 
and the United States, pushed hard for agreements on patent protection.  Furthermore it was made 
clear that pharmaceutical companies in the USA invest heavily in R&D with the intent of recouping 
such ‘capital investment’ from the drugs’ users.  India, widely considered the largest producer of 
generic drugs in the world, has ratified the 2001 TRIPS agreement on patent rights effective from 
January 1st, 2005.  This would most likely intensify the pro-patent nations in their call for further 
patent protection, particularly amongst the Oriental nations, India and China. The method used to 
protect these innovative drugs is to register a patent that is effective for a certain period of time.  
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The Waxman-Hatch Act of 1984 extended the length of time38 that an innovative drug is patent 
protected, but also made it attractive for generic drugs to enter the market at a greater rate.  This Act 
is credited with the dramatic rise of generic products since 1984 worldwide.  Such action resulted in 
lower prices of drugs, primarily because average prices fall when consumers switch to the cheaper 
generic.  Generic manufacturers compete quite heavily on price (Caves, CBO study 1998, 
MediKredit 2005). 
Figure 7.1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ruwart (2004a p. 1, http://www.ruwart.com/AAPS.pdf) 
According to Ruwart, the profit reaches a peak at the end point of patent protection, 17 years, and 
signalling the decline of profits over the following ten years. (See Appendix 4) 
 
The holding companies of innovator drugs require a certain time before they can recoup 
their investment. This is provided for in the patent protection period.  The price of an innovator 
drug includes the cost of drugs that do not make it to the market, the cost of waiting for a return on 
the drug, the cost of capital, and cost incurred in conducting the requisite clinical trials.  These 
expenses were heightened and expanded by the requirements put forth by Senator Estes Kefauver in 
1962.  It is often argued that these regulations did more harm than good (Ruwart, 2004a, p. 1).   
 
                                                
38  The Waxman-Hatch Act extended the period that a drug enjoyed patent protection to 20 years.  This 
however, was not a straight-forward extension.  The time that that drug spent being assessed for safety and 
efficacy is also included in the 20-year period.  The Act did allow for some flexibility to enter into the market 
by easing regulatory conditions (proposed by the Kefauver-Harris Amendments) for manufacturers.  
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Competition amongst innovative drugs39 is characterised by the breakthrough innovator 
drug with ‘me-too’40 drugs and generic drugs following in its path. When an innovator drug reaches 
the market, it is protected by a patent for a period of roughly seventeen years.  Although patent 
protection prevents competing companies from producing the exact compound, it does not prevent 
the competitors from producing slightly different drugs that are functionally similar.  The statin 
example illustrates this state of affairs.  Zocor, with its active ingredient simvastatin was the first 
broad-based statin on the market to achieve a level of success.  Lipitor41, using a similar mechanism 
to block the production of cholesterol production in the liver, was developed using an active 
ingredient called atorvastatin.  The later drug set a new standard in cholesterol treatment and can be 
referred to as a ‘me-too’ drug, newer examples include the drug Crestor.  
 
The competition between a generic drug and an innovative drug has intensified somewhat, 
primarily to the number of innovative drugs coming off-patent, but also due to a peculiar effect that 
Kong (2004) referred to as the ‘generic competition paradox’. The typical economic situation is in 
the result of a generic drug entering the market: more innovator drugs are being substituted for in 
prescriptions, driving the average price of a prescription down.  These generic drugs quickly gain a 
large share of the market.   
 
The generic competition paradox can be explained by considering the role of the consumer, 
particularly the consumer’s behaviour.  Those consumers who are price sensitive or covered by 
health plans will more likely purchase the generic product.  As this purchasing pattern continues the 
demand for the innovative drug falls.  At this juncture, the remaining consumers who still continue 
to purchase the innovative drug are likely to have an inelastic demand for the drug and hence less 
sensitive to the price of the drug.  Given this situation, the price of the innovator drug could rise 
rapidly over a short period of time in order to take advantage of the inelastic demand for the drug.  
The manufacturer can only do this because of the influence of the generic drug in segmenting the 
market.  The CBO (Caves, CBO study 1998) paper lists a number of studies that support this 
phenomenon.  Two considerations are important in the generic competition paradox: the 
                                                
39 Innovative or ethical drugs are newer drugs that still enjoy patent protection. In other words, they are not 
generic drugs. 
40 ‘Me-too’ drugs are drugs that capitalize and build on older drugs and technologies. It is often the case 
where the ‘me-too’ drug performs at a much higher efficacy than the original drug. 
41 Lipitor was recently reported as the world’s top selling drug with sales of 10.86 billion dollars (USD) with 
Zocor in second place with 5.17 billion dollars in sales. Both drugs maintained their 2003 standing of 1st and 
2nd most popular drugs in 2004.  Med Ad News, May 2005 
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substitutability of the brand name with that of the generic product and the market share of the non-
price sensitive patients.  
Table 7-1 
Box 7-1. 
Calculating the Impact of the Replacement Effect and Generic Competition on the Returns from 
Innovation 
Calculation of Returns from Innovation When New Products Replace Old Ones 
       
Present Discounted Value 
(PDV) of Profits from 
Innovation 
= 
PDV of Returns 
from New 
Product 
- 
[ PDV of Returns from 
Currently Marketed 
Product 
x 
Share of Current 
Market Replaced by 
New Product ] 
       
Calculation of How the Rise in Generic Entry Since 1984 Has Affected Returns 
       
Change in PDV of Profits from 
Innovation Caused by 
Increased Generic Entry 
= 
Change in PDV 
of Returns from 
New Product 
- 
[ Change in PDV of 
Returns from Currently 
Marketed Product 
x 
Share of Current 
Market Replaced by 
New Product ] 
That relationship can be expressed mathematically, as follows. Assuming that:  
t = number of years a product has been on the market  
tg = year of generic entry  
T = number of years of product life  
h = year in the life of the currently marketed product when a new, competing product is 
introduced by the monopolist  
= share of the current product's market that is absorbed by the new product  
= monopolist's profits in year t with no generic entry  
= monopolist's profits in year t with generic entry  
= if t < tg; if t > tg 
Source: Caves R (1998), p.74  
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Competition amongst generic drugs is characterised by price wars.  The CBO (Caves, CBO 
study 1998) study indicated that the price of a generic is inversely proportional to the number of 
generic manufacturers in the market.  Primarily all of the generic producers manufacture the same 
compound (that of an off-patent drug).  The result is that these producers compete on price.  Caves 
(1998, p. 65-71) found that when the number of manufacturers increased from 1 to 10, the average 
generic drug fell down from 60 percent to 34 percent of the brand name drug. 
 
7.3  Regulatory Interventions 
In many national healthcare delivery models, the largest purchaser of healthcare products 
tends to be the government.  This presents a problem to drug manufacturers because of the 
monopsonistic nature of the contact that they enter into. The situation is further exacerbated by the 
presence of generic manufacturers who may have more appeal to the purchaser.  Governments 
control prices in a number of ways (as discussed in Chapter 3); reference pricing, limiting the level 
of reimbursement to the patient necessitating out-of-pocket payment and ultimately running the risk 
of non-compliance.  
 
The state of affairs presents a dilemma in that drugs are targeted to specific populations and 
it is important to the manufacturer that sufficient recoupment of capital costs take place.  The 
impact of monopsonistic purchasers tends to reduce income because the purchaser tends to want the 
product at the marginal cost. This does not leave sufficient monies to invest in R&D.   
 
Vernon, et al (2004, p.2) indicate that new drugs generate immense social benefit, mainly 
by obviating older, more time consuming and painful treatment protocols.  Newer drugs tend to 
have a higher success rate at treating certain conditions, and in some cases, obviate the need for 
surgery – as in the case with stomach ulcers.  Economic theory, according to Vernon et al (2004, 
p.2), is clear in its prediction that price controls will reduce biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
R&D by reducing cash flows, thereby decreasing expected revenues streams.  This situation 
reduces the incentives to develop new drugs.  In their study they infer, through the use of 
retrospective data, that governments impact through regulation and purchasing has a negative 
impact on biotechnology prices and pharmaceutical R&D (see Figure 7.2 and Table 7.2 below ).  
 
Danzon’s (1999, p. 352) analyses of drug pricing in seven countries supports Vernon’s 
view and goes further in postulating that countries with a relatively free pricing system (such as the 
USA, Canada and Germany) are much more susceptible to the impact of generic pricing.  Countries 
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that have a stringent drug pricing policy (such as France, Japan and Italy) do not gain the benefits of 
generic pricing structures.   
Figure 7.2 
 
Source (Vernon et al, p. 5).  One series identifies the trend in actual real drug prices over time, 
whereas the other series shows how drug prices would have trended in the absence of any 
government influence. Notice that real drug prices actually dropped by roughly 50 percent from 
1960 to 1980. Also notice that after 1980, real drug prices continued to increase but never quite 
obtained in 2001 the same level observed in 1960. 
 
Anecdotal evidence (Danzon, 1999, p.352) suggests that generic manufacturers in countries 
with stricter regulations tend to be licensed co-marketers of drugs that manufacturers introduce in 
order to get a price increase. This differs markedly from the situation where in a free market 
system, generic manufacturers enter the market, competing on price.  The price of the product is 
inversely proportional to the number of generic manufacturers in the industry.  Volume discounts 
and competitive pricing are also reflective of this environment.  Danzon’s analyses suggest that 
“…regulation of both manufacturer prices and retail pharmacy undermines competition in the off-
patent sector and that potential budgetary savings from post-patent competition are not fully 
realised in countries with strict regulatory systems.” (Danzon, 1999, p. 355) 
 
The extreme view is that regulations take lives instead of saving them (Ruwart, 2004b, p. 
3).  The aspect known as ‘regulatory creep’ is cited as a major cause of the increase in the cost of 
healthcare to the patient.  A number of issues are raised, one of them being the impact that 
regulations have on drug development time and the negative impact of cost-cutting legislation.   
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Table 7.2 
 Source Vernon et al (2004, p. 7).  “The key estimate from this simulation exercise is, of course, the 
measure of cumulative forgone R&D investment. We estimate this amount to be $188 billion as of 
2001. This figure represents the amount of R&D that the federal government, through its influence 
and constraint on real drug prices, disincentivized firms to undertake.” 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the Kefauver-Harris Amendments of 1962 required that 
manufacturers test drugs for efficacy.  Ruwart’s contention is that no drug treats everyone equally 
and hence even testing the number of people that will be affected would not decrease substantially.  
Furthermore, the 1962 regulations increased the drug development time from 4.4 years to 14.2 
years on average (Ruwart, 2004b, p.1).  Using the number of lives that the average drug saves, the 
number of lives saved compared to the number of lives lost is in the region of 4.7 million lives lost 
from 1962 to 2004 compared to 90 000 lives saves.  This reasoning is extended to the amount of 
money spent on R&D costs and the additional amounts required because of the regulatory 
requirements.  A similar situation was seen in South Africa in the medical schemes environment 
where roughly a third of the annual increase was attributed to the regulatory requirement of holding 
a mandatory reserve comprising of 25% of gross contributions (CMS, 2005, p.111).  
 
7.4 What lies ahead for the South African Pharmaceutical Industry?  Questions? 
How does South Africa fare in this arena?  South Africa’s national health policy is driven 
fairly rigidly along the lines of the White Paper on health.  Add to that, South Africa has a strong 
regulatory arm which tends to run against the grain of the healthcare community.  The introduction 
of the single exit price (SEP) has, in the short-run, attempted to restrict the free movement of the 
price of drugs.  Does this necessarily risk the public’s access to modern drugs in the long run?  Or 
does it necessitate that all drug development will be stopped. The southern African region has been 
significantly affected by the HIV/AIDS pandemic and is reliant on the development of newer drugs 
 113
to help ease the afflictions of this disease.  Most drug trials, as mentioned earlier, are conducted 
externally, very few compounds are tested locally.  The fact of the matter is that any research based 
organization (like a pharmaceutical manufacturer) will throw its resources behind an R&D project 
that has a fair return to investment.   
 
7.5 Concluding notes 
However, the reasoning presented above regarding regulatory heavy handedness appears to 
defeat the purpose that the regulation was intended for and one can assume that South African 
prices for both innovative and generic drugs will be higher than elsewhere in the world, particularly 
for the private sector patient.  
 
The research problem is focussed on whether a Coasian relation can exist within the current 
healthcare paradigm.  Furthermore the paper undertook to inform the reader about the significant 
relationships that exist in the healthcare arena.  In particular we considered a number of questions 
posed in the introductory chapter were addressed, including:  
i. whether the nature of the relationships between the stakeholders in the healthcare 
industry was efficient?; 
ii. if any aspects of the industry can be changed in order to create greater levels of 
efficiency?; 
iii. whether the lessons learned from other healthcare systems are useful?  How can 
alternate healthcare systems inform the issues at hand?; 
iv. are there any efficient pricing structures that can be utilised?; and 
v. ultimately the main thrust of the hypothesis would be whether an efficient 
relationship can exist between the supply and usage (demand) for medicines.  
 
It is clear from the discussion that an efficient relationship between demand and supply is 
governed by endogenous and exogenous factors and a multiplicity of relationships.  One way of 
examining this issue is to consider the overarching problem and then cascade it into more localised 
issues. 
 
Can an efficient solution exist between the supplier and the purchaser of pharmaceuticals?  
This was answered theoretically by a number of writers including Reekie (1997), Vernon (2004) 
and Danzon (1999).  Would this solution be a Coasian solution?  If all of the agents are informed 
and are happy with their respective agreements, then the solution is Coasian.  
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The paper also dealt with systems used in other parts of the world that have important 
lessons for South African policy-makers.  The recent legal impasse regarding dispensing fees and 
the high cost of pharmaceuticals prompted a number of calls from the Department of Health for 
expansion in the use of generic drugs.  The empirical study in Chapter 6 showed that the innovative 
drug, although more expensive per unit price, was more efficient than a generic.  Innovative drugs 
build on the R&D and success of the older drugs (some of which already have generic versions on 
the market).  Thus it is vital that R&D continue for such advances to be made.   
 
Medical schemes, under regulatory pressure to offer more benefits and reduce 
contributions, have responded by defaulting to generic versions of the prescribed drug in their 
benefit plans. If a generic version of the particular prescribed drug is not available, then the next 
choice would be a generic of another drug in the same therapeutic class.  This may be considered as 
inefficient behaviour, particularly in the case of coronary disease where the likelihood of a person 
getting worse is high.  
 
 Healthcare systems vary in structure, funding and efficiency.  The public healthcare system 
is regarded as far more efficient than the private healthcare system (WHO Report 2000).  Why?  
Outcomes are similar and yet the public system costs far less to treat specific conditions – albeit in 
far more dubious circumstances.  Could the use of generics allow for healthcare systems to become 
more efficient?  Reekie (1997) argues for higher prices and more profits, which in turn, would 
allow for more R&D and hence, innovative medicine.  This is the initial welfare loss to society 
given up for future gain.  This would allow for a Coasian solution, if the agents involved could 
agree on what would be spent today for the sake of improved health tomorrow.  The agents would 
have to agree on a principle of whose rights are more important.  
 
 Efficient pricing can also take the form as suggested by Ramsey price structures.  South 
Africa is divided, quite distinctly, along the lines of income earnings.  The affluent groups can be 
subject to one price and the less affluent groups to a lower price.  One would venture that this 
situation already exists.  However, if one assumes that both groups are ‘insured’ against healthcare 
interventions in the broadest sense, then a situation of Ramsey pricing does not exist.  An 
investigation into the specific impact of Ramsey pricing would be useful.  
 
 This leads to the final question of how the supply and demand of drugs in healthcare 
services can be made more efficient?  Specific policy recommendations are listed in the following 
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chapter.  However, assessing the broad based scope of the sector, one would assume that 
encouraging the established pharmaceutical industry to expand through a series of localised 
inventions, the use and encouragement of the use of traditional medicines, and a greater use of 
pharmacoeconomics in the assessment of prescribed drugs.   
 
 The role of R&D in pharmaceutical companies is core to their operations and profitability – 
which makes it important for these companies to compete on an R&D basis.  Drug companies 
depend on new drugs because such drugs, if successfully launched, yield the highest percentage 
returns (which increase profits).  Furthermore, newer drugs are much more efficient than their 
previous counterparts.  Add to that, there are differing pressures put onto healthcare infrastructures,  
such as HIV/AIDS in southern Africa;  cholera, dengue and typhoid in south east Asia; SARS in 
China; avian flu in northern Asia, south and central Europe.  Viruses and viral strains change and 
research has a constant battle to come up with antidotes.  Such situations need to be addressed with 
newer drugs since the older methods are no longer effective.  Malaria, one of the constant health 
issues in South Africa, being a prime example.   
 
 The twentieth century has indicated that there are many new strains of disease but many of 
them can be treated quite successfully with new generation drugs.  However, what is the cost of 
bringing these drugs to the market?   
 
 Stated differently, the role of R&D is core to the efficiency of healthcare systems and it 
would be efficient, in a Coasian sense, if the cost of R&D was borne by these healthcare systems.  
This does not imply that individual patients should bear the brunt of their own medications, but 
patients as a collective group would enjoy a level of cross subsidy for the (more expensive) drugs 
that they use.   
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CHAPTER 8 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
8.1 Discussion of Salient Points 
The study highlighted the proposition that economic efficiency can be attained if property 
rights are fully allocated.  However there are myriad additional costs that are involved, all 
encapsulated under the banner of transaction costs.  A useful approach would be to address the 
different transaction costs.   
 
A motivation cost is one type, and in particular one of its subsets called informational 
incompleteness.  One area where this cost is widespread is that the patient is in a weak bargaining 
position when it comes to making decisions about their own health; a typical principal-agent 
problem.  Secondly, the discussion that involved the restriction on advertising would also tend to 
exacerbate this problem.  The resultant situation would be a society that is totally dependent on 
what is being told to them regarding their health.  
 
Coase raised the issue of social cost. If parties bargain to reach an efficient agreement for 
themselves, and that they display no wealth effects, then efficiency alone determines the agreement.  
The question asked in the introduction is whether this type of solution is possible in the healthcare 
arena.  A Coasian solution is possible in the South African healthcare environment.  This will be 
expounded upon in the final section of this chapter.  However the solution may appear to be far 
more complex that the theoretical grasp presented here. 
 
Ramsey pricing for pharmaceuticals is currently being touted, in certain quarters, as the 
solution to many of the problems in the South African healthcare system.  However the issue of 
Ramsey pricing and patent rights challenges Coase’s argument that efficient solutions can be 
reached without the influence of externalities.  Multinational drug companies will price according 
to their country-specific marginal cost.  However, the multi-national agreement on TRIPS is 
indicative that nations are willing to work together, at least on paper.  Mechanisms expounded by 
TRIPS include compulsory and voluntary licence agreements that parallel trade restrictions.  These 
arrangements show that agreements can be effectively and efficiently reached if the parties to the 
agreement do not display any wealth effects.   
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Medicine prices have been the bone of contention for decades and governments, in their 
desire to protect their nations, often resort to heavy-handed regulation in order to restrict the free 
movement of prices (drug prices in this instance).  All four Commissions surveyed in the study 
recommended punitive restrictions on the free movement of pharmaceutical prices.  Support for this 
viewpoint comes in the form of the World Health Report 2003 that ranked France as having the 
most efficient healthcare system in the world.  There are, however, measures that go beyond the 
usual fiscal assessments and that comes in the form of opportunity costs and efficient usage of 
resources.   
 
Experiences from other countries can inform and help bridge the divide between the 
manufacturer and the patient in an environment characterised by diverging perspectives.  The PPRS 
in the UK is an example of how to address the needs of both sides of the issue.  The manufacturers 
get what they want because they make a normal profit and the payer gets lower prices.  
 
Some regulatory controls take the form of competition legislation.  The CC ruling against 
industry trade organisation is short-sighted since it ignores one of the basic tenets of 
microeconomics, namely transaction costs that were obviated by collusive bargaining.  The ruling 
led to a reference price list for services rendered. Although this does not impact the pharmaceutical 
pricing policies of individual drug manufacturers, it does play a role in defining the selling price to 
large purchasers such as hospitals.  Indirectly, the manufacturer must sell at a certain price level.  
The advent of the SEP enforced a transparent selling price.  The level of transparency can be 
argued in the sense that it is possible for a company to make supernormal profits which is enforced 
by government regulation.  
 
8.2 Gaps, Anomalies and Deviations 
Assessing the social impact lacks  the robustness of a controlled scientific study, hence 
much of what is proposed cannot be accurately measured.  Ergo, even though are limitations, the 
debate regarding prices should not be lost.  Regulations do have consequences and not all of them 
are intended.    
 
The pharmacoeconomic exercise was not done on original evidence but based on an 
assessment done elsewhere.  This may not be a true reflection of the local conditions.  If original 
research were undertaken, results might differ. 
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The results of the cost-effectiveness study deviated from the results of the original study.  A 
number of factors may have contributed to the deviation, price differentials, the inclusion of generic 
drugs and different treatment protocols.  
 
8.3 Significance of Results 
The cost-effectiveness study demonstrated there are a number of factors that need to be taken into 
account when making a decision regarding which drug to use.  Often decisions are made purely on 
the basis of price – true of some players in the medical schemes industry.   
 
Two significant factors come into play when looking at the results of the cost-effectiveness 
study, firstly, the study differs in its conclusion to the original study that it was based upon using 
the same clinical trial data, and secondly, the impact of the externalities on the cost effectiveness 
study is significant.  All factors need to be considered.  
 
Management care organizations tend to favour the least costly intervention, and this is true 
in their selection of drugs.  In South Africa, the drug of choice when treating patients suffering 
from CHD is a generic drug with the active ingredient simvastatin.  The cost-effectiveness study 
supports this decision on the surface.  A closer examination of the assumptions and the sensitivity 
analyses leads to a different conclusion.  Firstly, if the dispensing fee increases for pharmacists and 
dispensing doctors, then the innovative drug Lipitor becomes more cost effective.  Secondly if 
another generic comes onto the market, then the generic drugs would compete on price alone.  
Finally, compliance to a drug regimen is far more important than efficacy.  Compliance is a 
function of price, availability, simplicity of dosage and acceptability. If the ex ante costs are too 
high, then the transaction would not be completed.  The innovative drug scores higher on all of 
these areas and hence would be the favoured choice, as is evidenced in the MED AD News (May 
2005). 
 
8.4 Policy and Other Recommendations 
Recommendations pertaining to the private sector; 
i. A body is formed, similar to the PPRS, in order to negotiate prices on behalf 
of the consumer and the manufacturers.  A Coasian solution can be found 
since the negotiating parties would necessarily want to find an agreeable 
solution. 
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ii. R&D should be a joint cost, but in a pro rata manner.  If a drug company 
develops drug that afflicts one nation more than the other, CHD for instance, 
then the purchasing nation should necessarily pay more for the greater usage 
of the patent.  
iii. If this is not a possibility, then a free market pricing system should be 
adopted in order to allow for competition to prevail and that the innovative 
drugs compete within and between classes.  Furthermore the role of generic 
drugs will be enhanced to compete with each other and also, in some 
instances, with the innovative drugs if they fall in the same therapeutic class 
(e.g. simvastatin competing with the innovative drug Lipitor). 
iv. For patented drugs, the patent holders can issue compulsory licences for a 
limited period in order to meet local demand, if the need arises.  This 
however should be a last resort.  
v. Advertising of drugs carry as much information as possible in order to 
inform the public regarding their efficacy.  The primary aim should be that of 
informing rather than that of giving the wrong impression.  
vi. The private hospital industry, which trades in pharmaceuticals, should adopt 
a more transparent pricing structure that is made available to the public and 
done in a manner that would not compromise their competitive advantage.   
vii. The public sector hospitals should identify (as they have previously 
attempted to do) a number of premium hospitals that would be able to 
compete with the private sector hospitals.  The advantage that they gain in 
their monopsonistic purchasing ability can be used to fund the upgrade of 
other hospitals in the area and to pay their staff higher salaries.  This would 
create a level of competition within the hospital sector and also enhance 
competition amongst the drug producers since these stakeholders are the 
major clients.  
viii. A philosophical argument leads to the notion that advances in medicine, 
particularly in pharmaceuticals, are outstripping their value to society in the 
long-run.  This viewpoint contends that the rate of mortality is insufficiently 
high for the population to accommodate the current birth rate.  The net effect 
is that although the drugs are effective in the short-run, they ultimately have 
the effect of increasing the population so that the impact on sustainable 
resources is endemic.  Furthermore, there is an impact of the environment as 
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more and more people compete for less and less resources.  Many of the 
institutions that were set-up to cater to various sectors of society, pension 
funds being one example, require major structural changes in order to remain 
functional.  The contention is that drug companies would eventually also not 
be able to compete at this level.  
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APPENDIX 1 
Wealth Effects and the Value Maximising Principle, a summary of the Milgrom and Roberts 
proposals in Economics, Organization and Management (1992) 
 
There are three main conditions for the ‘no wealth effects’ proposal to hold (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992, p. 35): 
 
i) Given that there are any two decisions y1 and y2 and monetary wealth $x, the first 
condition states that there is an amount of wealth – $x – that would be sufficient to 
compensate the decision-maker for shifting from y1 and y2 (or vice versa).  
ii) If the decision-maker was given an additional amount of wealth, then the amount 
needed to compensate him for the switching from y1 and y2 would be unaffected.   
iii) The decision-maker should have sufficient means to absorb any loss in wealth in 
switching from y1 and y2, at least within reasonable parameters.  
 
These three conditions are fairly restrictive and do not hold all of the time. A reasonable 
assumption is that the sizes of the wealth transfers should be relatively small to the overall wealth 
of the decision-maker for the conditions of no wealth effects to be somewhat accurate.   
 
The utility function of the decision-maker, under these conditions, can be taken back to first 
principles.  When used for group decisions, a value index of all the stakeholders can be developed 
to measure the total change in the group’s welfare.  Assume x represents the decision-maker’s 
monetary wealth, and y represents all the characteristics associated with the decision-maker’s 
preferences (e.g. societal influences, job category, performance bonuses, etc).  Now x can be seen 
as the amount of money that will be received and y is the uncertain or risky component. Under 
normal conditions the utility function of any decision-maker can be expressed as u(x, y) = x + y. 
However under the no wealth effects conditions, a cash equivalent value v(y) can be assigned to y 
allowing the utility function to be re-written as u(x,y) = x + v(y), thereby obtaining a personal value 
index for the decision maker. Moreover the total utility for the group can be addressed to each 
individual through,  
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ui(x, y) = x + vi(y), with i=1, 2, 3 representing a particular individual. This utility function 
can represent satisfaction – P(y) – gained from investments, wealth, or whatever is defined by y 
(Milgrom & Roberts, 1992, p.37).  
 
The concept can be further developed to demonstrate the logic of value maximising.  
Assume P(y) represents the total cash income generated by the total of individual investments under 
consideration. For the sake of simplicity, assume that there are only two investors, i1 and i2.  The 
total investment income P(y) is divided on a pro rata basis to each of the investors, i.e., P(y) = x1 
+x2.  Now for any allocation (x1, x2, y), the total utility can be stated as [x1 + v1(y)] + [x2 + v2(y)] 
which is equal to P(y) + v1(y) + v2(y). This implies that the total utility depends on the variable y 
and not on the certainty x. In addition, the total value or utility is not contingent on the distribution 
of wealth between the stakeholders.  If an allocation is Pareto-dominant, it can be inferred that the 
allocation is efficient if and only if y maximises the value of P(y) + v1(y) + v2(y). The value 
maximising principle can be summed up thus: 
 
An allocation among a group of people whose preferences display no wealth effects is 
efficient if and only if it maximises the value of the total parties.  Moreover, for any inefficient 
allocation, there exists another (total value maximising) allocation that all of the parties strictly 
prefer (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992, p.36). 
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APPENDIX 2  Detail of Retail Prices for Statins as supplied by MediKredit 
 
 
 
NAPPI Code
NAPPI 
Suffix Product Name Product Strength
Dosage 
Form
Pack 
QuantityINGREDIENTRetail Excl TaxRetail TaxRetail Incl TaxEffective Date
701276 3 Adco-simvastatin 10 mg10mg TAB 30 Simvastatin 69.3 9.7 79 2002/10/15
701279 3 Adco-simvastatin 20 mg20mg TAB 30 Simvastatin 78.07 10.93 89 2002/10/15
701281 3 Adco-simvastatin 40 mg40mg TAB 30 Simvastatin 99.5 13.93 113.43 2002/10/15
813664 4 Lescol 20 mg 20mg CAP 28 Fluvastatin 96.1 13.45 109.5 1995/02/13
813672 7 Lescol 40 mg 40mg CAP 28 Fluvastatin 128.13 17.94 146.07 1995/02/13
70963 2 Lescol xl 80 mg 80mg TAB 28 Fluvastatin 147.47 20.65 168.12 2002/09/12
831484 5 Lipitor 10 mg 10mg TAB 500 Atorvastatin 2348.57 328.8 2677.37 1997/07/28
831484 6 Lipitor 10 mg 10mg TAB 30 Atorvastatin 140.79 19.71 160.5 1997/07/28
831492 7 Lipitor 20 mg 20mg TAB 28 Atorvastatin 203.85 28.54 232.39 1997/07/28
831492 8 Lipitor 20 mg 20mg TAB 30 Atorvastatin 218.42 30.58 249 1997/07/28
886015 7 Lipitor 40 mg 40mg TAB 28 Atorvastatin 230.69 32.3 262.9 2001/05/14
886015 8 Lipitor 40 mg 40mg TAB 30 Atorvastatin 247.18 34.61 281.79 2001/05/14
704186 1 Lipitor 80mg 80 mg 80mg TAB 30 Atorvastatin 247.18 34.61 281.79 2005/04/01
703906 1 Lovachol 20 mg 20mg TAB 100 Lovastatin 209 29.26 238.26 2004/10/29
703905 1 Lovachol 40 mg 40mg TAB 100 Lovastatin 236 3.04 269.04 2004/10/29
787345 16 Prava 10 mg 10mg TAB 30 Pravastatin 148.7 20.82 169.52 1992/05/08
787353 27 Prava 20 mg 20mg TAB 30 Pravastatin 185.06 25.91 210.97 1993/04/07
83965 2 Prava 40 mg 40mg TAB 30 Pravastatin 221.29 30.98 252.27 1998/05/18
704253 1 Simaspen 10 10 mg 10mg TAB 28 Simvastatin 64.68 9.06 73.74 2005/03/30
704254 1 Simaspen 20 20 mg 20mg TAB 28 Simvastatin 72.86 10.2 83.06 2005/03/30
70425 1 Simaspen 40 40 mg 40mg TAB 28 Simvastatin 125.26 17.54 142.8 2005/03/30
704174 1 Simcard 40 40 mg 40mg TAB 30 Simvastatin 99.5 13.93 113.43 2005/03/01
70519 1 Simvacor 10 10 mg 10mg TAB 28 Simvastatin 65.49 9.17 74.66 2003/07/16
70520 1 Simvacor 20 20 mg 20mg TAB 28 Simvastatin 74.38 10.41 84.79 2003/07/16
70520 2 Simvacor 20 20 mg 20mg TAB 30 Simvastatin 78 10.92 88.92 2003/07/16
703525 1 Simvotin 10 10 mg 10mg TAB 28 Simvastatin 64.68 9.06 73.74 2004/09/13
703526 1 Simvotin 20 20 mg 20mg TAB 28 Simvastatin 72.86 10.2 83.06 2004/09/13
703527 1 Simvotin 40 40 mg 40mg TAB 28 Simvastatin 125.26 17.54 142.8 2004/09/13
783951 19 Zocor 10 mg 10mg TAB 28 Simvastatin 90.5 12.67 103.17 1992/09/28
783978 6 Zocor 20 mg 20mg TAB 28 Simvastatin 10.46 14.06 114.52 1992/09/28
836265 9 Zocor 40 mg 40mg TAB 30 Simvastatin 149.16 20.8 170.04 1997/11/24
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APPENDIX 3 
 
THE ECONOMICS OF PARALLEL TRADE IN PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS 
Revised Summary for WTO-WHO Workshop April 2001 Presentation, Prof FM Scherer. 
 
This contribution summarizes a longer paper by the same title which is drawn from a more 
comprehensive manuscript, "Post-TRIPS Options for Access to Patented Medicines in Developing 
Countries," written jointly with Jayashree Watal.  Copies of the complete parallel trade paper will 
be available at the workshop.  The conclusions in this version are my own and not necessarily those 
of Mrs. Watal.   
 
Let me begin by addressing a semantic muddle.  Various workshop contributions speak of "equity 
pricing," "tiered pricing," and "differential pricing."  There is a century-old tradition in economics 
of calling the subject on which we focus "discriminatory pricing." I prefer to be precise but 
politically incorrect and abide by that tradition.  I will also refer to a special case known as Ramsey 
pricing (named after British economist Frank Ramsey, 1903-30) and propose that there are good 
reasons for using that term, since the concept characterizes the kind of pricing that, we shall see, is 
in a particular sense ideal for international price formation in pharmaceuticals. 
 
Parallel trade occurs when a product covered by intellectual property rights in Nation A is exported 
to and re-sold in another Nation B without the rights holder's authorization.  The incentive for its 
occurrence is a sufficient difference in prices between the two nations to cover shipping and 
transaction costs and still offer gains to both the shipper and the Nation B buyer.  It is therefore a 
form of arbitrage.  For it to occur, there must be underlying monopoly power and/or market 
imperfections, among which patent protection figures most prominently, exploited by the original 
seller through a strategy of price discrimination.  Adjudicating parallel trade disputes using WTO's 
disputes resolution procedure was expressly excluded in the compromises struck when the Uruguay 
Round Treaty was concluded, so the legality of barriers to parallel trade depends upon national 
laws, which are only required to confer most-favored nation treatment.   
 
My longer paper shows in detail why, in two nations that are identical except in incomes per capita, 
the demand curves for a pharmaceutical product can differ because of what economic theory calls 
an income effect.  The demand curve in the rich nation is steeper and (admitting possible 
exceptions) less price-elastic than the demand curve in the less affluent nation.  Assuming similarity 
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of production and distribution cost functions, this difference in demand curve elasticities leads a 
profit-maximizing firm with some monopoly power to charge a higher price in the rich nation than 
in the poorer nation.  If forced to charge the same price in both nations, the firm's profits will be 
lower, and under conditions that plausibly mirror the distinctions between rich and poor nations, the 
firm required to quote uniform prices may choose to set its price so high that there are no sales in 
the less affluent market.  Thus, discriminatory pricing facilitates selling pharmaceutical products in 
less affluent markets at lower prices than would otherwise be charged, and it may make the 
difference between having the product available in the developing country market and not having it 
at all.  It cannot ensure that sales will occur in the less affluent nation, for if demand is so weak that 
no feasible price is high enough to cover production and distribution costs, the market will implode 
to a zero - supply equilibrium.  In such cases, charity or government financing of drug purchases 
are the only viable alternatives.  Watal and I have shown in our Postª TRIPS paper that certain 
interpretations of the U.S. federal income tax laws make it profitable for pharmaceutical companies 
to donate free supplies to charitable organizations.   
 
For those who are concerned with ensuring that the citizens of less-developed nations have 
affordable access to patented pharmaceuticals, discriminatory price-setting is intrinsically attractive.  
But economic analysis makes a stronger statement.  When a large block of fixed costs must be 
recovered -- in the case of new pharmaceutical products, the costs sunk for research, development, 
and clinical testing -- setting prices lower in highª elasticity markets (i.e., in low-income nations) 
than in lowª elasticity markets confers the further advantage that those fixed costs can be recovered 
with minimal distortion to the efficiency of resource allocation.  That is, with so-called Ramsey 
pricing, the fixed costs can be recovered with the smallest feasible reduction of the summed 
surpluses retained by consumers and producers.  In the case of constrained Ramsey pricing, prices 
will be elevated only enough to ensure recovery of the desired fixed costs.  With unconstrained 
Ramsey pricing, i.e., with the elevation of prices above marginal costs being proportional to the 
inverse of the affected markets' demand elasticities, resource allocation will be relatively efficient 
while maximizing the amount of funds inducing future research and development.  Such pricing 
comes about as close as one can hope in an imperfect world to having one's cake and eating it.   
 
The distinction between constrained and unconstrained Ramsey pricing is an important one.  
Professor Danzon appears to believe that the profits of pharmaceutical firms are constrained by 
price competition among themselves.  Wholly apart from the fact that such competition was not the 
sort of constraint Ramsey and his followers had in mind, I am skeptical of the Danzon argument for 
 134
two reasons.  For one, the detailed market structures within which pharmaceutical firms find 
themselves competing vary enormously, from situations (such as with Diflucan) in which there is 
no good substitute therapy for certain indications, to those in which several different patented 
molecules offer essentially the same therapy, and from there to those in which good generic 
alternatives exist.  It is impossible to know whether the "right" degree of constraint arises from such 
a heterogeneous set of market structures.  Also, economic theory and studies of actual pricing 
strategies reveal that competition among substitute patented products with differing characteristics 
may lead to price increases, rather than the price restraint assumed by Professor Danzon.  My belief 
that unconstrained Ramsey pricing may be "good enough" is rooted in the assumption that when 
firms compete for market position and profits by investing aggressively in research and 
development (a phenomenon known as rent-seeking), pricing behavior that maximizes the profit 
pool also maximizes the stimulus to R&D investment, which, again admitting possible exceptions, 
is on the whole to be encouraged.   
 
My longer paper then explores three cases in which Ramsey pricing will fail, or at least, fail to have 
these desirable properties.  All are related to parallel trade.   
 
Because parallel trade arbitrages price differences by diverting products from low-price to high-
price markets, it can undermine attempts to maintain a system of discriminating prices.  This has 
two adverse consequences.  First, it will erode profits in the higher-price markets, lessening the 
contribution those markets make to the recovery of fixed (i.e., research and development) costs.  
Second, profit-maximizing firms will react to the diversion of products from high-elasticity, low-
price markets by reducing their supply to those markets, raising prices there and perhaps 
(depending upon demand curve shapes and the magnitude of parallel trade) choosing not to supply 
them at all.  Since this works to the disadvantage of low-income nations, one might reasonably 
support national laws or international covenants that prevent parallel exportation of pharmaceutical 
products supplied at low discriminatory prices within less-developed nations.   
 
Second, the attractive logic of Ramsey pricing may vanish if the market for pharmaceutical 
products within a low-income nation can be segmented into two (or more) groups:  an affluent 
minority, often well-covered by health insurance, with a low price elasticity of demand, and another 
group (comprising the majority of low-income nations' population) with little ability to pay and 
high price elasticity of demand.  Multinational pharmaceutical companies may find it more 
profitable to supply only the affluent minority, in which case prices in the low-income nation will 
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be much higher than one would expect under Ramsey pricing with homogeneous demand.  To deal 
with such cases, nations characterized (e.g., under United Nations criteria) as less-developed should 
not be denied the opportunity to engage in parallel importation from other nations in which prices 
are lower.   
 
Third, national price controls can undermine the logic of discriminatory world market pricing.  
Then nations may be the origin of parallel exports not because prices have been kept low under a 
Ramsey pricing rationale, but because local governments have exerted their price-restraining 
power.  When this happens, individual nations will end up paying less than their Ramseyª optimal 
contribution to cover research and development costs.  In addition, the pharmaceutical 
manufacturer may react to the diversion of product from the price-controlled market by reducing its 
supplies into that market.  If parallel exports continue nevertheless, there will be welfare-reducing 
product shortages in the market from which the parallel exports originate.  Recognizing these 
difficulties, it might be necessary to prohibit parallel exports from national markets subjected to 
price controls, especially when the receiving market is an affluent industrialized nation.     
 
Further complications can arise under so-called "reference price control" regimes that take as the 
benchmark for setting controlled prices the lower price charged in some other nation.  If 
discriminatorily low prices in low-income markets are the external reference, pharmaceutical 
producers will respond rationally by reducing the supply of drugs to the low-income markets and 
increasing prices there, or perhaps discontinuing supply to those low-income markets altogether.  
Since this is plainly undesirable, price control systems using low-income nations' prices as an 
external reference benchmark should be strongly discouraged.  Because this may conflict with the 
narrow national interest of the price-controlling jurisdiction, such a prohibition is likely to be 
accomplished only through an international accord.   
 
There appears to be considerable uncertainty as to whether pharmaceutical manufacturers actually 
try to set their prices across diverse national markets in conformity with the idealized Ramsey 
pricing guidelines.  If they did, we should expect to see lower prices for a given product in low-
income markets than in high-income markets, other conditions being held equal.    
 
Jayashree Watal and I have assembled a database providing insight into this hypothesis for certain 
drugs used in combating AIDS.  From the leading collector of data on pharmaceutical product sales, 
we have obtained information on sales revenues and quantities sold for 15 AIDS anti-retrovirals in 
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18 nations with low or intermediate per-capita incomes over the years 1995 through 1995.  The 
nations or national groupings comprise Argentina, Brazil, Central America, Chile, Colombia, the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, French West Africa, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the 
Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  For most of the nations, the sales 
covered are at the wholesale level to retail outlets, but for four of the nations, sales to hospitals are 
also included.  Excluded from the data set are donations or other sales at especially low prices to 
national procurement authorities.  Average wholesale prices for each of 586 nation-product-year 
triplets could be derived by dividing sales revenue by the number of units sold, the latter expressed 
as standardized daily dose quantities.  These standardized prices were then expressed as a ratio of 
the Red Book wholesale list prices for the same products in the United States.  The ratios derived in 
this way are called U.S. price relatives.   
 
Figure 3 attached plots the price relatives for 461 nation-product-year triplets attributable to 
multinational pharmaceutical companies.  (The average price relatives for the 125 triplets from 
companies not known to be multinationals were on average 14 percent lower than those of the 
multinationals plotted in Figure 3.)  In 98 of the 461 cases plotted in Figure 3, price relatives were 
higher, and sometimes much higher, in the less-developed nations covered by our sample than the 
unit value implying parity with U.S. wholesale list prices.  The average of all 461 price relatives 
was 0.847, suggesting that on average, prices in our sample of low- and medium-income nations 
were lower than wholesale list prices in the United States.  This finding must be amended by 
recognition that there is extensive discounting of actual transaction prices in the United States 
below published Red Book values -- assuming typical current experience, in the range of 15 to 25 
percent off list.  Thus, prices of AIDS anti-retrovirals in the 18 nations were on average at about the 
same level as those prevailing in the much more affluent United States.   
 
A regression analysis of the multinational drug product price relatives yielded two noteworthy 
further insights.  First, there was a systematic tendency for the price relatives in our sample nations 
to fall over time -- by about seven percentage points per year.  Thus, in 1995, prices in our sample 
of 18 low- and medium-income nations were on average above those prevailing in the United 
States, assuming that discounting in the United States then was of about the same magnitude as it 
has been recently, but by 1999, they had been reduced to average levels below those prevailing in 
the United States.  Second, there was a weak overall tendency for price relatives in the lowest-
income nations to be below those for the high-income members of our sample.  However, that 
tendency eroded with the passage of time so that by 1999, the correlation between per-capita 
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income (measured in purchasing power parity terms) and price relatives was close to zero.  Since 
the Ramsey pricing hypothesis predicts that price relatives should rise systematically with income 
per capita, it would appear that the multinational pharmaceutical companies have moved away from 
finely-tuned discriminatory pricing strategies toward cruder but more extensive discounting relative 
to the United States in less affluent nations.  Nevertheless, the main impression conveyed both by 
the scatter diagram presented as Figure 3 and the regression analysis is one of enormous 
unsystematic variation reflecting idiosyncratic pricing policy variations not adequately explained by 
our data.  Absent evidence to the contrary, these unsystematic variations would appear to suggest 
that the pricing of AIDS drugs by multinational pharmaceutical companies conforms at best poorly 
to the Ramsey strictures we have suggested as a rough ideal.  
 
To be sure, our data set ends with price observations for 1999.  Since then there have been 
important new developments as multinational pharmaceutical companies have offered large price 
concessions on AIDS drugs in some low-income nations.  Frank Ramsey's spirit may yet smile 
approvingly from its exalted place in economist's heaven.    
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APPENDIX 4     Presentation to PHrMA by Prof Mary J Ruwart, November 2004. 
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Appendix 5 
Competition Commission Finds GSK and BI in Contravention of the 
Competition Act 
 
16 October 2003 
 
The Treatment Action Campaign welcomes the statement below by the Competition Commission. 
Just over a year ago, Hazel Tau and 10 others lodged a complaint at the Competition Commission 
against GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer Ingelheim for excessive pricing of their antiretroviral 
medicines. The Competition Commission has now decided to refer this matter to the Competition 
Tribunal for adjudication.  
 
The 11 complainants are: COSATU, the TAC, CEPPWAWU, Hazel Tau, Nontsikelelo Zwedala, 
Sindiswa Godwana, Sue Roberts, Isaac Skosana, William Mmbara, Steve Andrews and Francois 
Venter. Two additional parties joined the complaint in February 2003, the AIDS Consortium and a 
TAC volunteer who subsequently died of AIDS in June .  
 
For questions on the Competition Commission case, please contact Jonathan Berger on 011 717 
8600 or 083 419 5779, or Fatima Hassan on 083 279 9962. 
 
We reprint the Competition Commission Statement below. 
 
Fact Sheet on the Competition Commission case last updated in October 2002. 
Price of Life: a booklet by the AIDS Law Project on the Competition Commission case. 
MEDIA RELEASE FROM THE COMPETITION COMMISSION  
 
16 October 2003 
Competition Commission finds pharmaceutical firms in contravention of the Competition Act 
 
The Competition Commission has found that pharmaceutical firms GlaxoSmithKline South Africa 
(Pty) Ltd (GSK) and Boehringer Ingelheim (BI) have contravened the Competition Act of 1998. 
The firms have been found to have abused their dominant positions in their respective anti-
retroviral (ARV) markets. 
 
In particular the Commission has found the firms have engaged in the following restrictive 
practices: 
 
1.Denied a competitor access to an essential facility 
2. Excessive pricing 
3.Engaged in an exclusionary act 
 140
 
The Commission has decided to refer the matter to the Competition Tribunal for determination. 
 
Menzi Simelane, Commissioner at the Competition Commission, says," Our investigation revealed 
that each of the firms has refused to license their patents to generic manufacturers in return for a 
reasonable royalty. We believe that this is feasible and that consumers will benefit from cheaper 
generic versions of the drugs concerned. We further believe that granting licenses would provide 
for competition between firms and their generic competitors." 
 
"We will request the Tribunal to make an order authorising any person to exploit the patents to 
market generic versions of the respondents patented medicines or fixed dose combinations that 
require these patents, in return for the payment of a reasonable royalty. In addition, we will 
recommend a penalty of 10% of the annual turnover of the respondents' ARVs in South Africa for 
each year that they are found to have violated the Act." 
 
Simelane said these practices violate the Competition Act of 1998's prohibitions against excessive 
pricing (section 8(a)), refusing access to essential facilities (section 8(b)) and exclusionary acts that 
have an anticompetitive effect that outweighs technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive 
gains (section 8(c). 
 
"Indeed the very goals of our Competition Act - promoting development, providing consumers with 
competitive prices and product choices, advancing social and economic welfare and correcting 
structural imbalances - have been made difficult in this context by the refusal of the respondents to 
license patents." 
 
The original complaint in this matter was filed by Hazel Tau and others alleging that GSK and BI 
were charging excessive prices to the detriment of consumers for their patented ARV medicines.  
 
GSK and BI hold patents on certain antiretroviral (ARV) medications used to treat HIV/AIDS.  
GSK holds patents in South Africa on AZT (branded as Retrovir), Lamivudine (branded as 3TC) 
and AZT/Lamivudine (branded as Combivir).  BI holds patents in South Africa on Nevirapine 
(NVP) (branded as Viramune). 
 
ENDS 
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